

AN ACCOUNT
OF THE
WAR, IN PORTUGAL,
BETWEEN
DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL.

BY ♦
ADMIRAL CHARLES NAPIER.

VOL. I.

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TO
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
PRINCE AUGUSTUS FREDERICK,
DUKE OF SUSSEX,
&c. &c. &c.

I dedicate this work to your Royal Highness,
because you are the friend of Portugal and of
freedom.

I have the honour to be,

Your Royal Highness's

Most obedient servant,

CHARLES NAPIER.

*Merchistoun-Hall, Horndean,
5th July, 1836.*

P R E F A C E.

VARIOUS accounts have been given of the war in Portugal, both by French and English officers who served in the armies of the Queen and of Don Miguel, but they relate chiefly the operations which came under their own observation, and touch little on what was going on in other parts of the country.

I have endeavoured to give an impartial account of the whole war, praising and blaming where it is due without favour or

affection. I am not accustomed to write histories or prefaces, therefore the less I say the better—the reader may judge for himself.

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WAR OF SUCCESSION

IN

PORTUGAL,

ETC. ETC.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN Dom John of Portugal died, Dom Pedro, the Emperor of the Brazils, abdicated the crown of Portugal, and presented to that kingdom his daughter Donna Maria de Gloria, a minor, and a constitutional charter, which was brought to Lisbon by Lord Stuart de Rothesay. The princess Isabel Maria was appointed Regent. Dom Miguel had been banished from Portugal for having conspired against his father, and had resided

for some time at the court of Vienna. During Isabel Maria's regency, a rebellion broke out against the government, at the head of which was the Marquis de Chaves, supported by the court of Spain.

Mr. Canning, then minister, at the request of the Regent sent a small army to Portugal to defend that kingdom from foreign aggression. This demonstration checked the rebellion, and put an end to Spanish interference. Shortly after this Donna Maria was affianced to Don Miguel, who was created Licut.-General of the kingdom, and proceeded to Lisbon from this country, having pledged himself to the Emperor of Austria and the King of England to preserve the charter, and marry the young queen, as had been settled by his brother Dom Pedro.

This faithless prince had hardly set his foot on Portuguese ground ere he began to pave the way for usurpation, by displacing all the constitutional officers, and appointing creatures of his own in their places. This was followed by dissolving the constitutional Cortes, and assembling the old Cortes of the kingdom, who proclaimed him absolute king. Mr. Canning in the meantime died ; the Duke of Wellington came to the head of the administration ;

and the British army remained tame spectators of the treachery of Miguel, with orders even to protect his person, and finally embarked for England, leaving suffering Portugal to be ruled by the iron hand of despotism.

The troops at Oporto declared against the usurper, and the chiefs of the constitutional party, who had withdrawn from Portugal, now returned, and put themselves at the head of the army, who were near Coimbra; they were defeated, and retired to Oporto, from whence many embarked; others retreated on the Minho, crossed over to Spain, and laid down their arms. Neither talent nor energy was displayed by the constitutional party, and they became an easy prey to the absolutists. The regiments stationed in the island of Terceira remained faithful to the Queen, and to that bulwark of Portuguese liberty many of the Constitutionlists repaired.

Saldanha, and a part of the refugees who had taken shelter at Plymouth, in endeavouring to get to Terceira, were driven back by two frigates sent by the existing government, who fired into one of his transports, killing one or two men,

and obliged them to proceed to Brest. Terceira, nevertheless, remained faithful. The Count Villa Flor proceeded to that island, and arrived in time to defeat a formidable force sent by Don Miguel to reduce it to obedience ; he was followed by the Marquis Palmella and many respectable officers ; and a regency was formed, consisting of Palmella, Villa Flor, and Guerreiro. The island was fortified, and by great exertions, and with the assistance of their friends in France, England, and the Brazils, they managed to keep up a respectable force, always looking forward to some happy occurrence in their favour. The French Revolution in July, 1830, was the first light that dawned upon them : this was followed by a change of ministry in England.

The obstinacy of Don Miguel, in refusing an amnesty, had prevented his being recognized by the Duke of Wellington's administration : in a despatch from Zea Bermudez to Count Montalegre, found in the Foreign Office at Lisbon, he relates a conversation with his grace, in which the latter distinctly stated that it was quite impossible for the powers of Europe who had already acknowledged Donna

Maria as the rightful Queen of Portugal, to recognize Don Miguel, unless he granted an amnesty without any exception, as the adherents of the Queen had relied on the justness of her cause in consequence of her being acknowledged, and to abandon them to the mercy of Don Miguel was quite impossible; but that, in the event of a full amnesty being granted, a minister would be shortly sent to Lisbon in a ship of the line, accompanied, if necessary, by two frigates, and a corvette to Oporto. His grace further warned them of the danger of delay, and pointed out the regency of Terceira as the quarter from whence a blow would be struck, which might throw the whole peninsula into a state of anarchy and confusion. The sequel has proved what a true prophet the duke was.

Previously to the change of ministry in England, several British vessels had been most unjustifiably captured off the Western Islands, and I was sent to Lisbon in the *Galatea*, with orders to the consul-general to insist on restitution, and two frigates proceeded to the Western Islands to restrain such lawless proceedings. In 1831 fresh insults were offered to England and France: the

former sent a force to the Tagus, and obtained redress, but it was refused to the French, till a squadron forced the river, dictated terms to the usurper, and deprived him of the ships that were at that time considered serviceable. A frigate was also sent to the Western Islands, and one of the two Portuguese corvettes on that station was captured. These events were not looked upon with indifference at Terceira: great exertions were made to equip an expedition, two small schooners were armed, forced loans had recourse to, the bells were melted down and converted into money, and every means that a government reduced to despair could think of, were employed to profit by the present circumstances and extend the Queen's authority over the Azorean Archipelago.

Representations were made by the British inhabitants that their lives and properties would be endangered in the event of an attack, as they were, generally speaking, disliked by the Miguelite party, who would profit by the confusion and make them suffer for their favourable feelings towards the Constitutionalists. The English in all foreign settlements are extremely sensitive of

danger, and generally cry out before they are hurt. Nevertheless the government determined on affording them protection. I still commanded the *Galatea*, had just returned from the West Indies, and was sent upon this service. On my arrival at St. Michael's, early in June, I found the *Druid* lying there; she had been ordered to touch at that island on her way to the Brazils, and to await my arrival. The expedition from *Terceira* had already sailed and taken possession of the islands of St. George and Pico, and were making preparations to attack *Fayal*.

After consulting with the consul-general, Mr. Reid, and paying my respects to Vice-Admiral Prega, the captain-general, (who, though a Miguelite, was a worthy man, and had refrained from all unnecessary cruelties to those who differed with him in politics, though fully authorized by Miguel's government to be summary in his proceedings with his enemies,) I proceeded to *Terceira*, and was received with great kindness by the Marquis Palmella and Mr. Guerreiro, two of the regency: the Count Villa Flor, the other member, was absent with the expedition. I at once explained to the

duke the purport of my visit, that my orders were to be perfectly neutral, and that I trusted he would take care not to oblige me to interfere with English vessels employed in his service, as complaints had already been made by the owners of one that had been impressed by the regency and lost. I gave him to understand that I should not prevent either party from hiring English vessels, but that no warlike operation could be carried on with them under the sanction of the British flag.

After this interview I proceeded to Fayal. The governor and garrison were in great alarm, as an attack was hourly expected, and the corvette had been driven from her anchorage by bad weather. I also learned that Don Pedro had touched at Fayal in the *Volage*, on his way to England, having abdicated the imperial crown of the Brazils. This intelligence gave fresh vigour to the hopes of the Constitutionalists, but still they hesitated long and were extremely dilatory. In the meantime the governor became more alarmed, and on the arrival of the corvette abandoned the island, leaving more than half the garrison behind him, becalmed in an American brig, which was captured by the

Count Villa Flor in his passage across. After arranging the government of Fayal, the Count returned to Terceira, organized another expedition, and took St. Michaels on the 2nd of July, and subsequently the whole of the islands. The cause of the Queen now began to brighten, and the regency already talked of fitting out an expedition to attack the usurper in Portugal. My opinion of how that attack ought to have been made is to be found in the United Service Journal of 1832, and was as follows:—

“ The only sure manner of settling the Portuguese question, is by dashing right up the Tagus, and carrying the capital by storm. The defences of the river are no doubt strong, but with a fair wind and strong current, they would be soon passed. The Portuguese artillery, though of high reputation in the Peninsular war, have not had much practice lately; every shot does not hit, and every shot that hits is not between wind and water; and if the guns on shore were divided between all the ships that form the expedition, there will not be more than half a dozen for each. It must also be remembered, that, in the event of a check, any

number of ships may anchor in the Tagus out of shot from all sides ; and with a squadron before the town having 8000 troops on board, the inhabitants of Lisbon do not rise *en masse*, they cannot be favourable to Donna Maria ; if unfavourable, that force on shore in any part of Portugal could never dethrone Don Miguel. With a larger force they could not carry on a defensive war in the provinces of Minho and Douro in the first instance, it is not likely they can carry on an offensive war with a smaller one now."

Shortly after the capture of the islands the marquis Palmella came to England, and concerted measures with the Emperor for attacking the Usurper. Captain Sartorius volunteered to command the naval expedition, and two indifferent frigates were purchased and fitted out in the Thames as far as the Foreign Enlistment Bill would permit ; but notwithstanding all their precautions, they met with many difficulties, and one was seized in the Downs and detained for some time, but on reference to the proper authorities she was given up. Several naval officers accompanied Captain Sartorius for a summer cruize, as

they expected ; and the frigates proceeded to Belle Isle, there to be equipped as ships of war. Men were forwarded from this country to that port, and after a series of blunders, bad management, and bad faith to the crews, the queen's agents succeeded in manning them ; and on the 10th of February the Emperor embarked on board the *Rainha* with Sartorius, who was made a vice-admiral, and arrived at St. Michael's on the 22d. Colonel Hodges, who commanded the English auxiliary force, accompanied the Emperor ; the *Donna Maria*, and several vessels with men and stores followed.

A loan had been negotiated in England, and M. Mendizabal, a Spaniard by birth, was charged with the financial arrangements. Few men possessed more talents for raising money than this active-minded individual, and few men knew less how to take care of it, or were more liable to be imposed upon by the numerous agents he was obliged to employ. The very nature of the service required the assistance of charlatans and intriguers, who distinguished themselves by the

honourable name of friends of the cause, and in this capacity they risked much, and robbed more.

The Emperor, in his passage to the Western Islands, had not shewn any particular partiality to his British auxiliaries; in short, he had been persuaded by those about him that his presence in Portugal was only necessary to the success of the Queen's cause, and Portuguese jealousy of foreigners and consequent intrigue began with the expedition, and continued throughout the arduous struggle. At St. Michael's the Emperor was well received by the inhabitants, and much pleased at the military appearance of the eighteenth regiment and fifth caçadores, who formed the garrison of the island, of which Count D'Alva was the governor.

A few days after the landing of the Emperor, the rest of the expedition arrived; and on the 4th of March they all rendezvoused in Angra roads, in the island of Terceira. The Emperor immediately landed under the salutes of the squadron and castle, was received with every mark of joy and respect, and proceeding to the

palace, took the constitutional oath and assumed the regency, which was ceded to him by the Dukes of Palmella, Terceira, and Guerreiro. He afterwards heard mass at the cathedral; salutes and fireworks had been going off all day; and in the evening the town was brilliantly illuminated. Although the island of Terceira had been the seat of government, it was far from being a constitutional island: indeed the heavy contributions levied upon them by the regency had cured their constitutional feelings, if they ever possessed any. St. Michael's and Fayal, on the other hand, who had been ruled by the usurping government, cherished tolerably strong feelings in favour of the Queen's cause.

CHAPTER II.

DON PEDRO now formed his administration, which consisted of Palmella for Foreign Affairs and Interior; Freire, War and Marine; Mouzinho de Silveira, Finance and Justice. The former, well known in Europe as a statesman, had been the rallying point of the Constitutionalists, and head of the regency; the second had been President of the Cortes, an ultra-liberal, was a man of neither military genius or talent, had every thing to gain and nothing to lose: he had lived quietly at Paris, free from danger and responsibility. The latter had been confined in St. Julian's, and was a man highly respected in his native country. Besides the ministers, there were several influential

men around the Emperor:—Candido Xavier, his first aid-de-camp and private secretary; a cunning old fox, who preferred that place to a portfolio: he had served in the French army against his country in the Peninsular War, and had been Minister of War before the return of Miguel.* He had bad health, bad manners, and was altogether a bad-looking man; but with all these imperfections, he was a first-rate favourite of the Emperor's. Silva Carvallo had been Minister of Justice, was apparently frank, fancied he knew a great deal of the feeling of his countrymen, and was of opinion that not a hostile shot would be fired on Portuguese ground. The Duke of Terceira was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, and M. Guerreiro, the other member of the regency, remained unemployed and neglected. The Marquis Palmella was much blamed for associating himself with Freire, and either ought to have refused office or insisted on the formation of his own ministry; and the sequel will shew this was not the only error committed by the Marquis.

The first political act of the ministry was

abolishing the lay-tithes, which obliged every peasant to pay the government a tenth of his poultry and other domestic property. This was a wise measure and very acceptable to the poor. The tithe of fish to the clergy was also abolished : this also was another popular act with the people, but necessarily the contrary with the clergy. Then followed the dismissal of the friars from the monasteries, and the seizure of their property, allowing them a small pension, the payment of which was very uncertain. The convents were also thrown open, and the nuns so inclined were allowed to return to their families, an annual stipend being allowed them. One nunnery was permitted in each island, for those whose religious feelings induced them to remain. That both monasteries and nunneries in these islands required reforming, is beyond a doubt ; but taking this opportunity of disgusting the clergy, and wounding the religious feelings of a bigotted people, at a moment when they ought to have been conciliated, pretty clearly proves the impolicy and incapacity of the Emperor's advisers : their whole

energies should have been employed to render the expedition perfect, leaving reform till the Queen's authority was established in Portugal.

The English auxiliaries, as might be expected from the nature of their composition, on their arrival at Terceira broke out into every sort of irregularity ; and Colonel Hodges very judiciously obtained permission from the Count Villa Flor to remove them to Praya, a distant part of the island, and there he was indefatigable in reducing them to order, and bringing them to a proper state of discipline, which, considering the inefficiency of the greater part of the inferior officers, was a matter of no inconsiderable difficulty. This was augmented by the want of clothing and shoes, which had not yet been supplied.

One of the first plans taken into consideration by the ministry was the propriety of immediately sending an expedition of three thousand men against the island of Madeira. This was supported by Palmella, and opposed by Freire, and with reason. The acquisition of Madeira, could it have been immediately obtained, would have added to the resources of the constitutional

party, but if successfully defended, as there was every reason to expect, the whole summer would have been lost, and the little money they possessed frittered away. Winter would have left the squadron without a harbour; discontent would have got into both services; and the Queen's cause would have been lost. Had it been thought advisable to attack Madeira, it ought to have been done with the whole naval and military force on their way to the coast of Portugal: this would have rendered success certain, and saved time.

An expedition of this sort was, however, never contemplated by the minister, but one of the most ridiculous nature was decided upon, and orders were actually given on the 6th of March to carry it into execution. This was no other than for Admiral Sartorius to embark in the Donna Maria, Villa Flor brig, and Terceira schooner, Hodges's unclothed, unarmed, and undisciplined battalion, and proceed off Madeira to summon the garrison to surrender, and in the event of refusal to land his men on the barren rock of Porto Santo, where there was neither food, raiment, or shelter. The proposition was made to Colonel Hodges by the

Marquis Palmella, who was soon convinced of the folly of such an enterprize. Freire, however, was not so easily persuaded, and as he had before opposed an expedition of three thousand men, I verily believe this sapient minister of war, impressed with the idea that Portugal was to be gained without difficulty, actually conceived this plan to get altogether rid of the English; whom he thoroughly detested; for I am convinced, had he entertained the least idea that this expedition would have led to the surrender of Madeira, he never would have allowed the foreigners to have reaped the honours of the enterprize.

Another council was held in the evening: the Quixotic expedition was given up, and admiral Sartorius was ordered with the Donna Maria, Villa Flor brig, and a company of caçadores, to make a demonstration off Madeira, and was accompanied by Mouzinho de Albuquerque.

From the moment the Emperor arrived in the island, he evinced the most indefatigable activity in making preparations for the expedition. The force at Terceira consisted of the third, sixth, and tenth of the line; the volunteers of Donna Maria,

in which Don Thomas de Mello, a member of one of the oldest Portuguese families, and many others served as privates; the second and third caçadores; a corps of about two hundred students from Coimbra; and the artillery. The greater part of the troops as well as officers wore long beards, with which custom the Emperor also complied.

The men were well clothed and appointed, with the exception of the British regiment, who were nearly naked, and when their clothing arrived from England, it was actually refused to be delivered to them till a duty of fifteen per cent. was paid upon it; and although the general as well as Colonel Hodges remonstrated with the minister-at-war, the only answer they could obtain was, that the British being an auxiliary force, paid by the commission in London, they must also pay the duty, and the British regiment was actually kept four weeks naked before the minister-at-war would consent to clothe his own troops. This was a beginning of the follies of that most incapable minister.

In the beginning of April the Emperor visited

Fayal, where the squadron was refitting. In this island he was received with much enthusiasm. Balls and parties were given, at all of which he made a rule of attending, and danced continually, that being his favourite amusement.

After reviewing the troops and examining the arsenal and ships, which required four days, he returned to Terceira. On the 15th he reviewed the English battalions, which now had a very military appearance, expressed himself satisfied, but did not give out the usual complimentary order he had been in the habit of issuing to the native regiments.

The foreign corps were certainly not favourites with the government ; they made no allowances for the dissolute habits of British soldiers, nor did they reflect that it was impossible to establish the same discipline over auxiliaries, as can be done over regular troops, particularly when the agreement made with them was frequently unexecuted. Want of pay led to discontent, and selling their necessaries ; the soldiers became dissatisfied with the government, and the government in their turn with the soldiers, without reflecting that breach

of faith was the cause of the soldiers' irregularity. A battalion of five hundred French now arrived. Amongst them were many old soldiers decorated with the Legion of Honour, and the medal of the July Revolution. After a long voyage they were unwisely ordered to St. Michael's, thereby occasioning a great deal of discontent, indeed mutiny; and the Emperor, who had gone on board to inspect them, was glad to get on shore, much less pleased with the behaviour of the French than he had been with the English. Neither the pay nor the allowances of the French were equal to the British, which was another cause of discontent.

On the 20th of April Admiral Sartorius returned in the *Villa Flor*, having left the *Donna Maria* and *Terceira* schooner off Madeira, and the company of caçadores under the command of Mouzinho de Albuquerque at Porto Santo. The governor having refused to surrender, as might have been expected, Admiral Sartorius was of opinion, had a force of two thousand five hundred men been sent there, the island would have been

given up ; but from the steady manner in which the governor held it to the last, assisted by the inhabitants, who were almost all Miguelites, I am disposed to think he was mistaken.

The Emperor having decided that the whole of the expedition should collect at St. Michael's, Admiral Sartorius proceeded to Fayal, and the necessary orders were given for that purpose. The Donna Maria and Terceira schooner, together with the company of caçadores, were recalled from Porto Santo, and on the 7th of May, the Emperor, his ministers, and suite proceeded to that island in the Superb Steamer, the Count Villa Flor and his staff having preceded him.

The greater part of the troops from Terceira were already there. The British, the Sacred battalion, composed of officers of all ranks old and young, the corps of Guides, and the artillery remained at Terceira, waiting for transports. On the 24th the Emperor returned to that island, highly dissatisfied at the tardiness in embarking these corps, and having given positive orders for their immediate embarkation, proceeded to Fayal for the same purpose ; it was not before the 29th of May

that the whole of the armament was collected at St. Michael's.

During the stay in the Western Islands, the Emperor's activity was unabated: he was regent, general, and admiral; sometimes he did good and sometimes harm; but he knew his countrymen; and with all his faults, had it not been for his activity, the expedition never would have left the Islands.

The army was now organized under their respective chiefs. Colonel Brito commanded the first division; Fonseca the second; Swalbach the light division; brigadier Cabreira the artillery; major Serra the engineers; and Count D'Alva the cavalry, that is to say, when they were to be found, for none embarked from St. Michael's.

On the 6th of June the Emperor reviewed his forces, consisting of six thousand five hundred men. The park of artillery consisted of 3 nines, 6 sixes, and 4 three-pounders, with three five-and-a-half-inch howitzers, well organized. This little army was certainly well-appointed in every respect, and well-officered; but the troops of which it was composed were not entirely to be depended upon;

one half had been recruited in the islands, and taken from the different Miguelite garrisons who had surrendered.

On the 20th of June the army was assembled on parade, and high mass performed in the most imposing manner. This finished, the embarkation commenced, and was completed the following day. The Emperor had embarked on the 19th on board the *Amelia* yacht, fitted out for his reception, and was most active in assisting Admiral Sartorius in his arrangement. He was the only Portuguese I ever saw who did not understand *Amanha* (to-morrow), the common answer of Portuguese, even on the most pressing occasions, when decision is necessary; indeed, do nothing to-day that can be done to-morrow is the leading feature of the Portuguese character, and never will they become a nation till that word is banished from their dictionary.

General Vasconcelles was appointed governor of the Azores; General Saraiva prefect, with sous-prefects in the other islands, the French system of civil government having been adopted; and on the 26th the signal was made to weigh, which was

joyfully received by the whole fleet. On embarking and taking leave of the islands, the Emperor issued two heart-stirring proclamations to the inhabitants and troops.

CHAPTER III.

THE sojourn of the army had been so long in these islands, that it is natural to suppose great intimacies had been formed with the inhabitants of both sexes, and their now leaving them on a hazardous expedition, which many would never survive, called forth the warmest feelings of their nature. The amiable Countess Villa Flor, who had accompanied her husband in all his adversities, felt most deeply, as did the Marchioness of Palmella : her grief was heightened by the recent loss of her eldest son, a young man twenty-two years of age, of great promise. He died at St. Michael's of a consumption. The ladies were to retire to Paris under the protection of the Count Villa Real, who had not been invited to accompany the Emperor. The Count was a nobleman of con-

sequence in Portugal, and an experienced officer; he had served with Lord Beresford in the Peninsular war, and certainly his services ought not to have been rejected: he was a man of moderate principles, and some intrigue had probably been on foot against him.

On the 27th Admiral Sartorius, having made his arrangements, bore up for the coast of Portugal with his convoy, composed of forty-two sail of transports under the protection of the *Rainha de Portugal*, of forty-six guns, commanded by Captain Crosby, and bearing the vice-admiral's flag; the *Donna Maria*, forty-two, Captain Mins, (Bingham); the *Amelia*, the Emperor's yacht, Captain Bertram (Pryce); *Villa Flor* brig; *Terceira*, *Liberal*, *Bon Esperansa*, and *Eugenia* schooners. The *Stag*, commanded by Sir Thomas Troubridge, had arrived from Lisbon, and accompanied the expedition for four days. On the 7th of July the land was seen, and in the evening the whole convoy was close in shore with *Villa de Conde*. The Emperor and his advisers were so sanguine of meeting a favourable reception from the army and people, that Bernardo de Sa was sent on shore,

at day-light on the 8th, with a flag of truce to Villa de Conde to summon the governor either to surrender or join the liberating army. He was received with shouts of "Viva Don Miguel!" "Viva el Re absoluto!" and conducted to the head-quarters of Brigadier-general José Cardoza, who threatened to shoot him as a rebel and traitor, and only allowed him fifteen minutes to return to his boat, which he regained with considerable danger, amidst vivas for Don Miguel and hisses for himself. This had some effect in opening the eyes of Don Pedro's advisers, particularly Candido Xavier, who opposed the landing of the Emperor and staff to the last moment.

It was, however, too late to recede, and the admiral pushed the men-of-war and small craft within musket-shot of the beach abreast of the village of Mindella, the transports anchoring outside. There had been no previous arrangements made for landing by divisions, and Colonel Hodges having anchored his transport close to the flagship, got the grenadier company, with the staff and colours, into the men-of-war boats, and had the honour of being the first on shore. He was

followed by the light company under Captain Shaw, who did duty as marines on board the flag-ship. He immediately took possession of a wind-mill, situated on some high ground. Captain Staunton was detached on the right and front, and the remainder of the battalion now landing, Colonel Hodges marched them up to join Staunton, at the same time sending a detachment of forty men into a wood that stretched as far as Villa de Conde.

Count Villa Flor now landed with his staff, expressed himself pleased with the disposition of Hodges to cover the landing, but informed him the emperor was much dissatisfied at his precipitation, very naturally wishing the native troops to land first. The rest of the army were soon on shore. Colonel Schwalbach, with the second and third caçadores, moved rapidly on Lessa, while Major Xavier and the fifth caçadores menaced Villa de Conde on the left. At sunset, the greater part of the troops having disembarked, the Emperor landed.

Every thing as yet had favoured the enterprize ; fine weather and a favourable breeze had brought

them to the coast ; the water was smooth, and the landing easy,—a rare occurrence on the coast of Portugal, which is almost continually protected by a heavy surf. No enemy appeared to oppose the landing, which was effected without the loss of a man : it was indeed unaccountable that General Cordoza, who commanded an imposing force at Villa de Conde, should have remained there, a quiet spectator of the disembarkation, and still more unaccountable that a rapid movement was not made on Villa de Conde, and the army of Cordoza overturned before they had recovered from the panic with which they were struck at the appearance of so large a fleet, which they supposed contained at least 20,000 men.

I am convinced, from what I had before and have since seen of Villa Flor, that had he been left to himself, he would not have hesitated one moment ; but, unfortunately, the Emperor had timid, incapable, and intriguing counsellors about his person, who thwarted Villa Flor's operations, and he was of too mild and kind a disposition to act independent of them, and shew the Emperor that, now he was in the field, it was to his general and not to his advisers that he ought

to intrust the military operations. If, however, Cordoza shewed no activity, the priests did, and they were indefatigable and successful in persuading the country people that Don Pedro was at the head of a band of brigands for the purpose of plundering the inhabitants, and returning to the Western Islands: the whole country was in consequence abandoned by the people.

Cordoza, seeing there was no intention of attacking him, moved with great celerity on Penafiel, and General Santa Martha, who commanded the province of the Entre Minho and Douro, where were stationed twelve thousand men, abandoned Oporto in the night, with his garrison, about four thousand strong. Here began the Miguelite blunders. Santa Martha ought to have held firm at Oporto, and Cordoza should have hung on Villa Flor's rear, if he marched on Oporto, or defended Villa de Conde should he take that direction, while Santa Martha would have advanced from Oporto.

The Emperor, on landing, proceeded to Parafita, where he found the British under Hodges. They were directed to remain there till the army had passed and form the rear-guard. At three in

the morning the whole of the troops had defiled and collected at St. Pedro D'Avroga, with the exception of Schwalbach's division, which had moved on the road of Lessa.

The news of the evacuation of Oporto reached the Emperor at nine o'clock in the morning of the 9th, and he immediately put the troops in motion ; and after a severe march of five leagues, under a burning sun, the liberating army entered Oporto, the second city of Portugal, at four o'clock in the afternoon. Their reception was by no means what was expected ; a few vivas were given, and a few flowers strewed upon the Emperor's head as he passed to his quarters, which commanded a beautiful view of Villa Nova and the adjacent country. The troops were quartered in the different barracks and convents, all of which had been abandoned by the friars, who took up arms in Don Miguel's cause. The enemy occupied Villa Nova on the opposite side of the river, and very much annoyed the inhabitants in the lower part of the town.

On the 10th, the admiral anchored in Oporto roads, and pushed the small craft into the Douro,

losing a few men by the fire of musketry from Villa Nova ; and it was not before the afternoon of the 11th that Schwalbach, with the light division, was ordered to drive them out of the town at the instigation of Admiral Sartorius, the Emperor and his ministers being still impressed with the idea that not only the army, but the whole country were so attached to the cause of Donna Maria, that it was most advisable to avoid collision with the Miguelite troops. The capture of Villa Nova and the Serra convent, which the enemy abandoned and never afterwards recovered, inspired the inhabitants of Oporto with more confidence, and in the evening the town was brilliantly illuminated.

The Emperor had now been three days in Oporto, and no ulterior operations were decided on. Villa Flor, who was the most competent judge, was for pushing on at once for Coimbra, being morally certain that nothing but a forward movement would give them the smallest chance of success. No deserters had come in ; there was no appearance of defection in the army ; and every hour's delay gave the Miguelites time to recover

from their panic and ascertain the weakness of the Emperor's forces. The incapable minister-at-war was crying out for delay and organization, had no soul to advise a forward movement, was looking towards the provinces of the Minho and Douro and Tras-os-Montes for support, where the inhabitants were all Miguelites, and gave his opinion that in a week the army would declare for the Queen ;—Lisbon would be revolutionized, and the Emperor would then march in triumph to the capital. Before this gentleman had presumed to thrust himself into such an office as minister-of-war, he ought to have read the account of Buonaparte's march from Cannes ; and if he had neither head nor heart to have advised the Emperor to follow his example, he ought to have remained at Paris, and allowed his place to be filled by a bolder man.

On the 12th the light division advanced a league and a half on the Coimbra road, and Brito occupied Villa Nova with his division. The ministers amused themselves in framing laws for the government of a kingdom they did not occupy. General Cabrera was appointed governor of Tras-os-Montes, and a battalion of the 15th

regiment of the line was sent to Guimaraens to support his authority, and collect provisions and stores for the army. Don Thomas de Mascarenhas was appointed governor of the town, M. Van Zellar corregidor, and all the inferior offices were filled up with the Emperor's friends. The principal inhabitants of Oporto showed no disposition to undertake offices in the town, and the people in general seeing the weakness of the Emperor's force, and putting no confidence in his advisers, were afraid to compromise themselves. This feeling extended even to the British merchants, who were very shy in noticing any of their countrymen in Don Pedro's service.

The inactivity of the troops in Oporto restored confidence to the Miguelites, who now crossed a force over the Douro under the command of Cordoza and the Viscount Montealegre; and at one o'clock on the morning of the 17th Colonel Hodges marched with the first battalion of the fifteenth, the British battalion, and thirty mounted guides on Carvoeiro, to reconnoitre the enemy. He there learnt that they occupied Penafiel with three companies of the line and a battalion of royalist

volunteers. He then returned to Valongo, and was reinforced by the regiment of volunteers of Donna Maria of four hundred strong, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Luis Pinto de Mendosa Arraes, and two six-pounders, with orders to drive the enemy out of Penafiel if not too strong, and there wait for further directions. At three o'clock on the morning of the 19th he put his force in motion and halted at Baltar. Both in this march and that of the day before the most perfect indifference was shewn by the peasantry; they followed their usual occupations without caring, and probably without knowing, whether the troops were in favour of the Queen or Don Miguel, and very likely were not even aware that an expedition had landed at Oporto. Pushing on from Baltar, they were fired on from the surrounding heights, and the peasantry showed themselves inimical to the advanced guard; and as they approached Penafiel, the resistance became more pronounced. One friar alone presented himself; he brought intelligence that the Miguelites were in position at Penafiel supported by bands of guerillas, and were determined to fight. This

gentleman brought two horses as a present to the Emperor. At Valongo, a little in advance of where the Miguelites were posted, the guerillas opened their fire and, after discharging their pieces, fled. On the left of Penafiel the enemy were posted, resting their right on a convent; another convent in front of the town appeared fortified; the baggage-carts and mules were placed on some high ground to the right, and appeared ready to retreat; and a party of guerillas were stationed at the convent of Bostello. Through Valongo ran a deep stream with considerable velocity, having a bridge over it, and further down a ford practicable for infantry. •

Hodges now showed the heads of his columns, and threw forward his artillery; Donna Maria's volunteers attacked the enemy's right, and the fifteenth the convent in front. The British battalion moved through a valley to gain the hill, to cut off the mules and baggage, and keep the guerillas at Bostello in check; the artillery covered the attack with a brisk and well-directed fire; the conflict lasted half-an-hour; the enemy were driven from their position and retired in disorder

on Amarante, closely pressed by the Queen's troops. About two miles to the right of the town they made a stand to cover the retreat of their baggage, but were charged and driven from their position by Donna Maria's volunteers. The loss of the Miguelites was about two hundred killed and wounded, amongst whom were seven friars. There were several women in this fray, who made themselves useful in carrying off the wounded. Our loss was three killed in taking possession of the convent of Bostello, and nine died afterwards from the effects of heat and fatigue. The fifteenth regiment burnt the convent in Penafiel, and Bostello was sacked notwithstanding all Colonel Hodges' efforts to prevent it. The friars had it well stocked with all sorts of provisions and wines; but the fatigue of the troops was so great that many were absolutely incapable of enjoying the fruits of their conquest. At five o'clock Penafiel was occupied, but with the exception of about twenty persons it had been abandoned by the inhabitants, who left their houses barricaded. Strict discipline was observed, and the soldiers bivouacked in the streets.

The enemy had now passed the Douro in force, and were moving on Amarante; and at eleven at night Colonel Hodges retired on Valongo, agreeably to the orders he had received from the Count Villa Flor. Having reached Ponte Ferreira, a strong position, he there halted for a few hours, and got to Valongo at eight on the morning of the 19th, after thirty hours hard service. At four they again marched, and arrived at Oporto at eight in the evening. The fifteenth of the line had also retired from Guimaraens. Thus terminated the duties of the governor of Tras-os-Montes.

Hodges' Narrative.

On the 22d of July, at one o'clock, the fifth caçadores, the volunteers of Donna Maria, the three battalions of the eighteenth regiment, and the British battalion with four field-pieces and a howitzer, under the command of Colonel Fonseca, marched on the Valongo road, on the heights of which they arrived before day-light. The enemy were strongly posted in front of Ponte Ferreira in great force. The first battalion of the fifteenth and British battalion were in reserve on the heights of Valongo, and the fifth caçadores and

Donna Maria's volunteers, supported by a six-pounder and a howitzer, attacked the enemy, and were repulsed, losing two guns. Hodges moved the light company of the eighteenth and the British grenadiers to watch the enemy, who were in motion on the left, rapidly advancing to the point where the light troops had attacked, and who were now retiring on the Valongo road ; and he fell back on the reserve. The enemy's force now advanced on the Oporto road. Here the Count Villa Flor came up, and ordered the column to halt. An aide-de-camp from the Emperor also arrived, and ordered the column to retire on Rio Tinto, where he was posted with another division. Colonel Brito and Schwalbach had also been called from the south, and joined the main body of the army, removing the bridge. The armed volunteers were left in Oporto to defend the town.

What object was expected to be gained by this foolish attack it is not easy to conceive ; if it was meant as a reconnaissance, that would have been accomplished without attacking a very superior force strongly posted and unsupported by the

main body. The Queen's troops were few enough, and they should not have been risked where no object was to be gained. This check had a bad effect on the troops, as well as the inhabitants of Oporto.

CHAPTER IV.

THE whole army being now assembled at Rio Tinto, dispositions were made for a general attack the following day. The light division under Schwalbach was placed in the centre; Brito's division was on the right; the battalion of officers, a battalion of artillery with muskets, the third battalion of the eighteenth regiment, the French and British, composed the left wing under Hodges; the Count de Bemposta and Monsieur Lasteyrie, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, accompanied their countrymen. The whole moved from the bivouack at three in the morning. The Miguelites were posted behind the river Souza, their left protected by the high ground on the right bank of the Douro, and their right by a sugar-loaf hill, occupied by a considerable force, and one field-piece.

Hodges'
Narrative.

Major Checar, who commanded the French, was ordered to cross the ford ; he was closely followed by the British under Shaw ; two companies of the eighteenth, under Major Miranda, acted as light troops, and cleared the road in front ; the eighteenth was ordered to turn the enemy's right ; and the battalion of officers and artillery were held in reserve. The British and French soon drove the enemy from their position, and the eighteenth, instead of turning the enemy, ascended the hill unmolested.

Hodges'
Narrative.

Major Checar with a part of his battalion advanced too far in the plain, and was followed by some of the British ; a body of cavalry, hid by a hedge, now charged, and killed the major and a considerable number of the men who advanced with him. The main body of the French and British were formed under a wall skirting the wood ; the cavalry, flushed with success, rode gallantly up, and received a volley which threw them into confusion, but not before several had actually attempted to leap the wall, and were bayonetted while endeavouring to clear it. Brito's division had been ordered to attack the enemy's

left, and three several times orders were sent to that purpose by Villa Flor; but by some unaccountable mistake he did not move, and it was alleged the Emperor had ordered him not to advance, as he was menaced by the enemy's cavalry. The enemy, seeing his left was not attacked, advanced two columns to retake the position Hodges had gained, supported by clouds of guerillas on his left and in his rear. Lieutenant Mitchell was sent to the Count Villa Flor to request a reinforcement; this was supported by another request made by the Count of Beira-posta; but it was not till some time had elapsed ere the Emperor sent the third battalion of the eighteenth to his support. The hill had been abandoned, the French and British were now placed in reserve, the reinforcement was ordered to regain the hill at the point of the bayonet; at the same time Hodges led the third battalion to turn it on the left; this was done with great gallantry, many of the enemy were killed, and some prisoners taken. Thus ended the battle of Ponte Ferreira, which led to no consequences; the attack on the enemy's right was not followed up by a simultaneous movement on their left; and with the excep-

tion of the light division in the centre having driven in their outposts, no further fighting took place.

Villa Flor was not to blame; his orders were interfered with by the Emperor and those about him, who disconcerted all his plans, and prevented him reaping the advantages that he most probably would have gained, had the movements of the army been left entirely to his management. This was not the only evil, for some one of his staff sent an order to the governor of Oporto to embark the treasure and the Emperor's baggage. This order, instead of being kept secret, was publicly known, and created a great sensation in Oporto, which was increased by general Povoas taking possession of Villa Nova, and collecting boats above the Serra convent, threatened to cross over and attack Oporto, under cover of a heavy fire of musketry on the lower part of the town; and although there were three schooners in the river keeping in check the fire from Villa Nova, it had no effect in quieting their fears. Crowds of people of all ages and sexes were hurrying to the Foz, and the governor had even given orders to pull up the paving stones and

barricade the streets in the lower part of the town, and many of his friends to whom he had communicated the orders to embark the Emperor's baggage were the first to take to flight. On the return of the Emperor to Oporto, Mascarenhos was superseded, and the governorship of Oporto conferred on Bernardo de sa Nogueira, a gallant officer and one of the Emperor's aide-de-camps.

After the battle of Ponte Ferreira the enemy retired two leagues. The Queen's troops did not advance, but returned to Oporto at four o'clock on the following day, carrying green boughs in their caps as an emblem of victory. An order was issued next morning, not to thank the troops for their behaviour, but to praise Doctor Tavares for his attendance to the wounded, Padre Marco, and Paul D'Almeido, the Emperor's chamberlain.

Hodges' Narrative.

The battle of Ponte Ferreira put an end to the hopes of gaining the Queen's cause by any thing short of hard fighting. The Emperor's eyes were now opened to the perilous situation he was in; and he at length saw how little reliance was to be placed in the knowledge his advisers had of the feelings of the army. The green boughs in the

caps of his troops did not blind the inhabitants of Oporto; there were neither rejoicing nor vivas for the constitution; all seemed to have awakened from a dream, and despair was deeply depicted in their countenances.

The unnecessary retreat into Oporto after the battle of Ponte Ferreira, which ought to have been followed up by vigorous measures, as the only chance of repairing the errors already committed, was rendered still more pernicious by an attempt to destroy the whole army by setting fire to their barracks when the troops were asleep, exhausted with the fatigues of the two previous days. This infamous project was supposed to have been undertaken by three priests, who set fire, at one o'clock in the morning of the 25th, to the convent of St. Domingo, where were quartered the fifth caçadores. The flames broke out with great violence; the alarm was given, and happily the men escaped, only three losing their lives, and the colours of the regiment burnt. One of the friars was instantly put to death by the soldiers, and the other two were imprisoned, but never brought to trial, though the evidence against them was so

strong as, to leave little doubt of their guilt. It was reported that an attempt was intended to have been made against the life of the Emperor, should an opportunity offer, by a Capuchin friar, who presumed that his Majesty, with his usual activity, would be forward in assisting to subdue the fire. This, however, was only conjecture, and it never could be traced with any certainty.

The intention of offensive operations was now abandoned, and it was decided to fortify Oporto, and wait the course of events. In this undertaking the Emperor showed his usual diligence, and in this *undertaking* he was unanimously supported by all parties; there was no intriguing here: the first law of nature, self-preservation, came home to all, and perhaps this is the only instance in the whole war in which honest men and intriguers perfectly agreed. The fortifications began at the Quinta de China, touching the river, and extended all round Oporto, including the light-house and the Foz. Redoubts were thrown up on the commanding hills, the whole connected with ditches; and although of no great strength, they were sufficient, when defended by the Queen's

troops, to baffle all the attempts of the Miguelites to penetrate them. Villa Nova was not included in the defences; many were of opinion that it ought not to be neglected, but the Emperor resisted all importunities on this head, and limited himself to the defence of the Serra convent; and here he was right, for with the small force he commanded, it would have endangered the whole, had both sides of the river been garrisoned. The defence of the Serra was intrusted to Brigadier Torres, a brave old man, with Bravo for his second.

Although the Emperor was in my opinion perfectly right in not attempting to defend Villa Nova, his ministers ought to have been suspended on a gallows fifty cubits high for not removing the immense quantity of wine in the stores. It was arranged that Palmella should proceed to London to negotiate a loan, and the only security he had for that loan were the wines at Villa Nova. It had been decided in council that they should be immediately removed; and before his departure he pressed on the ministers the absolute necessity of immediately commencing

the operation ; but the more than incapable ministers put it off from day to day, until the whole fell into the hands of the enemy, and with the wines the last hope of raising money for the exigencies of the war was lost ; and yet those ministers, instead of being hanged or banished from Oporto with disgrace, were still allowed to direct the Emperor's councils.

It must not, however, be supposed they were idle ; far from it—they were sitting in their offices distributing orders and promotion to their friends, pleasing some and disgusting more, and intriguing against the general, who had, when left to himself, been successful in all his undertakings. The moment this came to his knowledge, he tendered his resignation to the Emperor, and offered to serve his country under any commander he thought proper, with the exception of his majesty's aid-de-camp Candido Xavier, who, it was supposed, was to be appointed *chef-d'état* major, in the event of the Emperor himself taking command of the army. His Majesty became alarmed at the determination of Villa Flor, refused his resignation, and assured him that no change should

take place. The count in consequence retained the command on condition that Colonel Battiste, the chief of his staff, and Captain Pimentel, the quarter-master-general, should be removed. Brigadier Valdes was appointed adjutant-general, Major Lourerio quarter-master-general, and Major Mendez secretary. Colonel Battiste was appointed to command the artillery, and Pimentel made aide-de-camp to the Emperor.

Up to the present time there had been some desertion from the enemy's ranks, which now very much decreased, probably owing to the precautions taken by the Miguelite general, as well as the Miguelites losing confidence in the Queen's cause; and the latter reason seems the more likely, as desertion about this time became considerable from the Queen's troops, particularly in the fifteenth regiment, which more than once lost a whole picquet. This regiment had been largely recruited from the Miguelite prisoners taken in the Azores, and they corrupted the young soldiers raised in the islands. There was little desertion from the other corps, none from the French, and only two from the English.

On the 18th of July Admiral Sartorius sailed for the Tagus with the *Rainha*, *Donna Maria*, *Villa Flor*, *Amelia* corvette, and *Eugenie* schooner, and on the 19th anchored in Cascaes Bay, where he found Admiral Parker and a British squadron. A remonstrance having been made by the governor of Cascaes to the British admiral, the Queen's squadron moved to the south passage of the Tagus, from whence they could plainly perceive Don Miguel's ships at anchor between St. Julian's and Belem. On the 23d Admiral Parker weighed, and passing close to Admiral Sartorius's squadron, hoisted *Donna Maria's* flag, and returned his salute. This species of acknowledgement of her flag by a British admiral was most annoying to the Miguelite government, and proportionally agreeable to Admiral Sartorius. The Tagus was strictly blockaded, and several vessels of value captured: amongst them was the *St. John Magnamino*, store-ship from India, carrying thirty guns, captured by the small corvette 23d of July, Captain Morga, and *Eugenie* schooner.

On the 3d of August Miguel's squadron,

consisting of a ship of the line, a frigate, three corvettes, and three brigs, commanded by Commodore Joao Felix, put to sea. Sartorius weighed and recalled the Donna Maria. At ten, the admiral, being to windward of the enemy, made the signal to prepare for battle and bore up. I believe the Rainha ran through the squadron, but not being followed nothing decisive took place. On the 5th the Amelia, who sailed bad, was considerably astern. Two corvettes chased her; she tacked, the signal being made to provide for her safety, which she did by proceeding to Oporto: her appearance there without knowing what had become of the squadron caused great consternation. The corvettes soon gave up the chase; the squadron kept close together till the night of the 10th, and at half-past eight Sartorius bore up and ran through the enemy's squadron, passing under the frigates' stern, and then hauling his wind, engaged them to leeward. In about half an hour the Don John tacked, which finished the action. Both ships suffered considerably in their masts and rigging, and lost two or three men killed, and

about twenty wounded. Next morning the enemy's squadron were still in sight, the Don John having lost her main-topmast.

Nothing further took place till the 12th, when both squadrons appeared off the bar of Oporto. The Miguelite squadron to windward, bore up and made all sail, the frigate and a corvette considerably ahead. Sartorius did all he could to separate them from the rest of the squadron; they were, however, too cautious, shortened sail, and hauled their wind. In the evening it fell calm, and there was every prospect of bringing on a decisive action. The Rainha lashed the steamer alongside of her, took the Donna Maria in tow, and steered towards the enemy, who now appeared in perfect dismay. They were much separated, and were hoisting out their boats, the small craft using their sweeps. In half an hour they would have been in action, and probably the Miguelites would have been annihilated, but unfortunately a breeze sprang up, and another steamer and corvette joining Sartorius, so alarmed Joao Felix that he made sail, and was seen by the Amelia, who joined on the 17th, steering for Lisbon. Sartorius returned to Oporto,

repaired his damages, and completed his water and provisions.

It does not appear that the Miguelite commodore had any serious intention of bringing Sartorius to action ; it is most probable that he wished to draw him off the land to enable stores to be sent up to the army before Oporto, and in this manœuvre he succeeded. The Emperor and his ministers do not appear to have been much satisfied : they expected nothing less than the capture of the squadron, without once reflecting on their superiority, or considering the state they would have been in at Oporto, had Sartorius lost the day or been so disabled as to have obliged him to seek a port to refit in either France or England.

CHAPTER V.

AFTER the battle of Ponte Ferreira, no movement took place on either side till the 7th of August. The emperor had been fortifying his lines, Don Miguel collecting troops to attack them. At three in the morning of that day Villa Flor marched with the first and light division on Souto Redondo to reconnoitre Povoas' force; they were driven from the village of Feira with some loss. Villa Flor was following up his success with great boldness, when Captain Rebosa, who was in advance, either seeing or fancying he saw the enemy's cavalry, sounded the retreat, exclaiming at the same time that the horse were upon them. The fifth caçadores, who till now had always distinguished themselves, were seized with a sudden panic, and fled in the utmost confu-

sion ; the other troops caught the alarm, and ran for Oporto without giving themselves time to look behind. In vain did Villa Flor attempt to stop their flight ; nothing could induce them to halt. The Miguelites, themselves astonished, could not believe the flight was serious, and did not profit by the panic. This hesitation gave Villa Flor time to collect his staff and a few men, who kept in check the enemy's sharpshooters and a few cavalry, until his troops, probably fatigued with the celerity of their retreat, halted at the entrance of Villa Nova, where they were met by the Emperor. The loss of the enemy in the early part of this affair was considerable ; that of the Queen's troops about three hundred in killed, wounded, and missing, and two field-pieces. Passou was cut down at his guns. Schwalbach was wounded early in the action, but did not quit the field. Mascarenhas, the late Governor of Oporto, was also severely wounded ; he accompanied Villa Flor as a volunteer, anxious to wipe off the stain he had undeservedly incurred in the battle of Ponte Ferreira.

This affair created great alarm not only amongst

the inhabitants of Oporto, but in the councils of the Emperor; and the very men who had led him to believe he would meet with no opposition in landing in Portugal, were the first to advise him to reembark his arms and give up the contest. This was strongly opposed by Villa Flor and Palmella; but it was not till after forty-eight hours' deliberation that their pusillanimous councils were rejected. Rebosa was tried and condemned to be shot, but his punishment was very improperly commuted to degradation and hard labour for life. This disaster strengthened the enemies of Villa Flor, and it is generally believed that Palmella, who went to England after this affair, had instructions to treat with some British officers either to take the command of the troops, or to act as chief of the Emperor's staff.

Hodges's
Narrative.

On the 22d of August the squadron again sailed: they now consisted of the Rainha, Donna Maria, Coquette schooner, twenty-third of July brig of 18 guns, Eugenie schooner, and a couple of steamers. On the 25th they were off the Tagus. They there learnt that the Miguelite frigate had lost eight men killed and thirty wounded,

and shifted her foremast. The *Don John* and a brig had been a good deal cut up, but were now refitted and expected shortly to put to sea.

On the 10th of September they sailed: their force was a line-of-battle ship, a frigate, two corvettes, two brigs, and a steamer. The following day one of their brigs lost her fore and main-topmasts, and was in tow of a steamer. This steamer was so overloaded with heavy stores that she herself went down before the brig was ready, which was not before the 14th, both squadrons then in sight of each other. There had been for a long time some dissension in the fleet, particularly between Admiral Sartorius and Captain Minus. I shall not enter into the cause of these dissensions, but I cannot omit publishing a most extraordinary letter addressed by the petty officers of the *Donna Maria* to her captain, and Captain Minns's reply, neither of which were creditable to her discipline. On the 23d the *Donna Maria* parted company, and did not join the admiral till the 30th off Oporto, where was now assembled the whole of the squadron, consisting of the *Rainha* 46, *Donna Maria* 42, *Portuense* 20, *Villa*

Flor 16, 23d of July 18, Regencia 18, Constitution 13, Mindella 13. The admiral was much dissatisfied at the Donna Maria having parted company, and thinking all was not right, shifted his flag to that ship, and on the 2d of October anchored at Bayonne Islands : the enemy were then lying in Vigo Bay.

At day-light on the 10th of October the enemy's squadron quitted Vigo and passed through the South Channel. Sartorius followed through the same passage, and at half-past one on the morning of the 11th brought them to action. It appears to have been the admiral's intention to attack the Don John with the two frigates, leaving his corvettes and brigs to fight the enemy's frigate, and keep their smaller vessels in check, but from want of wind or other causes the smaller vessels did not get to their stations, and the brunt of the action fell on the Donna Maria. At half-past two the Rainha ran between the line-of-battle ship and the Donna Maria, and then took a station on her weather-bow, where she was of little service. Her running between the two ships was most inju-

dition ; but had she afterwards put her helm up, and ran athwart the Don John's hawse, she would necessarily have been supported by the Donna Maria running alongside, and the Don John would have inevitably been captured. The small vessels at the same time should have mobbed the frigate, who could have easily been carried, and the corvettes would have saved themselves by flight. This was not done, and the consequence was the Donna Maria was dreadfully cut up, having eighty shot in her hull and being otherwise damaged ; and the enemy escaped. The loss on this occasion was ten killed and forty wounded.

On the 20th the squadron anchored in Oporto Roads, and the Miguelites returned to Lisbon. Admiral Sartorius landed, and took upon himself the duties of major-general ; and a large proportion of the seamen were landed to occupy the Foz batteries. Shortly after the weather became unsettled, and the squadron took shelter in Vigo Bay.

Little consideration was shewn to the admiral on his landing either by the Emperor or his mini-

sters. They had buoyed themselves up with the hope that the whole squadron would be captured, and never took the trouble to reflect that in no one instance had even a well-manned and well-disciplined British frigate taken a line-of-battle ship.

During the time the naval operations were going on, the opposing parties were not idle at Oporto. The former appearance of the enemy's fleet off the bar had frightened a little activity into the Emperor's ministers. The troops were employed night and day on the fortifications, and the Emperor himself was indefatigable. The English and French, much to their shame, declined working in the trenches, although three vintims a-day were offered to them. Faith had not been kept with them in the* first instance, which was probably the cause of this refusal, as well as of the disorders that frequently took place.

Heavy fogs had been hovering over Oporto for many mornings, which was most favourable for attack, and the troops were kept under arms from two in the morning till they cleared away; but the enemy's attention seemed to be entirely taken

up with preparations for attacking the Serra convent, and on the 8th of September a strong column was seen advancing from Grijo by the Bandeira road. Passou's* horse artillery was placed at the Seminario, which commanded the road by which they were advancing; and many of the inhabitants of Oporto armed themselves and crossed over to assist Major Marcelli and a battalion of the sixth infantry in the defence of so important a post, which, if lost, would have rendered the town untenable.

Bernardo da Sa, the governor of Oporto, led out part of the garrison to oppose the enemy, who were rapidly advancing, and received a severe wound in the arm, which was afterwards amputated. This officer had a particular *penchant* for fighting, and was never willingly absent wherever a shot was fired: and he was generally successful in his undertakings.

The enemy advanced to the attack with great gallantry, led by the lieutenant-colonel of the Tondella militia, and were severely harassed by the

* The nephew of the one who was cut down in defending his guns at Souto Redondo.

guns and musketry from the Seminario. Torres, the commandant of the convent, reserved his fire till they actually began to storm, when it was poured in with such effect that they could no longer hold their ground. Their gallant leader fell in attempting to scale the wall. A second attack was made at another point, which was also repulsed. This affair cost the enemy two-hundred and fifty men in killed and prisoners, besides the wounded. The garrison only lost five killed and twenty wounded: amongst the latter were Major Marcelli and Count St. Leger. Two days afterwards another attack was made, which met with no better success.

On the north of the Douro the enemy had nearly completed a battery opposite Monte Pedral, which on the 16th of September Villa Flor decided, if possible, to destroy. A detachment of eighty-six men under Colonel Burrel had landed on the 12th, and though small it was considered of great importance. Gaspar Texeira had assumed the command of Miguel's army, having Santa Martha for his second, and issued a proclamation worthy of the cause he served.

General Brito commanded the sortie: the force employed was thirteen hundred men. They sallied out at two P. M., and gained the heights of Cobello and Paranhos without being discovered. The first piquet was surprised, and the greater part taken or killed. Brito then completely destroyed the works and retired. The enemy by this time were under arms, and showed a strong force on the centre, menacing the left at the same time with two squadrons of cavalry and some light troops. Colonel Fonseca advanced from the Foz with five companies of caçadores, and the enemy retired. An attack on the outposts of Carvalhedeo was also repulsed.

Three strong columns now advanced on the heights in front of the Antas. Major Shaw commanded the piquet and retired, placing them behind some walls, from whence he opened a fire, which, together with the batteries of the Captivo and the Fojo, kept the enemy in check. Colonel Hodges sent two companies of the twelfth caçadores to support Shaw. Major Staunton with the British grenadiers, and a company of the twelfth caçadores was ordered to move on the

enemy's left, but by some accident took the road on their right, ascended the hill with fixed bayonets, and the enemy fled ; they were, however, rallied by an officer, were again charged by Staunton, and again routed ; but the gallant Staunton fell, and his subaltern, Lieutenant Jenkins, was shot through the thigh. Of the British, two were killed and seventeen wounded ; of the Portuguese, one lieutenant killed, one wounded, and nine privates.

No attempt had been made to disturb the enemy on the south bank of the Douro, though two batteries for the attack of the Serra and the bombardment of the town were rose under the very muzzles of our guns, without any serious endeavour to molest them. Villa Flor, Palmella, and the British merchants, who were anxious to get possession of their wines, were loud in their representations to attack Villa Nova. Palmella, when in England, had contracted a loan of £200,000, pledging the wines as a security, and when these wines were lost, the loan was not completed ; and although the ministers saw ruin

staring them in the face, they were not to be moved.

About this time Colonel Sorrel was appointed consul at Oporto. British property had not been much respected by the Miguelite general, and he sent a flag of truce with a severe remonstrance. Lieutenant Elliott, who was the bearer of it, was well received and invited to dine at head-quarters. Promises were given to be more circumspect, but so ill kept, that Lieutenant Elliott was again sent over. This time he was not received by the Miguelite general, and treated with little politeness. In both his visits he saw Sir John Campbell, who was with the Miguelite army.

On the 27th the London Merchant arrived with fifty-four horses, and cavalry appointments for two hundred men, and more were on their way to Oporto. For several days rumours of an approaching attack were afloat, which was supposed would take place on the 29th, Miguel's Saint's-day. Loaded mules and a good deal of baggage was passed over to the north side, together with four battalions and some field artillery. The officers in

command in various parts of the line made every preparation for defence. To the right, where the foreign brigade was stationed, were many houses and garden-walls outside the lines, which Hodges had repeatedly applied to have cleared away, but without effect ; and on the 28th, when he saw an attack would certainly take place, he took the responsibility on himself and levelled them with the ground.

When a position, not strong and feebly garrisoned, is expected to be attacked by a numerous army, it has been the custom both in ancient and modern times to concentrate the whole force for its defence ; but Don Pedro's minister-at-war, despising all these rules, actually sent away, two days before the expected attack, the twelfth *caçadores* in the London Merchant steamer, to make a descent at Aveiro—a port extremely difficult of access at all times, and so uncertain, like all the bar-harbours on the coast of Portugal, that you may get in one day, and perhaps be detained a week before the bar be again passable. This alone ought to have forbid an expedition, unless there was a moral certainty of success, which was

not the case here. The pilots knew nothing of the passage of the river; one hundred and twenty men were put into boats to reconnoitre; the enemy showed themselves in force; and it was with the greatest difficulty, owing to the strong tide, that the boats regained the steamer; and it was even no easy matter for the steamer to repass the bar. Thus ended this foolish expedition, which might have caused the loss of Oporto.

CHAPTER VI.

THE attack of the 29th is so well described in Colonel Hodges' Narrative, that with his permission I shall employ his own words.

“ On the morning of the 29th, two hours before daylight, we distinctly heard columns moving in different directions. This fact I communicated to the Count de Villa Flor, with the intimation that unless I received a reinforcement of five hundred men, as an equivalent to those withdrawn from me on the 27th, I could not answer for the maintenance of the position which the French then held. The position referred to was that from the St. Cosme road to the Quinta da China, touching the river, which important range I had assigned to the charge of the French battalion under the Count de St. Leger.

“ At half past five, whilst I was at the Bom Fin Battery, (in the centre of my line, on the main road to Valongo,) I received notice from the Count de St. Leger that the enemy was rapidly advancing upon him both by the river side and the St. Cosme road. Proceeding immediately to the Count's quarters, and finding that no reinforcement had arrived, I directed the officer of the Quarter-Master-General's department attached to me, Don Fernando de Almeida, to present himself to the Emperor with all speed, and demand the required succour. I also detached the Cadet Valdez to the General-in-Chief, to point out the perilous situation the extreme right of my line was in, from the want of a reserve, and to request urgently that a battalion of five hundred men might be sent with all possible dispatch. At the same time, I assured the General that I would maintain my ground while I had a man left to enable me to do so. The Count de Villa Flor stated in reply, that he had ordered the fifth Caçadores to my support, and that I might expect their arrival within a few minutes. No reinforcement, however, did arrive until nearly three

hours afterwards, and then only one hundred and twenty men, with a captain and three subalterns.

“ I had charged Lieutenant-Colonel Burrell with the defence of the Quinta and gardens of the *Praça das Flores*, while Major Shaw was placed at the barrier and redoubts in front. Both these officers had instructions to maintain their respective posts against all skirmishers, and only to retire within the lines on the enemy's advancing in column. The Portuguese troops furnished on this morning the picquets for the heights on the *Lugar das Antas*; an arrangement which I made for the purpose of enabling me to concentrate my little band of English, and to have them disposable for any required point.

“ The enemy's first effort was directed on the Quinta da China and the St. Cosme road. Their columns of attack on the Quinta were conducted by the identical Balthazar, the Count de St. Leger's favoured, but double-dealing spy, already spoken of.

“ The numerical force of the French battalion in position at this time was but three hundred and seventeen bayonets, while the two brigades

of Miguelists which attacked them mustered about two thousand five hundred. The French picquets on the St. Cosme road were charged and driven in by cavalry; and the hostile columns were enabled, through the treachery of the inhabitants of the neighbouring houses, to advance within half-musket shot of our trenches and batteries, without our being able to discover the heads of them. This contrivance exempted them from the effect of the instructions I had given to the various batteries, not to fire until the enemy were within the range of grape, and then only to pour it in on the heads of their columns. Favoured by the concealment they had obtained, and by the brisk impetuosity of their own movement, the Miguelists reached our very lines, and actually brought up their pioneers to cut down the fir-trees we had placed as a stockade in our front. Their overwhelming superiority of number, and the loss occasioned by their fire, created a momentary sense of alarm in the heroic little band of Frenchmen, who had, however, rallied together for the defence of the battery in their rear, when I came up.

“ Seeing the Count de St. Leger dismounted, (his horse having been shot a few moments before,) I called upon his gallant corps to retake the stockade at the point of the bayonet. He himself led them to the attack *au pas de charge*, and they retook the post with all the dashing spirit so much noticed among French soldiers. This point regained, (although I regret to say, not without a severe loss,) I ordered the men to expose themselves as little as possible—to place the muzzles of their muskets through the interstices of the stockade, and only to fire when they were sure of bringing down their men.

“ Seeing the description of foe they had to contend with, the Miguelites abated somewhat of their impetuosity, but kept up a sharp fire from the neighbouring houses and sheltered gardens. They next made a bold attack on the barrier placed on the St. Cosme road, a hundred yards in front of the house of Baños Lima. A mine had been laid there, but proved unserviceable, owing to the previous rains. Here also the Miguelites made a momentary lodgment, and got possession of the barrier, just as the long-expected

but scanty reinforcement arrived. The men of this latter body were not disposed to retake the barricade at the point of the bayonet, and the consequence was, that between one and two hundred Miguelites actually got within our lines. They were, however, promptly charged by a detachment of the mounted corps of guides, (commanded by Colonel Joao Nepomucceno de Macedo,) who cut some down, made a few prisoners, and obliged the remainder to retire across the trench, which had been filled up with the furniture from the contiguous houses.

“ With the exception of this spirited charge, the French corps had received no assistance up to that moment, in defending their ground (no inconsiderable portion of our line) against a force of two thousand five hundred men. The Count de St. Leger, a short time before this charge, was severely wounded, and obliged to quit the field. The brave young Lasteyrie, who was throughout the day forward in all danger, (having relinquished the comparative security of the Emperor’s staff,) was also wounded, but was not compelled to quit his post.

“ Seeing this part of my position apparently secured, I repaired with all haste to the Fojo battery, immediately in the rear of the *Praça das Flores*,* and from thence I perceived the British battalion to be warmly engaged—they having been also attacked by greatly superior numbers. The enemy having gained the heights of the Antas, which were abandoned without resistance by the picquet of eighty men from the eighteenth regiment, that had been placed there, the British

* “ Previously to my leaving the extreme right, Lieut. Colonel Pacheco, with the battalion of the tenth infantry, garrisoned the batteries that had been momentarily in the possession of the enemy, as well as that part of the external line fronting the battery of Lombo, and touching the Bom Fin Church. A fine trait of intrepidity was exhibited before the arrival of Pacheco, by six of a body called the *Corps of Academicians*, who, on seeing the enemy repulsed from the St. Cosme barrier, rushed forward from the Lombo battery, and retook the fort immediately in its front. In this fearless and successful attempt, two brothers out of the six assailants were killed. The other four maintained their acquisition until Pacheco's arrival. Throughout the protracted struggle which I am recording, the little corps of Academicians distinguished themselves honourably by their courage and devotion to the cause.”

became exposed to imminent danger. This small corps, retiring from the barricade on the Valongo road, (but not till they had made an obstinate resistance there,) got within a house that had been prepared for defence, and barricaded its doors and windows, which were loop-holed for the use of musketry. While Lieutenant-Colonel Burrell, with the right wing of the British, was defending this house, Major Shaw commanded the left wing, for the defence of the garden. Here the Miguelites made a desperate attack, having rapidly pushed a large body of troops into the neighbouring houses immediately in front, by which means they were secured from the fire of our batteries, and enabled to scale the garden-walls, and in part to surround the house in which Lieutenant-Colonel Burrell was. He, however, perceiving his danger, made a bold sally, and at the point of the bayonet charged them, and caused them for a brief interval to retire. Scarcely had he thus far succeeded, when he himself received a musket-shot which killed him on the spot. With him fell twelve of his men. The remainder then joined Major Shaw, who with marked obstinacy disputed every inch

of ground, until such of the officers and men as were wounded were brought within our lines ; after which he, with the remainder of his body, retired in good order into the battery of the Captivo.

“ In the course of this attack on the garden of the *Praça das Flores*, some remarkable evidences of personal courage were given on both sides. Some of the enemy’s light troops had the hardihood to attempt single combat with the British, being elated with the show of success attending their onset. Nor were these individual rencontres among the privates alone. One of the Miguelite Caçadores made a rush towards Lieutenant Burton, who at the moment was standing near to Major Shaw. The Lieutenant, with characteristic coolness and precision, took up a stone and flung it at his assailant with such effect that it struck him in the face, and knocked off his cap. He in return levelled his rifle, and shot poor Burton dead, at so close an approach to him that his coat was singed by the powder. The Caçadore himself presently paid the forfeit of his life for his temerity. Major Shaw, too, was struck by the spent shot, which, for a few minutes, rendered him insensible.

Captains Mitchell and Chinnock, and Lieutenant Walsh, were badly wounded, and carried to the rear.

“ When I saw the remnant of this valiant little band within the battery, and perceived, by the thinness of their number, the slaughter that had been made in their ranks—when I beheld, likewise, their gallant Major insensible through the hurt he had received on his breast, and only two of the junior subalterns, (one of whom carried the colours,) left for duty, my feelings, it will readily be supposed, were of no enviable nature. I was directing the Adjutant to take charge of the battalion, and addressing a few encouraging words to the men, when Major Shaw recovered, and I had the satisfaction to hear from his own lips that he was able to return to the field. Suiting the action to the word, he got up and assumed his position of command, to the great joy of the men under his orders.

“ The British, on going into action, had numbered only two hundred and eleven bayonets. They were attacked by a column of two thousand men in front, while the fire from clouds of skir-

mishers, who were placed on the heights of the Antas, did them destructive mischief.

“ As the action proceeded, much inconvenience was sustained in regard to our *matériel*. A field nine-pounder in the Captivo battery was damaged in its carriage, so as to render the guns unserviceable. Unfortunately, too, there was a lack of ammunition in all the batteries under my command, although, from the commencement of the day's business, I had appointed an intelligent Portuguese officer to attend to this important service. To repair the first accident, I ordered up Captain Pasos, with a six-pounder from his brigade, to take the charge of the Captivo battery; and to remedy the second, I sent urgent demands to Colonel Battiste, the commander of artillery, for fresh supplies of ammunition for the several batteries, as well as for the use of the battalions, whose reserve ammunition had become exhausted.

“ I then proceeded to the Fojo battery, which the enemy was now advancing upon, having brought three nine-pounders to bear upon it from the Antas heights. The fire of musketry on this

battery was extremely heavy. Within twenty minutes six artillery-men were shot dead, while working an eighteen-pounder. Their places were speedily and efficiently filled up from amongst the Academicians, and the brave Volunteers of Oporto, who, although only incorporated a few weeks since, vied with the best of the veterans in fearless self-exposure. Still no ammunition arrived for the batteries, so that I was compelled to use nine-pound shot for the eighteen-pounder. When the supply did arrive, there had been such ignorance or negligence in its distribution, that the eighteen-pound shot was sent for the use of the nine-gun batteries, and *vice versâ*!

“ Another evil lay in the fact that the men’s muskets (which, when new, were none of the best) were so hot from incessant use as to be unsafe in their hands. I therefore made a pressing requisition for two hundred stand of new arms to be issued, flinted from the arsenal, and specified the several points they should be sent to. With the strangest absurdity, these much-needed weapons, instead of being sent to the lines, were forwarded,

together with a supply of ammunition for the infantry, to *my* quarters, a large house situated a quarter of a mile in the rear of the lines.

“ Such blunders and delays as these were a considerable obstacle to our operations. It so chanced, however, that I had a supply of Congreve rockets in the Captivo battery; and these came into serviceable application. By directing only two of them against the heights of the Antas, we checked the advance of the enemy's fresh columns, although it was visible that their superior officers were using all their efforts to induce their men to the attack. Just at this time there fortunately arrived a *small* supply of suitable ammunition for the use of the Captivo and Fojo batteries. Directing two shots from the eighteen-pounder on the enemy's guns on the heights of Antas, we dismounted one of them. Presently some cavalry, and (as we afterwards learned from the prisoners) Sir John Campbell himself, who had directed the entire attack on this quarter, appeared on the heights. A discharge of grape soon sent them about.

“ The Miguelites now evinced no desire to

renew the attack. They kept up, indeed, a sharp fire from the front on our head-quarter battery of the Congregadors, to the extreme right; but this was plainly with the object of keeping us in check until dark, when they might retire without risk.

“ At this juncture I despatched an officer to the Count Villa Flor, requesting his Excellency’s permission to attack the enemy’s left from the St. Cosme road, and suggesting that a similar movement should be made from the centre of our line, with a view to secure that portion of our opponents that had occupied the houses and cottages in front of our position. I was speedily informed that the Count approved of my proposal, and that he had directed Brigade-general Henrique de Silva da Fonseca to detach a force from under his command to attack the enemy’s right as soon as I should be engaged. Accordingly, taking with me forty men of the British battalion under the command of Adjutant Brown, and sixty Frenchmen, commanded by the chef-de-bataillon, Gentil, (an old officer of experience in his own service,) I directed at the same time two companies of the third caçadores to advance along the ravine to the

right of the Bom Fin, while Major Shaw was simultaneously to make a rapid movement upon his old quarters and gain possession of them ; and three companies of the fifth caçadores from the left of the Fojo battery were to recover the heights of the Antas. I also gave direction that as soon as a bugle should be sounded for the advance, Lieutenant-colonel Pacheco, and the battalion of the tenth infantry under his command, should break from their lines, and support the attack of the British on the *Praça das Flores*.

“ On our first sortie upon the road from our lines, we were received with a heavy fire of musketry. The French detachment, which headed the attack on the road, while the British inclined to their left, were also exposed to a deadly fire, by which Major Gentil and two subalterns were killed, and Major Bourso de Carbonette, and three other officers, were severely wounded. Of the English, we lost six men, while the adjutant and many others were wounded.

“ Finding that Pacheco did not advance as he had been directed to do, that our force was inadequate to the intended object without such aid,

and that the brave Captain de Montenegro, who commanded the companies of the third caçadores, was added to the number of the killed, I was constrained to order the men to retire.

“ I was afterwards given to understand that the cause of Pacheco's not advancing was attributable to the minister-of-war, though I was never able to clear up the matter satisfactorily. However it may be, no doubt remains on my mind that Pacheco was not only willing but anxious to grapple with the enemy in the open field, and that he would generously and nobly have seconded French or English at so important a crisis, when all were contending alike for the emancipation of his country. If, therefore, the fact is to be attributed to Senor Freire, it is but in keeping with the rest of his conduct towards the foreigners in the Queen's service,

“ I now proceeded to the Captivo battery, and had the satisfaction to behold the enemy in disgraceful flight. They had thrown away their arms, and were ascending the heights of Antas in crowds, while a few remaining red jackets and the fifth caçadores were in full pursuit.

“ On the attack of the British on the Praca das Flores, a frightful massacre took place ; for seeing many of the bodies of their comrades mangled in a most disgusting manner, their feelings of revenge could not be controlled. They gave no quarter. At the barrier on the Valongo road sixty Miguelites were bayoneted.”

“ While the enemy were ascending the heights, I again brought grape and Congreve rockets to bear on them, so that the slaughter was very considerable, and their cries were distinctly heard within our lines. The whole scene, however animating to the victors, was still shocking to humanity. We made two hundred and sixty prisoners on this point alone ; and had the attack on the right been seconded with all due vigour, it is a reasonable calculation that two thousand prisoners would have crowned our success on that day. As it was, we made but three hundred and fifty, with two-six-pounders, and a howitzer captured in front of the position held by the French. The two former of these guns had been previously taken from us on the 22d of July, the day before the battle of Ponte Ferreira.

“ The enemy made no attack or considerable demonstration during the day, either on our left or our centre. His whole efforts were directed to the right ; and it has been asserted that Sir John Campbell boasted of his intention to annihilate the French and English battalions posted in that quarter. It is true he had nearly succeeded ; but the determined resistance he met with, and his final utter failure on the point of attack, will compel the gallant general, when party feeling shall have lost some of its bitterness, to acknowledge that the valiant little band nobly upheld the honour of their respective nations.

“ Our Portuguese fought admirably throughout the day, and too much praise cannot be bestowed on the new levies of volunteers raised among the heroic inhabitants of Oporto. After this day I could never bring myself to believe that a “ Carcundo ” (or Miguelist) could be found within the walls of that noble city. The old men, the women, and children, were active in various ways in supplying our wants, and aiding the public service. Nor must I fail to acknowledge the kindness of the ladies of various English families in the town,

who were most assiduous in their attendance at the hospitals, and liberal in their supplies of shirts, sheets, and linen for the wounded. The wounded officers too are not likely to forget their delicate attentions, particularly those whose wounds were most dangerous, and to whom such attentions were most especially important."

The brunt of the action fell on the foreign brigade. The French and English rivalled each other in daring, and well maintained their military reputation: they had often fought against each other on Portuguese ground, but here they fought for the first time side by side: no jealousy or animosity subsisted between them; their only feeling was admiration at each other's determined bravery, and no little credit is due to Colonel Hodges for creating such a good understanding. After the action was over and Oporto safe, Portuguese jealousy and intrigue went to work against them. It was asserted that the English were drunk, and that the French had abandoned their position. On this being reported to Hodges, he immediately applied to Villa Flor, and was by him informed that the Emperor had

made the assertion through the Marquis of Loule, and that he had contradicted it. Hodges then wrote to the Count, and requested that his letter might be laid before the Emperor, which was done ; but no explanation was given to Villa Flor by the Emperor further than that it was a mistake, and that he himself would speak to Hodges on the subject, which, however, he never did.

The foreign hospital was much exposed to the enemy's fire, and ill provided in every respect. Application was made for another, and even two empty houses pointed out where they might be well accommodated. The usual answer, " to-morrow," was given by the minister, and when to-morrow came, after much delay they were thrust into one house with little bedding and no accommodation, and so small that both stairs and passages were crowded with sick and wounded men.

On the 1st of October Hodges' brigade was replaced by the light division, and they were ordered to form the reserve. This change was nothing in itself, had it not so closely followed the reports that had been in circulation, or had it been accompanied with some mark of approbation, or

even a simple notification that they were relieved in consequence of the hard duty they had performed, or the severe loss they had met with. The ^{Hodges' Narrative.} Count Villa Flor felt this, and represented it to the Emperor; he was, however, overruled at the palace, and in consequence absolutely refused to convey the order to Hodges, and the Emperor was himself obliged to send orders by Major Loureiro to give up the post to Schwalbach, who was already on his march to occupy it.

This affair, together with many other annoyances, determined Villa Flor to resign the command, which was exactly what the Emperor's advisers wished. The minister-at-war never had the manliness to openly dismiss an officer whose services he did not wish; his system was to disgust and oblige him to resign. I speak more particularly of the minister-at-war, because it was his department; he was the responsible man, and if the acts were the Emperor's, and disapproved by him, it was his duty to resign.

The Emperor now assumed the command of the army. Candido Xavier became military secre-

tary ; Loureiro, one of the best officers in Portugal, was dismissed without ceremony, and Pimentel appointed quarter-master-general. The Count Villa Flor was created Duke of Terceira, with one hundred contos of reis when he could get them, and his military appointment, first aide-de-camp to the Emperor ; such were the empty rewards bestowed upon Villa Flor, who had performed such eminent services to his country. There is not in Portugal a better or milder man than the Duke of Terceira, and it was to be regretted that in these dangerous times he had not assumed a higher tone : had he held up his finger, he might have driven the Emperor's imbecile advisers not only from his presence, but from Oporto, and had he done so, his conduct would have been applauded by all right-thinking men.

On the evening of the 9th of October the Serra was again attacked, and the enemy repulsed with considerable loss. Works were now in progress in various parts of the Miguelite positions, and the town was cannonaded every night. The Emperor was driven from his quarters, which

were much exposed, and many families were obliged to quit their homes, and seek shelter in less exposed parts of the town.

About this time Sir John Milley Doyle made his appearance, with a suite of twenty gentlemen; what were his views and prospects, or how these gentlemen were to be employed, it was difficult to say. Already were there officers more than sufficient for the few remaining British troops. The gallant officer probably expected the command of the army, and had taken the precaution to bring out his *état-major*; but the Emperor having assumed that command himself, Sir John was obliged to put up with the appointment of orderly officer. A few English and Belgians now arrived for the British and French regiments, and two subalterns and eighty men for Bacon's lancers, and he was shortly expected himself; the horses that had preceded the men, for want of proper care, had fallen into a wretched state, and when the evil was done, they were consigned to the charge of Colonel Hodges.

The new comers unfortunately brought money in their pockets, with which they regaled their

countrymen ; and till it was gone, there was much disorder in both the French and British regiments, which did not escape the observation and the severe remarks of the Portuguese.

On the 14th the Serra was again attacked with the most bold and determined courage ; a battalion of caçadores was the first to attempt to scale the walls, the commanding officer himself carrying a ladder : they were received with vivas by the garrison, and repulsed with great loss. Again and again were they brought up by their officers, but the Serra was not to be taken. The enemy lost in these attacks five hundred men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Batteries were now established against the Serra at four hundred yards distance, which damaged the walls and buildings, but did little harm to the garrison. Towards the end of this month two steamers arrived from England with troops. Major Sadleir brought with him about one hundred men and officers : another body of two hundred and forty men, under the name of Cochrane's Battalion, commanded by a gentleman of that name, but his services and several of the officers were rejected

by the Emperor. This order was communicated to Admiral Sartorius by the minister of marine; (the British having been formed into the regiment of the Armada, were now under his orders.) About this time Mouzinho de Albuquerque resigned the marine department to Bernardo de Sa, and was appointed minister of the interior, and the British returned to the war department. They were now without clothing, shoes, and were not even entirely armed, and had never been supplied with bedding. This was repeatedly represented to the quarter-master-general, who referred Hodges to the minister-at-war; and though there was clothing of every description in store sent out expressly for the British troops, this minister, from some unknown cause, (I believe hatred to foreigners,) would not supply them. Hodges appealed to the Emperor by letter, which was read by Palmella in presence of the minister, and all grievances were promised to be redressed. A trifle of pay was issued to the men who were much in arrear, and clamorous. Indeed M. Freire had taught them, that mutiny was the only means of getting their grievances redressed, for he made a rule of never

paying them till that took place. It has been alleged, and with some justice, that the British were constantly selling their clothing, which the Portuguese never did; but let it be remembered, that the Portuguese were regularly paid—the British never; and I am satisfied, had faith been kept, or even had a reasonable pay been regularly given them, there would have been no difficulty in keeping them under proper control. It is true the military chest was low, but it is difficult to make the soldiers understand that question. They agreed to come to Oporto to fight in the Queen's cause, and to receive a certain pay, and that pay ought to have been insured to them; and if not, the Emperor himself ought to have honestly explained to the foreign troops his position, and treated them with some degree of kindness or even flattery, which I really believe would have had the desired effect.

Colonel Bacon, a few cavalry officers, and one hundred horses now arrived from England, and a regiment was formed, called the Queen's Lancers; they consisted of four squadrons, composed of French, English, German, and Portuguese, and

it is astonishing with what celerity that active officer brought them into an efficient state. They consented to serve on Portuguese pay, on condition that their arrears should be paid up on their arrival in Lisbon. This was no doubt most generous on their part, but it had a bad effect, as many, if not almost all the infantry officers were without private fortunes; and to keep themselves respectable on £2 : 10 a month, the pay received by all the Portuguese officers from the highest to the lowest, was perfectly impossible, and they in consequence did not follow the example of the cavalry, which much displeased the Emperor's ministers.

Shortly after the arrival of the cavalry, Sartorius, who was now refitting at the Bayonne Islands, sent the marines to Oporto, which increased the British to seven hundred and fifty strong.

The enemy were not idle : they constructed two batteries, the Cabodello and the Sampayo, which blocked the river completely against the ingress or egress of merchant ships. They were in consequence obliged to anchor in the roads and watch favourable opportunities of sending their boats in at

night either over the bar, or in a small bay to the northward of the Foz. Both operations were attended with difficulty and danger, and the inhabitants soon found out that in the winter it would be quite impossible to provision the city. This added to the uneasiness of all parties, both civil and military, as they foresaw the possibility of being obliged to capitulate from starvation. Provisions rose in price in consequence, in about the same ratio that the means of purchasing decreased; and to add to this, Don Miguel arrived at the head-quarters of the army with a reinforcement of four thousand men. Gaspar Texeira was replaced by Santa Martha, and a severe attack was anticipated.

Little respect had been paid to the British vessels in the Douro, and the Childers, Orestes, and a steamer were ordered into the river for their protection.

The British battalion were still without necessities, accoutrements, or shoes, the greater part of which had fallen into the enemy's hands on the 29th of September, and the new-comers were without arms or clothing. Hodges made another

strong demand on the minister-at-war, and with the same success: he seemed determined to get rid of him, would not honestly say so, but followed his system of annoyance to obtain his purpose. .

The sick and wounded were still without a proper hospital, though there were two empty houses in the same street; they were without either comforts, necessities, or bedding, though it was known that both had been sent to Oporto from Liverpool by some friends of the British, and addressed to Hodges or Shaw, and appropriated to other purposes.

On the 8th of November the French regiment and the second battalion of Portuguese in Hodges' brigade were removed from under his orders, and he was reduced to the command of his own regiment. To put up with this was impossible, and he decided on sending in his resignation to the Emperor, which was accepted. This was followed by resigning the order of the Tower and Sword, which had been conferred on him for his conduct at the battle of Ponte Ferreira. On Hodges' resignation, Sir John Doyle was appointed to command the British, and they were ordered to

occupy the post they formerly did in the proximity of the enemy. This appointment so disgusted Major Shaw and several other officers that they sent in their resignations, which were not accepted; but Sir John was removed from the command, which he only held forty-eight hours. During that time he had been liberal in promises; and after Hodges embarked for England, four hundred of the British got under arms, marched to the Emperor's quarters, and demanded their pay, which was promised as usual.

CHAPTER VII.

THE first military event that marked the assumption of the command of the army by Don Pedro, was the attack on Villa Nova on the 14th of November. Schwalbach passed the Douro above the Seminario, at the head of one thousand five hundred men; his orders were to destroy the batteries of St. Christovao, Bandeira, and that of the Pinery if possible, while two hundred seamen pushed over to the Cabedello to destroy it, and the Sampayo battery. Captain Hill commanded the gun-boats, and landed Schwalbach with great promptitude. The Miguelites were prepared for the attack, swept the landing-place, and pounded the town from their various batteries. Schwalbach advanced at a charge, carried their bivouac, and

the two batteries, which were destroyed ; the guns were disabled as well as they could be done without either spikes or sledge-hammers, which had been forgotten. The enemy now advanced two heavy columns, and Schwalbach, who knew his art well, retired in good order and embarked under cover of the fire from the Seminario and Serra Convent. The gallant Captain Morgal with his sailors carried the Cabedello, but he too was unprovided with implements to destroy the guns, and could only upset them and break the carriages. His men had only ten rounds of ammunition, and when that was expended, they were obliged to retreat.

Captain Morgal and Lieutenant Haward, a volunteer from the British regiment, and six men, were killed and fourteen wounded. The success these sorties met with, proves how much it is to be regretted a larger force was not employed. The Serra Convent ought to have been well reinforced the night before, and as Schwalbach landed, they ought to have made a sally. The seamen should also have been supported by troops ; they are always active, but never ought to be employed in shore expedi-

tions, unless properly assisted ; they are liable to fall into disorder, and not being accustomed to act together, when attacked by regular troops are easily cut up.

The troops behaved with great courage, and lost two hundred men in killed and wounded, which could ill be spared from the Queen's little army. The enemy, it is supposed, suffered considerably more.

On the 17th of November another sortie was decided on, under the command of Schwalbach. The British, now divided into three battalions, were commanded by Brigadier Bento de Franca ; they marched out on the Valongo road; supported by a battalion of the sixth regiment, and forty mounted guides. The French and the third caçadores, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sequeira, advanced from the Captivo battery, and the second caçadores on the St. Cosme road. The fifth caçadores were in reserve on the Antas. The enemy's piquets at St. Roque fell back on Rio Tinto, where the main body was stationed. Before they had time to form, Lieutenant-Colonel Soares, with two hundred of the second caçadores, seized the

bridge of Campanhan, and destroyed the barricade : those of St. Roque were also destroyed by Captain Barreiros. The enemy were in great force, and by no means backward to engage ; their main attack was on Schwalbach's left and centre, as well as on the Antas. Shaw reinforced this point with the second battalion of the British, was shot through the thigh and obliged to quit the field early in the battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, with the first battalion of the British, being menaced by half a squadron of cavalry, was ordered to retire, which he did in close column in good order, but was not followed.

Schwalbach, being hard pressed, was obliged to retire within his lines, with a loss of three hundred killed and wounded. The French suffered considerably, the Miguelites giving no quarter either to French or English. There appears to have been no object whatever in this *sortie* : a few barricades were destroyed, which could be more easily replaced than the men who were killed. The Miguelites were supposed to have lost five hundred men, but their army in Portugal consisted of nearly one hundred thousand men of all arms,

and they had the whole country to recruit from, while Don Pedro could with great difficulty procure either men or money ; and all the exertions and resources of Mendizabal were inadequate to keep pace with the losses attending these ill-digested attacks.

Desertion now became a heavy drain on Don Pedro's force ; the rations of his troops had been much reduced ; and not only Portuguese, but both French and English went over to the enemy. A private of the third caçadores was shot, and it was with great difficulty Don Pedro could reconcile himself to permit his execution : this was the second that had taken place at Oporto. The Emperor had a great antipathy to the punishment of death, and yet I have heard this man accused of every species of cruelty.

The Duke of Palmella and Mouzinho de Albuquerque left Oporto in the London Merchant on the 22nd of November, and were nearly lost in passing the bar. On board this vessel General Mina was also embarked : he had been examining various parts on the coast of Spain and Portugal in disguise, had visited Lisbon, and landed in

Spain, and been some time in Oporto undiscovered, and only made himself known to Colonel Hodges, who was his old friend. His disguise was so complete that discovery was impossible, and in this manner he remained unknown even in the steam-boat, though he was well acquainted with the Marquis of Palmella. The British government had insisted on Don Pedro not permitting any Spaniard connected with the Spanish liberal party to come to Oporto as the price of their preventing Spain from meddling with Portuguese affairs ; and had it been known that Mina was in Oporto, it would have placed the Emperor and his ministers in a very awkward predicament.

The object of Palmella's mission to England was to employ his influence to raise money, and to obtain, if possible, the direct interference of France and England in Donna Maria's favour. Unlimited powers were granted to Palmella, but he insisted on Mouzinho de Albuquerque being associated with him in his mission. The marquis had no confidence in the Emperor's advisers, and suspected they would sacrifice him at the earliest opportunity. The ministers, on the other hand,

were pleased to get rid of him, and would have objected to nothing he proposed provided it removed him from Oporto.

On the Marquis's arrival in England, he found that the interest in favour of Donna Maria was fast subsiding: her friends had lost all hopes of her cause; many of the officers coming home in disgust at the manner they had been treated, and the little thanks they got from the minister-at-war for their services, together with sick and wounded men appearing in London totally unprovided for, had very much cooled those interested in Don Pedro's success. Added to this, rumours were afloat of discontent and mutiny in the squadron, and disagreements between the admiral and several of his officers. These occurrences were necessarily reported to the French and English governments, and it is not surprising that they should be extremely cool in their reception of Palmella; being a minister, he necessarily became mixed up with all the faults, follies, and intrigues that had been so long going on at Oporto. They were not to know that the Emperor was completely in the hands of Freire and Candido Xavier.

On an exposé of the state of affairs at Oporto being laid before the cabinets of France and England, it is believed, (though I have had no means of getting at the fact,) that they both refused to interfere even in negotiations with Spain, unless the two princes and their ministers should retire from Portugal and Oporto. This stipulation, as regarded Don Pedro, was absurd to ask, and equally as absurd to consent to. The Emperor, with all his faults, was the heart and soul of the cause; he was active, determined, and obstinate to a degree; and though that obstinacy often did harm, it was the cause of the splendid defence of Oporto. As for his advisers they were totally incapable; they had neither military talent nor military firmness; they had persuaded Don Pedro that he was a great general, and had driven from his military councils the best and wisest men in Oporto; and had they been moved from his person affairs would have gone on well. The Marquis and Albuquerque were, however, supposed to consent to this, and Sir Stratford Canning proceeded to Madrid. Zea Bermudez was now minister, and it was hoped he was less hostile to the Queen's

cause than his predecessor. Palmella without loss of time communicated the arrangements he had made to the Emperor, and as might have been expected from a man of his temperament, was dismissed from office, his conditions rejected ; had he been himself the bearer of them, he would have most certainly been imprisoned by his former colleagues, and executed if they dared go that length.

A new ministry was formed : the Marquis of Loulé succeeded Palmella, Silva Carvalho took the Finance and Justice, two most irreconcilable portfolios at the present moment, for money was wanted, the portfolio of finance was widely opened to receive it, while that of justice was securely locked up in the minister's bureau. Carvalho was, however, not to blame. The troops and fleet were in arrears, provisions scarce, the town besieged by a powerful and revengeful enemy ; and as long as there was a shilling in the town, he was right to take it either by fair or foul means. Had Oporto fallen, the Miguelites would have respected neither property nor persons ; the plunder of it had been promised to the troops, and the peasantry even came from afar to share the

spoil. The sacking of Badajoz would have been a trifle to what would have happened at Oporto.

Candido Xavier became minister of the interior; Bernado de Sa remained; and the only excuse for him doing so, and for the Marquis of Loulé, who was an honourable man, accepting a portfolio with such colleagues, was their desire to serve the cause, and prevent Pedro's other ministers from doing as much harm as they would had they been left to themselves.

I still continued to be much interested in the affairs of Oporto; I had a sincere regard for many of the Portuguese officers, with whom I became acquainted in the Azores; and on the arrival of Palmella in London, I proposed to him, in the event of its being possible to embark the army at the Foz, to hire a dozen steam-boats, run up the Tagus in the night, land at Black-Horse Square, and settle the question at once. The best part of Miguel's army, consisting of at least thirty thousand men, was round Oporto; and the continual sorties made by the Queen's troops was a useless waste of life, and could not in the least advance her cause. This was evident to every one

except those who had the management of military matters ; and it was also evident that unless some daring measure was adopted, the army in Oporto must inevitably lay down their arms. There was a British steam-vessel of war at Oporto, to carry off the Emperor in that event ; and I suppose his advisers looked for a passage in her. Had their retreat been out off, as was the case with the army, I suspect that the capacity of the minister-at-war would have been a little quickened ; and as long as the danger lasted, he would have forgotten the word "*Amanha*," and even treated the foreign troops with justice.

The rage for making sorties had in no way subsided ; and on the 28th of November two columns of a thousand men each, under General Brito, assembled at Carvalhido. The intention of this sortie was to surprise Telles Jordao, who com-
Hodges' Narrative.
manded the right of the Miguelite army, extending from the neighbourhood of the Foz to Matazinhas. Here, then, was a decided object in view, sufficient to countenance an attack : we shall see how it was executed. The left column under

Brito took the Ramalde road ; Queirioz headed the other on the road of P'adrao de Legoa. Fonseca, with a hundred and fifty men from the Foz, menaced the enemy's right; while Bacon, with a squadron of lancers, was in reserve in advance of the Lordello.

Xavier, with the fifth caçadores, commenced the attack with his usual impetuosity, surprized and bayonetted the enemy's picquets; he then carried their entrenchments, where the surprise was complete, and the greater part of the enemy destroyed. Santa Martha now advanced with a large force to support Telles Jordao. Xavier was reinforced by Colonel Mariana Barossa, by which he was enabled to destroy the enemy's encampment, and carry off a considerable quantity of cattle and grain. Brito was now ordered to retire, and in his retreat was attacked by Santa Martha, and suffered considerably. Colonel Williams's battalion, under the orders of Barossa, formed the rear-guard, and behaved well. The loss of the Queen's troops was about three hundred killed and wounded ; the enemy were supposed to have

lost nearly eight hundred men, fifty prisoners, and about fifty deserters came in, and three hundred were said to have deserted to their homes.

The French on this occasion met their old antagonists the royalist volunteers, who had refused them quarter on the 17th, and bayoneted two companies of that blood-thirsty corps.

This sortie, like the other two, led to no results: it did not succeed in cutting off Telles Jordao's division, and the Miguelites could better afford to lose men than Don Pedro; but it made a strong impression on the Miguelite troops. They found they had to contend with a desperate enemy, and it inspired the inhabitants of Oporto with much confidence. They had now taken up the constitutional cause with great vigour, and on every attack or sortie old and young were seen armed with every species of weapon they could lay their hands upon: even the women on many occasions showed their enthusiasm for the cause of the Queen.

The squadron continued in Vigo in consequence of the danger of the anchorage off Oporto; they were far from being provided with stores, either to

keep the sea, or ground-tackle to keep the anchorage. The crews were without pay, clothing, and provisions. At first they were well received at Vigo. The Donna Maria was stripped and allowed to refit; but on the Don Pedro, an Indianman mounting fifty guns, arriving from France to reinforce the squadron, the governor requested Captain Mins to send her to sea. This ship had been purchased in England in September, and the Marquis Palmella, then in London, requested me to assist in getting her fitted out as expeditiously as possible.

Sartorius, conceiving that his force was not sufficient to cope successfully with the Miguelite squadron, had written to Mendizabal to procure a ship of this description. The funds at that time at his disposal were very scanty, and the friends of the cause had purchased this ship. She was not of a sufficient size to insure a decided superiority over the enemy; and assisted by M. Da Sylva, now the Baron of Lagos, who took a great interest in the affairs of the Queen, I endeavoured to induce them to fix on an Indiaman of twelve hundred tons, a much more effective ship; but hun-

dreds of reasons were against this selection. The friends of the cause had already purchased the Don Pedro, and it was indispensable that they should force her on the Queen's agent : he had no means of resistance ; and the Don Pedro, a small ship of eight hundred tons, was taken up. She was well and expeditiously fitted out in Mr. Young's yard : none of her old rigging, anchors, or stores were thought sufficiently good ; every thing was landed ; and, what is rather singular, the Queen's friends actually sent out her anchors to the Bayonne Islands, though they were not supposed good enough for her in the Thames ; and one, marked with her former name, the Lord Wellington, found its way afterwards as new stores on board the Don Pedro.

The Foreign Enlistment Bill prohibited the arming of this ship in England, and she was in consequence sent to Cherbourg, where, after the usual blunders and the usual want of faith to the crews, she was equipped.

The Rainha sailed shortly after the Don Pedro, which had proceeded off Oporto ; and in the beginning of December the Donna Maria was

again ready for sea. Shortly after this Admiral Sartorius arrived from Oporto, where he had been since the action, attending to the duties of major-general, and the Rainha coming in he hoisted his flag on board his old ship. The rest of the squadron, with the exception of the Don Pedro, had also arrived. On the 9th the governor of Vigo, who had as yet been very kind, invited the officers of the squadron to a ball.

The dissensions in the squadron had not subsided ; on the contrary, they had increased. It is not my intention to enter into their causes. Captain Mins has published one account ; Captain Boyd has replied to it, and I have every reason to believe that Admiral Sartorius himself intends favouring the public with an account of his proceedings when in command of the squadron. I shall merely observe that Captain Rose was brought to a court-martial on various charges, and acquitted. The discretion of the admiral may be here questioned ; troublesome times are not favourable to court-martials. If the admiral was dissatisfied with his officers, and was of opinion they were plotting mischief and intriguing against him, they

ought to have been superseded, and sent to Oporto; or one might have been selected and punished without the ceremony of a court-martial.

This trial did not at all tend to improve the discipline amongst the seamen. No great pains were taken to prevent the disagreements between the admiral and the officers from being known to the ships' companies, and on the 20th of December, when the Donna Maria was ordered to carry stock to Oporto, the men refused to weigh till they were paid, and no persuasion or threats of the admiral could induce them to change their resolution. Upwards of two hundred left the squadron, forfeiting their pay and prize-money. Had the admiral been supported by his officers as he ought to have been, whatever was their cause of complaint, this mutiny would not have taken place; and if it had taken place, strong measures would have put it down.

Shortly after this the cholera broke out in the squadron, and the Spanish authorities took this opportunity of ordering the ships out of Vigô, and, ill provided as they were, they had no other place of refuge except under the Bayonne islands.

CHAPTER VIII.

As the winter advanced, the provisioning of Oporto became more difficult, and the force of the Miguelites kept increasing, which enabled them to establish a very strict blockade by land; while the difficulties of the bar rendered the provisioning of the town very uncertain. On the 7th the Lord of the Isles steamer crossed the bar under English colours, wearing a pendant, and was not fired at. She brought stores and three hundred ragged recruits from Boulogne. A French-schooner also attempted to cross the bar, but was sunk. Soon after this the brig 23d of July was sunk, and ultimately the small vessels of war, with the exception of the Liberal, who was most gallantly brought out of the river by Lieutenant Souares Franco. Keeping them so long in the Douro was

a great mistake ; they were of little or no use there, and it could not be supposed that the Miguelite batteries would allow them to remain unmolested.

As the danger increased, the ministers became wiser. General Solignac, a French officer, who had served with much reputation under Massena, was invited to take the command of the army, which he accepted, and his arrival was daily expected. The government, not yet satiated with sorties, decided on another, and Villa Nova was the part fixed where more constitutional blood was to be needlessly shed. It will be remembered that through the procrastination of the ministers in not removing the wine from Villa Nova, it had fallen into the enemy's hands. An attempt was now to be made to obtain a supply for the inhabitants and the army. On the 17th of December detachments from the different corps were passed over to Villa Nova ; the enemy opened a fire from the Quinta de Cavaco, from whence they soon after retired. The convent of St. Antonio was occupied by the Queen's troops, who were also stationed on the neighbouring heights to cover the removal of the wine. The stores were to the right

of the convent near the water's edge. The boats which conveyed the troops were quickly loaded and returned to Oporto. In the meantime the third caçadores foolishly set fire to the convent, which they could easily have defended. The Miguelites, perceiving this, immediately advanced with a strong force; a panic seized the Queen's troops, and they fled to the river side. Few of the boats had returned from Oporto; those few were crammed with troops, and a scene of confusion not easily to be described took place. Those who could swim threw away their arms, took to the water, and endeavoured to reach the shipping, where they clung to the ships' sides and cables. Many were shot in the water, others were drowned, and not a few bayoneted in the quay. Here there was no respect shown to the British flag; some of the unfortunate wretches, thinking they would be safe, made for the British ships, and were shot hanging on their cables and sides.

On the 30th of December the Custom-house took fire, and the Miguelites, who now amused themselves in daily pounding the town, eagerly seized this opportunity of doing as much injury as

possible. The flames were a good mark, and that part of the town suffered considerably.

On the 1st of January, General Solignac arrived, and was named marshal and major-general of the army. He was well aware of the intriguing spirit of the various people about the Emperor, and it is believed he was very plain and frank in his language to Don Pedro on assuming the command of the army.

He examined with care into its state, as well as into the material; proper regulations took place with respect to rations, and he steadily set about reforming many existing abuses, and met, no doubt, with much opposition from those interested in their continuance.

On the 5th of January nearly two hundred Scotch arrived, and were put under the orders of Major Shaw, who was much pleased with having the command of his countrymen. Six hundred had been recruited in Glasgow, four hundred of whom were wrecked on the coast of Ireland, and every soul perished. This was a severe blow to the cause at a time when both men and money were so much wanted at Oporto. On the 15th a

reinforcement of two hundred Portuguese arrived from the islands, and four hundred French ; the whole were safely disembarked under the light-house, where provisions continued to be landed, though frequently interrupted by the surf.

On the 20th of January the squadron anchored in Oporto roads ; and on the 24th the marshal, having made his arrangements with Admiral Sartorius, determined to attack Monte Castro and the castle de Quejo. At one o'clock in the afternoon the French marched by the road leading from the Foz, and drove in the piquets ; while Major Brownston with the second British charged the enemy, drove them from Monte Castro, and advanced by the beach to the Quejo. They were to have been supported in their attack on that battery by the squadron, but the crews refused to weigh till they were paid ; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Sartorius could induce them to get the anchor up, and then it was much too late to be of any service.

General Brito had advanced with a division from Carvalhido to attack the enemy's left, but was halted,* as it has been alleged, by the Empe-

ror himself. This left the Marshal without support, and he was obliged to retire. The order of ^{Appendix,}
the day given out by him looks as if he was not _{No. V.} satisfied with what took place.

The loss on this occasion was eighteen killed and ninety-five wounded; that of the enemy considerably more. The marshal called this affair a reconnaissance; and it is probable he intended it as such, and also to ascertain by personal observation what dependence he could place on his troops when brought into contact with the enemy.

A great deal had been expected from the marshal by the Emperor, the inhabitants, and the army; but he was cautious, and I have no doubt he soon perceived that, with the small force under his command, continual sorties were not advisable; and a forward movement with the whole army, with any prospect of success, extremely problematical. This caution was displeasing to the military as well as to the ministers, and the personal activity of the marshal not being conspicuous, they soon lost hope of any thing

brilliant being undertaken, and became discontented.

On the 27th Generals Saldanha, Stubbs, and Cabrera landed at the Foz. Their services had been declined in the early part of the expedition, but they had since been called upon by the Emperor; and, although the cause was desperate, they obeyed the call with alacrity, and directed their best energies to serve the Queen and constitution. Saldanha and Stubbs had fought with distinction in the Peninsular war; the latter had been long governor of Oporto, and was highly respected by the inhabitants; he now resumed that post, and Saldanha took the command of the left, having his head-quarters at the Foz, the hottest part of the whole line of defence.

The weather had now set in bad; the squadron had returned to the Bayonne Islands; and the landing provisions was entirely cut off. The allowance of rations had been much reduced, and what they got was of bad quality: salt-fish and rice were the principal articles of diet. The

Portuguese were patient under their deprivations ; but the French and English, being accustomed to better fare, were not so easily pleased ; and there were occasional disturbances and demands for pay, which, as usual, were complied with as far as circumstances would permit. Fresh provisions were not to be had, and dogs, cats, and rats were in considerable requisition. The inhabitants suffered much ; many had laid in stores in time ; but the poor, who were not in a situation to provision themselves, were in a starving state.

In addition to this scarcity of provisions, an almost constant fire was kept up on the town, and many of the inhabitants were killed. The cholera also broke out with violence and carried off immense numbers. Thus was this unfortunate city subjected to war, plague, pestilence, and famine, all of which evils they bore with Christian fortitude : indeed the inhabitants had become desperate, and sooner than surrender, seemed determined to perish in the ruins.

It has been asserted, and I believe with truth, that orders were given to the marshal fully authorizing him to break out of the city with the

whole army, and try the fate of a battle. The marshal, on the other hand, accused the ministers of preventing him from executing those orders, when he had made dispositions so to do ; and it is true that when the bar again became open, and reinforcements were expected, his orders were countermanded.

The plan I had proposed for removing the army from Oporto and attacking Lisbon, had been submitted by the Duke of Palmella to the Portuguese government ; and on the 1st of February, Rodrigo de Magalhaes arrived in London from Oporto, with orders to carry the plan into execution.

Here I must correct an error, fallen into by the ministers-at-war and finance, who in their reports take the credit of having planned this steam-boat expedition, which they do not appear even to have thought of till my plan was forwarded by the Duke of Palmella, which will be seen by Bernardo de Sa's letter in the Appendix.

The only part they had any thing to do with was sending one of their party to London, unprovided with either means, money, or credit, to carry it into execution ; and M. Mendizabal, who

was no great admirer of the Emperor's ministers, seemed little disposed to have any transactions with Rodrigo Magalhaes, the gentleman entrusted with the mission.

He was also bearer of a letter to M. De Lima, Appendix, No. VI. desiring him to offer me the command of the squadron; and one from the minister of marine; begging me to concert measures with M. De Lima and Mendizabal. The date of these letters was the 31st of January. It was reported that there were disagreements between Sartorius and the Emperor's ministers, but no open rupture had taken place; and I was not aware that Admiral Sartorius had resigned the command; and as there was an article in his contract by which no officer could be put over his head, I did not see Appendix, No. VII. my way at all clearly, and consequently sent to the minister the conditions on which I should take the command, and wrote to Sartorius at the same time. It had been rumoured, though I do not pretend to say with justice, that it was the intention of the government to invite Admiral Sartorius to Oporto, and to take that opportunity of

removing him, and I thought it right to put him on his guard.

No attempt was made to procure the steam-boats for the projected expedition; it was altogether impossible. The friends of the cause were much cooled; they entertained no hope of ultimate success; and indeed a great disaster was anticipated. The merchants in London were well aware of the difficulties of provisioning the city, and the news of its surrender was expected by every packet.

After the reconnoissance of the 24th January no further movements took place on either side for some time. The enemy continued, however, to strengthen their lines and bombard the town. Marshal Solignac was blamed by some for want of activity, and for not sufficiently examining into the defences and obstructing the enemy; and, above all, for not possessing himself of Monte Castro and fortifying it, which would have greatly facilitated the landing of stores. I was not sufficiently long at Oporto to form any opinion on those subjects, and I have not seen documents sufficient to

assist me in judging how far he was right or wrong; it would, therefore, be great presumption in me to criticise the acts of a French general of his experience.

Monte Castro was certainly a desirable position to possess, but it would have too far extended our already extensive lines, and cost many men in defending it; and be it remembered, how many had been already lost in ill-judged attacks. Moreover, if the marshal entertained any serious intentions of marching his whole army out of Oporto, he was right in not diminishing their numbers. I must, however, observe that as the minister-at-war opposed a forward movement on the first landing at Oporto, before the Miguelite army was collected and entrenched, I cannot understand how he should afterwards approve or advise it, unless the provisions were so reduced that there was no alternative left but a desperate attack or surrender. He states, however, in his report to the Cortes, that at different times the government insisted on the Marshal undertaking offensive operations as the only means of saving them; and in the same report the troops at Oporto

are stated to amount to nearly eighteen thousand men of all arms, not half of whom, however, were fit to take the field. The same minister states that the enemy's force at that time round Oporto consisted of upwards of thirty-nine thousand infantry and fifteen hundred horse.

Figures are awkward things, particularly when they are officially stated by a minister; and Mr. Freire may explain to the Portuguese nation how he could expect Marshal Solignac to attack such a force strongly entrenched, when it was by his councils that an immediate advance was not made from Oporto after the Emperor landed; he was minister-at-war, and was responsible for the military operations.

Santa Martha had been lately deprived of the command of the army, which was conferred on the Count St. Lorenzo; and on the 3d of March, he attacked the Serra without success. A serious attack being expected next day, the troops were kept under arms all night; and at day-light a cannonade was opened from all parts of the enemy's lines, and the Serra was again attacked. Torres still commanded there, and as usual reserved his fire till the

enemy approached, and drove them back with loss.

The Pasteleiro had been fortified by General Saldanha, but the works were not finished, and to this point the enemy directed their attention, making a feint at the same time on the defences of the city. Colonel Pacheco, with the tenth infantry commanded by Major Carneiro, and a battalion of the Minho under the orders of Colonel Ozorio, was charged with the defence of the redoubt of Pinhal, to the left of the Pasteleiro. Major Cabral, with a part of the third infantry, defended the latter position. A detachment of the third and tenth were stationed in the curtain that connected the two redoubts. Colonel Fonseca occupied the light-house with the first moveable battalion, commanded by Major Rangel. The communication between the Pasteleiro and the Lordello was confided to the Scotch and the English rifles under the orders of Shaw; and a battalion of the ninth occupied the Lordello. The columns of the enemy, preceded by their skirmishers, attacked those positions and the communication between them; while another column

endeavoured to penetrate between the Pinhal and the light-house. The latter was vigorously charged by a company of the third regiment under Captain Meniz, supported by two companies of the tenth under Major Magalhaes, and were driven back with great loss.

The attack on Shaw was gallantly repulsed at the same time by the Scotch and rifles. In the two attacks two officers and thirteen men were killed; Pacheco and ten officers and thirty-four men were wounded. The enemy were reported to have lost three hundred men killed, and one thousand five hundred wounded: their loss must have been considerable, as they were exposed in their advance to the fire of the redoubts, but I think it was greatly exaggerated. This defeat was, however, a severe lesson to them, and inspired much confidence in the inhabitants and troops, and they began to believe that Oporto was not to be taken.

Since the marshal's attack on the Quejò, the squadron had been lying under the Bayonne islands, without pay, provisions, or clothing, cut off from all communication with Vigo, and even threatened to be driven out by a Spanish squadron;

the crews discontented, or, rather, in a state of mutiny, and every day expected to rise and take possession of the ships. The admiral had been ordered to Oporto, but having suspicions of treachery declined complying with their wishes. The St. Vincent was in Vigo to watch the movements of the Spanish squadron.

In this state of things the Emperor's ministers were mad enough to deprive Sartorius of the command of the squadron, and confer it for the time being on Captain Crosbie. The decree was dated the 13th of March. A few days previous to this, the admiral received my letter, which prepared him for a coup-d'état. This letter he replied to Appendix, No. VIII. under date of the 14th.

Sir John Doyle was the bearer of the decree, accompanied by Captain Crosbie, to whom he was to deliver up the squadron ; and Captain Bressane Lieto was charged with the settlement of their accounts. In the event of the admiral declining to give up the command, he was instructed to arrest him, for which purpose he was provided Appendix, No. IX. with a party of caçadores.

Will posterity believe that, in a town besieged

by a powerful force, without means either to pay or provision an army, a squadron in a state of mutiny, on the brink of starvation, unprovided with anchors, cables, stores, or clothing,—I say, will posterity believe that a set of men, calling themselves statesmen, were to be found capable of such unparalleled folly? The decree was signed by the Baron de Sa, but I have reason to believe that he, as well as the Marquis of Loulé, was overruled in the cabinet by Freire, Carvalho, and Candido Xavier.

It was not before the 23d that Sir John Doyle arrived at Vigo. The admiral was in some degree prepared for his reception, and, indeed, had read the decree in the Chronicle, which was the first intimation he had of being superseded.

An officer was sent from the flag-ship to make enquiry who the passengers were, and returned with a request that a boat might be sent from the flag-ship, to convey the gallant officer on board, with his despatches and instructions. This was of course complied with as far as Sir John Doyle was concerned; but Captain Crosbie was put under arrest, and Captain Bressane, and two

officers who accompanied him, were ordered to remain. Sir John, in full uniform, and decorated with his various orders, now appeared on the Rainha's quarter-deck, and offered his hand to the admiral, which, however, he declined until informed of the nature of his mission, and requested it might be communicated to him on the quarter-deck. The general produced the Carta Regia, and, not being an expert diplomatist, also produced his instructions, which the admiral read, rather against the ambassador's will, and, as he might have expected, he was placed under arrest and deprived of his sword. He attempted to address the officers and ship's company, and to assure them that all promises made to them should be fulfilled, but was stopped by the admiral. Captain Goble and the other captains now came on board, and retired with the admiral to his cabin, leaving Sir John on deck, under custody of a lieutenant of marines. In half an hour the diplomatist was summoned to the cabin, and then Captain Goble communicated to him that the crews of the different ships had determined that neither the admiral nor captains should quit

their respective ships until they were entirely settled with; and, in fact, the Don Pedro's ship's company, who were now becoming mutinous, had drawn up resolutions to that effect.

The admiral required Sir John to pledge his honour that he had no money or other public documents, which he did. A boat was sent for Captain Bressane, who declined coming on board the Rainha with either money or documents, as his instructions were to settle the accounts of the squadron only when it was delivered to Captain Crosbie.

Another boat was sent, to bring him on board. On appearing on the Rainha's deck, he protested against their proceedings, but delivered the money and papers. Sir John and Captain Bressane now returned, under escort, to the vessel which brought them to Vigo. Several letters passed between the admiral and Sir John, which it is unnecessary here to publish. They were shortly after released, and permitted to return to Oporto, to make their report to the ministers.

When the services admiral Sartorius had ren-

dered to the cause are considered, together with his preserving the squadron under the most trying circumstances, and under every deprivation, it is not to be wondered at that the officers should feel indignant at this treatment. They now came to certain resolutions relative to their future proceedings, which were forwarded to Oporto. The ministers, seeing the danger their folly had brought on the Queen's cause, restored Sartorius, and complied with the demands of the squadron. Bernardo de Sa, who had opposed the proceedings in the first instance, thinking they betrayed weakness, resigned his portfolio.

Appendix,
No. X.

The Portuguese government have endeavoured to persuade the world that the admiral was a traitor to the cause he served; but, taking all circumstances into consideration, had he acted in any other manner, the squadron would have been lost. The crews had been long discontented, being neither paid, victualled, nor clad. The admiral had so often promised them a settlement of their claims, that they had lost confidence in him; and nothing but his seizing this opportunity of placing himself at the head of the revolt

restored confidence and saved the squadron. The crews wished to carry the ships to Flushing, and abandon the cause altogether. It was their idea that the admiral was ill-treated, and would support them, which again restored his authority. The only error Sartorius committed was not proceeding immediately to Oporto, and insisting that Messrs. Freire, Carvalho, and Candido Xavier should be consigned to his charge, thereby ridding the Emperor of three men who had done all they could to ruin the Queen's cause. I do not accuse them of treason; but had they been the vilest traitors that ever drew breath, they could not have taken a more decided part to serve Don Miguel and ruin the Queen.

Besides, it was a gratuitous insult to a man who had performed great services, and made great sacrifices; and had they signified to Admiral Sartorius that he no longer enjoyed their confidence, he would have been too happy to have resigned the command, with which he had been thoroughly disgusted for a considerable time.

CHAPTER IX.

ON the 21st Oporto was again attacked on the side of the Antas by a column of three thousand men ; the half-constructed redoubt was destroyed, and the piquets stationed there driven in. During the day there was a good deal of skirmishing, and at two o'clock the marshal ordered the fifth caçadores, part of the third infantry, and the first and second British battalions, supported by two squadrons of lancers, to attack the position in front, while Schwalbach's brigade advanced on their left ; Major Sadler's battalion charged up the hill, and the major was mortally wounded. The men fell into confusion and retired. Major Brownston, who commanded the other battalion, rallied them and carried the hill at the point of

the bayonet. Here the Queen's lancers endeavoured to break a spear with the Miguelité cavalry, who showed themselves on the hill, but retired on the approach of the lancers. Schwalbach gained the height on the left and made fifty prisoners. Twice the army attempted to regain the position, and were driven back.

Our loss on this occasion was one hundred killed and wounded: amongst the latter were Major Sadler and Captain Wright, who both died. Mr. Woldrigé behaved with great courage on this occasion and was wounded. Two strong redoubts were now constructed on the Antas without having been molested by the enemy.

The weather now became more moderate, and the landing of provisions comparatively easy. For two months Oporto had been in the utmost distress for want of provisions and ammunition; and it was even contemplated to make propositions to the enemy. The marshal had been instructed to move out, but this order was contradicted, further reinforcements having arrived, and more expected. The Emperor was so well aware how

precarious his tenor of Oporto was, that he wrote to the Empress about this time to say that nothing but a miracle could save them.

On the 9th of April, Monte de Cavallo, where the enemy were constructing a redoubt, was attacked and carried with great gallantry by the third, tenth, and fifth caçadores ; this hill was maintained and fortified.

About this time Mr. Sandford, the commissary-general of the fleet, arrived at Vigo, with a small sum of money, from England; which assisted Sartorius in quieting the people, and persuading them to relinquish their intention of carrying the ships to Flushing. A reinforcement of seamen also arrived in the *Edward* transport, and finding the squadron in an unsettled state, they made an attempt to carry her off, but were stopped by the *Rainha*. She had also a main-mast on board for that ship, which Mendizabal had taken the precaution to send out : it had been once before at Oporto, and had been sent back by the minister.

The *Don Pedro* had been cruising off Oporto, and arrived about this time at the Bayonne Islands. Her ship's company, thinking they were as much

entitled to mutiny as those of the Donna Maria and Rainha, rose and sent their officers out of the ship. The other crews, were, however, of a different opinion. She was not so deeply in arrear of pay; and they most willingly supported the admiral in bringing them to reason. This was an opportunity that ought not to have been lost, and had a severe example been made of the ringleaders, there would have been no further disturbance in the squadron.

The news of the revolt of the fleet, which arrived in England in the beginning of April, aroused some of the Queen's friends; and they were determined to make a last effort to rescue suffering Portugal from the grasp of Don Miguel and his wicked advisers. The Chevalier de Lima, knowing that I was a well-wisher of the Queen, requested me to come to town and concert measures with him and Mendizabal to save her cause.

At this time I had received no answer from the Portuguese government to my proposals, and considered the affair at an end. Rodrigo Magalhaes was still in London, but had made no progress in his mission about the steam-boats; indeed it

had been entirely given up. It was now necessary to do something, and we cast our eyes towards the Algarves.

We had been assured that they were favourable to the Queen, and that a respectable force landed there would insure the revolt of the whole kingdom. Mendizabal engaged to provide twelve hundred Poles at Rochefort for the purpose, and two or three steam-boats to carry them ; to this point we directed our attention.

I had been in the Algarves during the Peninsular War, and retained a very good recollection of the Guadiana ; and it appeared that, by forcing the entrance of that river, and steaming up to Mertola, a rapid march might be made on Beja ; and if the people were really favourable to the cause, a general rising might be anticipated throughout the Alemtejo ; but this ought to have been accomplished with native troops, and I hesitated undertaking such an enterprise with the motley crew I had reason to suppose would be engaged for this forlorn hope ; but the persuasions of Mendizabal, and my own sincere desire to serve the cause of the Queen, which had much interested me when in command

of the Galatea in the Western Islands, overcame my objections, and I consented to undertake it, provided I was accompanied by the Duke of Palmella and Mendizabal, who had long been enthusiasts in the Queen's cause.

The zeal of the Duke, though no longer minister, was in no way diminished, and he left his amiable wife and large family in Paris, and consented to embark in this hazardous undertaking. The sum of ten thousand pounds was necessary to fit out the expedition; Mendizabal had exhausted all his money and all his rhetoric; and most of those who had already advanced large sums, looked upon the cause and their money as lost, and refused further aid. Others, also deeply engaged, were willing to come forward with a small sum, and make a last effort for suffering Portugal. M. Da Sylva, now the Baron Lagos, was the first to engage his father-in-law, Mr. Pratt, Mr. Humphreys, Mr. Wright, Mr. Easthope, and Mr. Pitta, to advance the necessary sum, on condition that the troops were not to land at Oporto; and the security they required was an assurance from me that an expedition would actually take place. Secrecy was necessary, but

we were obliged to communicate our plan to those who advanced the money; and, as all were interested in being silent, I have every reason to believe the secret was well kept.

Mr. Pratt had always been a sincere friend to the Queen, and, through the influence of the Baron Lagos, had lent her Majesty twenty-five thousand pounds on her departure from Portsmouth for Rio de Janeiro, which was the salvation of the Terceira regency.

A few days after these arrangements were made, letters of a more favourable nature were received from Admiral Sártorius. The ministers, having failed in their unworthy attempt to arrest him, had annulled their ordinance depriving him of the command of the squadron, and restored him to his rank. This apology and a small sum of money to the crews restored order, and the squadron consented to weigh and proceed to Oporto. The Admiral, however, had determined to relinquish his command, and only waited the arrival of his successor; and he had written to this effect to the Portuguese minister in London and myself. The expedition now assumed a more

Appendix.
No. XI.

respectable appearance. The hopes of the Queen's friends revived, and through the influence of the Baron Lagos and M. Mendizabal a sum sufficiently large was obtained to send five steamboats, with an English battalion of four hundred men, commanded by Colonel Dudgeon, an old Peninsular officer, and a Belgian of like number : four hundred seamen were to be entered, and several distinguished naval officers consented to accompany me.

This expedition, like all others sent to Portugal, was ill managed in the details, which led to much inconvenience, loss of men and money, and well nigh to a total failure. Instead of the steamboats at once receiving their men in London, some rendezvoused at Portsmouth, others at Falmouth, and small steamers at an enormous expense conducted the seamen and troops to the different ports. The Mendilla Portuguese corvette was lying in the Thames, and little or no difficulty was thrown in the way of entering men. Upwards of two hundred had been obtained by the usual method of crimping, and the usual method of cheating them was carried on to a shameful ex-

tent. They received nominally two months' wages, the greater part in bad and dear slops supplied between the crimps and the Jews. In this manner they were shipped on board a steamer to be conveyed to Portsmouth. On the passage from London, spirits were obtained from the steward, and a scene of drunkenness, insubordination, and confusion took place, not easily to be described. By the great exertions of Captain Wilkinson and the other officers order was restored; and on their arrival at Portsmouth they were turned over to the City of Waterford steamer, destined to convey them to Oporto. At night, the men, having had time to reflect, found they had been imposed upon, and instead of quietly submitting their case to the officers, broke out into a general mutiny. Some rushed aft with open knives, and threatened to massacre Captain Wilkinson and all the officers; others lowered the boats down, and as many as they could contain went on shore. One boat, which was crowded to excess, upset, and several men were drowned. As we were all embarked in the face of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, caution was necessary in endeavouring to suppress

Capt. Wil-
kinson's
letter,
Appendix,
No. XII.

a mutiny. Had lives been lost, the authorities would have interfered and stopped the expedition; and how the officers would have been protected by the law was not very easy to foresee.

The loss of life by the upsetting of the boat, together with the impossibility of getting on shore, brought them a little to their senses; and the prudent, temperate, and firm conduct of the officers restored peace. Before daylight all was quiet, and they appeared ashamed of their conduct. In the afternoon I got quietly on board without its being generally known at Portsmouth, gave the men a severe lecture, heard their story, and promised to redress their grievances, and on the same evening, 22d of May, we left Portsmouth in company with the Britannia steamer, having on board Dudgeon's regiment, where a similar scene, but less violent, had occurred. Every precaution was taken to prevent a recurrence of these evils at Falmouth, and an allowance of one sovereign was given to each man to make up for what they were supposed to have been defrauded of; but the volcano, though smothered for the moment, was not extinct, and the day after our

arrival there was much grumbling and discontent: in short, they had received their money and were determined to proceed no further; they kept quiet, however, till after midnight, when, the moon going down, the boatswains' mates very coolly piped all hands on shore. A rush was made to the boat tackle falls, which were cut, and as many as the boats would contain took French leave and went on shore.

Before leaving Portsmouth I had taken professional advice how to act in a similar case, and was informed that the only legal manner of resisting was by the captain of the vessel calling upon the officers to prevent the men taking away his property. Our captain, however, was a poor devil, and instead of taking any steps, very quietly took himself into a small boat at the beginning of the row, and came on shore to report the circumstance to me. Fortunately, the steamer's boats were only capable of containing a few men, and none others being allowed to come alongside, the remainder of this unruly crew were obliged to remain. Next morning, I embarked, in company with the Duke of Palmella and M. Mendizabal, thinking ourselves

fortunate in getting out of Falmouth with only one hundred and thirty-seven men instead of four hundred men, which were wanted to complete the squadron. All this might have been prevented had honest and proper people been chosen to carry on the details, and had our friend Mendizabal been less active in mind, and had found out that one head, be it ever so clever, is incapable of managing every thing. The steamers should have started from their different ports, and have rendezvoused off Ushant, which would have given the men no time for reflection, and put it totally out of their power to get on shore; the very sight of which, particularly when they are unoccupied, is too much for so unprincipled and thoughtless a set of men as undisciplined British seamen generally are.

The auspices at starting were unfavourable; nevertheless we were not discouraged, and, much to the annoyance of some of the authorities at Falmouth, we got clear off on the 28th, with five steamers, containing about one hundred and sixty officers and seamen, and an English and Belgian regiment; and, after a pleasant passage,

arrived on the 2d of June at Vigo, where we found another steamer from Rochefort with twelve men instead of four hundred Poles, that part of the armament having completely failed.

A few hours sufficed to make arrangements for completing four of the steamers with fuel and water, who were left there for that purpose ; and the City of Waterford pushed on and anchored in Oporto roads after dark : the usual night salutation of shells was going on with great vivacity on both sides, and appeared to us novices a serious attack.

Admiral Sartorius was lying there with his flag on board the Rainha, together with the Don Pedro, Donna Maria, Villa Flor brig, and a numerous convoy of merchant-vessels waiting favourable opportunities to land provisions and stores for the army and inhabitants. The landing had been effected during the last two months with tolerable safety, though frequently interrupted by the surf ; and the town was now well supplied with every species of provision with the exception of live stock, which was not easily obtained. The Duke of Palmella and Mendizabal accompanied me on

board the flag-ship, where we were received with the greatest kindness and sincere welcome. He was quite disgusted with the service, and indignant at the conduct of the ministers towards him.

It appeared pretty certain that, when he was invited to come on shore at Oporto, it was the intention of the government to have kidnapped him, and the letter he received from me was the first intimation he had of their intention to supersede him. This having failed, the Quixotic expedition of Sir John Doyle followed.

Sartorius hastily recounted the various events that had taken place, and by all I could collect from him, the prospect before me was by no means brilliant. The Miguelite fleet was fitting out in great force, and shortly expected to sail. Our force was very inferior in numbers and material, and no dependence was to be placed on the men who had the direction of the war. They were on bad terms with the marshal, and were pretty generally despised by the Portuguese officers.

The civil war in Portugal was unlike other wars. Don Pedro's and Don Miguel's ministers vied with

each other in intrigues and follies; but, fortunately for the cause of the Queen, Don Pedro was more active than his brother; his ministers could do less harm, and the cause of liberty triumphed.

After remaining a few hours with Sartorius, the despatch boat came off; and as the beach was good, no time was lost in getting on shore,—a task attended with considerable danger. The entrance of the river is little more than pistol-shot across; the north side, where the Foz is situated, was possessed by the Queen's troops; the opposite by the Miguelites. To the north of the Foz there is a small bay under the light-house, where the boats landed when the surf permitted; this bay was commanded by the enemy's musketry, which, however, at night did little damage, as they were kept in check by the light-house battery; and it is to be presumed that the piquets stationed to annoy the landing got careless and kept under cover, firing their muskets at random over the parapet. In this bay we landed, and received a tolerable good salutation of musketry, happily without effect. Crossing the bar is at-

tended with considerably more danger, which shall be described in its proper place.

We were received with great kindness by General Saldanha, who commanded at the Foz ; and during the time the mules were preparing, he gave us some insight into the affairs of Oporto. Our arrival had been talked of, but little known. The army was tolerably well supplied, and desertion, which had got to an alarming height, had ceased.

A meeting had taken place on board Lord Henry Paulet's brig between Saldanha and the Count Torre Bello, one of Miguel's officers, to endeavour to bring about an arrangement, which failed. Different opinions have been given about this meeting, and about the proposals made by Saldanha ; but as they are not supported by proof, it is unnecessary here to state them. I believe the Count Torre Bello gave him to understand that nothing short of Don Miguel marrying the Queen would be listened to.

The marshal was highly incensed at this meeting, and told Saldanha that had he been in the French service, he would have been shot : but it soon passed over. The intentions of Saldanha, I

am convinced, were good; but an unauthorised meeting of that description at such a critical time was decidedly improper.

No fresh enterprise had been undertaken on either side, and with the exception of the batteries exchanging shot and shell, all was as quiet as if nothing was going forward. The Foz was much exposed both to the north and south, and was nearly destroyed; but still, though protected only by a few redoubts connected with ditches, certainly not strong, there seemed to be little apprehension on the part of the constitutionalists.

The Castle is situated at the entrance of the harbour. On the opposite side of the river were placed the Miguelite batteries, threatening destruction to any vessels that had the hardihood to force the passage. On a hill to the north of the Foz is placed the light-house battery within musket-shot of the enemy's lines, composed of strong redoubts connected with ditches extending from the Foz all round Oporto. The Foz, on the other hand, is connected with Oporto by a chain of redoubts and ditches, which were never forced, but which could have been forced by a strong and determined enemy.

CHAPTER X.

AFTER partaking of the hospitality of Saldanha, we mounted our mules, and proceeded to the town. The weather was fine, the country beautiful, and the scenery enlivening to a degree. On the left were the enemy's batteries, with their flags flying, sufficiently close to observe their sentinels: on the right, at a little distance, the river with its high-rising banks well wooded, and the opposite heights crowned by the Miguelite batteries, occasionally sending their shot and shell from either side into the Queen's lines, distinguished by the blue and white constitutional flag. Nearly twenty years had elapsed since I had seen an enemy: the sight of flags, the noise of guns, the sound of drums and bugles, soon awoke me to a recollection

of the scenes of early life, and conveyed a sensation which will be well understood by those accustomed to the bustle of war and camps. The road was tolerably well covered, being dangerous only in a few places, and we passed without molestation.

At six we entered the besieged and heroic city of Oporto, and proceeded to the Duke of Terceira's quarters, where we were greeted with the greatest joy by the duke and his staff, —Palmella as a sincere friend and colleague, and myself as an old acquaintance in the Western Islands. A few minutes sufficed to explain how we came and what brought us, and the whole party were rejoiced at our arrival. They now looked forward to active measures and to the termination of the intrigues that had been so long going on at Oporto.

The house in which we were had been frequently perforated by shells; nevertheless the inmates seemed quite at ease, and we sat down to a most comfortable breakfast; and after making ourselves acquainted with the situation of affairs, we waited on the Marquis of Loulé, the Emperor's

brother-in-law and minister of marine, and were rather surprised to learn from him that all was not quite right at head-quarters: he even cautioned me to say nothing about the projected expedition.

Appendix,
No. XIII.

I shewed him the Chevalier de Lima's letter, and at once gave him to understand that I should not take command of the squadron unless an expedition was immediately decided on. We had all calculated on a welcome reception from the Emperor, and the Duke of Palmella had proposed to proceed at once to the palace, which I objected to, not being exactly in a costume to appear before royalty, having suffered much from a nervous affection of the face, and my head being wrapped up in flannel, like a respectable old lady. The Marquis of Loulé conducted us to the palace, and ushered in the Duke of Palmella, who soon returned, not well pleased at the very cold reception he met with. I came next, and was received at the door of the apartment by the Emperor, who stood with his hands behind him, looking very angry, and speaking as roughly as he looked. Not being accustomed to such company, I began to consider whether this was

an uncivil or only an imperial manner of receiving a person who had come out to render him a service. My meditations were soon disturbed by his Majesty, in rather a brusque manner, asking me if I wished an expedition immediately; to which I replied, I had come out for the express purpose. He then referred me to Marshal Solignac, and dismissed me rather abruptly. My interview with the marshal was not much more satisfactory; when I shewed him the letter of Appendix,
No. VI. the late minister of marine about an expedition of six thousand men, he at once told me it was out of the question, as he had not more than six thousand bayonets altogether, and he invited me to accompany him next morning to the Emperor, which I declined unless expressly sent for. I added that I felt much hurt at the reception I had met with, and if something was not immediately decided upon, I should return to England forthwith; and this I communicated to all my Terceira friends. During the course of the day we found out that some evil-disposed persons had put it into Don Pedro's head that we had brought the expedition out to displace him; for which reason

it had been got up secretly, without communicating with his government. The latter part of this was quite true, and the reason plain,—secrecy was necessary; and that word was nowhere to be found in the Portuguese dictionary at Oporto. Next morning I accompanied the marshal to the Emperor, at his particular request, and was most graciously received; he had got the better of his ill-humour, and I suppose had been told that I was not satisfied the day before.

I told him at once the view I took of his situation, that he had no choice but to lay down his arms or take a decisive step; the shortest was to force the Tagus, if we could get a good breeze at night, and land in Black-Horse-square or close to Lisbon, make a rapid march on the capital, or send a force to the south; the three different plans being subject to the troops he could spare. I recommended him at once to commence the embarkation of troops, which was difficult and required time, and pressed upon him the necessity of dispatch, as the Miguelite fleet were fitting out in great force, and would, if ready, check all our operations. The interview, however, ended without any determina-

tion; the Emperor and the marshal would consider. The delay caused considerable discontent among the general officers, and they were anxious to go to the Emperor, and request him to put Palmella at the head of the administration, and go to work at once. Palmella, however, thought it advisable to wait, being of opinion that the ministry would fall from their own weakness, but in this he was mistaken.

No person had confidence in the present ministers. Freire was idle, incapable, and an intriguer; Candido Xavier a worn-out old man; and Sylva Carvalho unpopular, though certainly clever, and the only one who could have found funds to have kept the army together at Oporto. This day the Duke of Terceira gave a grand dinner to the ministers and superior officers; every thing was talked of; Mendizabal, impatient at delay, could hardly contain himself, and no one was pleased. In the middle of dinner a shell burst against a wall, within a few feet of the window of the room in which we sat; but neither guests nor servants seemed much disturbed, though a little more powder would have pitched it in the

centre of the dining-table, and in all probability sent marshal, admiral, generals, and ministers to their consultations in another world. This was an every-day occurrence in Oporto during the siege in one house or another, and scarcely a day passed without loss of life.

Next morning the marshal called upon Palmella, and after talking a good deal about expeditions, &c., asked if he was willing to form an administration, to which the Duke readily assented, provided he was at liberty to choose his colleagues. Next morning at ten we were appointed to meet the Emperor: there were assembled Mr. Freire, minister-at-war; Candido Xavier, foreign affairs; the Dukes of Terceira and Palmella; the marshal and myself. I was still very ill, and could hardly articulate from an inflammation of the tongue and face, which was still bound up, and in this plight, for the first time in my life I attended a cabinet council; the expression of Oxenheimer to his son flashed across me when I saw some of the councillors. The marshal made an exposé of his force, which amounted to nine thousand men fit to take the field; various points were discussed,

but nothing decided, and we were all invited to dine with the Emperor. Palmella was to return at four o'clock, and the marshal told him he would then be desired to form an administration; but alas! between twelve and four the Emperor changed his mind, and the interview ended in some trifling conversation.

It is difficult to know who was at the bottom of all this indecision. It was clear the Emperor did not like the Duke of Palmella, who he fancied had lent himself to an intrigue to displace him; whether this is true or not I never learnt. The Emperor liked his present ministers, from whom he had nothing to fear, and they cordially hated Palmella. The marshal was not partial to them, and with great reason, for one of their colleagues had been a short time before turned out of office for surreptitiously getting hold of his papers; perhaps also he feared Palmella, who had the reputation of being a good statesman, and was probably afraid of losing the influence he had with the Emperor, which appeared considerable, though at the same time his majesty did not appear very placid under it.

I was very ill and out of temper, and did not go to the Emperor's dinner. In the evening Palmella, Terceira, Saldanha, and several of our old friends came to see me; a good deal of discussion took place relative to the causes of all this procrastination: we were totally in the dark, and knew not whether to blame the Emperor, the marshal, or the ministers; but as there was a council of war next morning, we hoped it would lead to something decisive.

At the council were assembled about twenty generals, ministers, and officers, and the Emperor prepared four questions for discussion.

1st. Is it advisable to embark as many troops as can be spared, and make a bold attack on Lisbon?

2d. Is it better to embark between two and three thousand, and make an attack on some distant point?

3d. Should Villa Nova be attacked by landing in the rear?

4th. Should an attack be made in the rear of the lines to the northward?

The marshal again made his exposé, gave us

to understand we were to state our opinions, and the Emperor should decide.

I was so ill I could hardly speak one word, and gave my opinion in writing:—that the Emperor was placed in a critical position, and nothing but an immediate and decisive step could save him. The squadron of Don Miguel was to be ready by the 20th, consisting of two line-of-battle ships, a fifty-gun ship, a fifty-gun frigate, and five or six corvettes and brigs; he had three frigates, one corvette, and one brig to oppose them. Should they come out before we sailed, and beat his squadron, he must lay down his arms; if we beat them, we should probably be too much disabled to undertake an expedition, and he must still lay down his arms. Should the battle be a drawn one, we had no place to refit; they would return to Lisbon, refit, and blockade him, and he must eventually submit. I therefore advised him to contract his lines, give up the Foz and the communication, and defend Oporto, which was provisioned for three months,—embark all the men he could spare, and make a dash on Lisbon; if we succeeded, Don Miguel's game was up, and his

troops in Oporto delivered; if he failed, the Oporto troops must share the fate of the Lisbon division.

There were various opinions about this. The marshal opposed, as fatal to the cause, sending a small force to a distant part of the kingdom, and preferred an attack either on the enemy's lines to the north or south. I could see no advantage in this. We were led to suppose Don Miguel had from thirty to forty thousand men round Oporto; their lines were strong, and could not be forced without great loss; and even should we be victorious, it would be quite impossible to advance with so small an army, and must eventually return to Oporto with diminished numbers. Should a landing be effected to the north or south of the Douro, and the enemy taken in the rear, some of their works might be destroyed; but from the difficulty of landing on all parts of the west coast of Portugal, nothing certain could be calculated upon, and the division, if landed and unsuccessful, would be entirely cut off. There were various opinions on these plans. Saldanha agreed with me, as did the majority. He was of opinion that Lisbon was

Portugal, and once in possession of the capital, the war was at an end. The sequel, however, proved he was mistaken as well as myself, and had our plan been put in execution, we should certainly have taken Lisbon, but Oporto must have fallen before we could have organized a sufficient force to relieve it. Had the Foz and the line of communication been given up, Oporto could certainly have been defended, but it was only provisioned for three months, and would have ultimately been reduced by famine. Had the lines of communication with the Foz been preserved, Bourmont must have forced them on the 25th of July.

The whole of the proceedings were reduced to writing, and I was desired to attend on the Emperor next morning, who was to decide. I had seen so much indecision and vacillation that I still expected nothing, and was most agreeably surprised, at the meeting with the Emperor and Marshal Solignac the following day, to find he had decided on embarking five thousand men, making a dash on Lisbon, and playing double or quits. The Emperor asked where I should place him; I told him the royal standard must fly on board the

Rainha de Portugal. All this was to be kept secret—I was desired not even to communicate it to Palmella.

Two hours afterwards I again met the marshal, who told me the Emperor insisted on having a steam-boat for himself. I explained the impossibility of complying with this ; our means were so circumscribed, it would be with the greatest difficulty we could embark five thousand men ; that the Emperor must come on board the flag-ship with the marshal and his staff, and leave his ministers at Oporto, where they could do little harm. I also pointed out the bad effect of the Emperor placing himself in a steam-boat, as people would suppose, in the event of a failure, he was ready for a start. I also spoke to the minister of marine, who quite agreed with me and promised to mention it to the Emperor. I begged to be allowed to communicate with the Duke of Palmella, as we had gone on together from the beginning, and my silence would appear as if there was a wish to detach me from him and create want of confidence. I also recommended him to tell the Emperor that a great deal depended on who his ministers

were, and that he had better put Palmella at the head of the administration.

In the course of the day all was changed. The Emperor and the marshal were to remain at Oporto, and a smaller expedition sent to land where was most advisable. I was permitted to communicate this to the Duke of Palmella, but not to the marshal, as he was known to be entirely opposed to it. I now received my commission as Vice-Admiral and Major-General, with authority to appoint my officers, took leave of the minister, and embarked at the Foz after dark. I had not proceeded many yards when the Miguelite batteries, which we were obliged to pass within pistol-shot, opened their fire of round, grape, and musketry, throwing fire-balls at the same time to point out more clearly the position of the boats. The castle of the Foz and the adjacent batteries returned the salute, and between the two fires, which to a person in safety would have been very beautiful, but to one in danger very unpleasant, I managed to get safe through the surf with a boat's crew half of whom did not know how to pull their oars, and could not have been worse had they

Appendix,
No. XIV.

been selected by Don Miguel himself. I was followed by about five hundred men of the first division, and though they were peppered most confoundedly, not a man was hurt. The landing and embarking, both from the river and the bay, had been going on upwards of six months, yet no improvement had taken place. There were no capstans to haul the boats up, no discipline amongst the boatmen, no classification, yet there was no want of naval officers. They had, however, more confidence in Providence than in their own genius, and Providence most singularly assisted the Queen's cause, and brought it to a happy termination.

Early on the morning of the 11th I got safe on board Admiral Sartorius's ship, who gave up the command of the squadron on having received letters of thanks from the ministers in the name of the Emperor, and I was assured that his accounts should be settled forthwith, and a title conferred on him as a reward for his services. How ^{those} promises have been fulfilled, he will ^{probably} inform the public. To the Marquis of Loulé, who was ^{minister} of ^{marine}, no blame

can be attached ; he was an honourable man, and Sartorius must look to the other worthy gentlemen who advised his dismissal, and I believe opposed the settlement of his claims to the last.

My flag had not been long up ere I found I was not reposing on a bed of roses. Promises had been made to the oldest seamen that they should be allowed to return to England with the admiral, and no persuasions would induce them to remain. I was thus deprived of one hundred of the best men the day I took command of the squadron. I had brought out one hundred and thirty-seven, who were barely sufficient to complete the crews of the frigates. The *Villa Flor* was chiefly manned by Portuguese, the *Portuense* entirely so ; the latter was in such a state of disorder that she was paid off, and the officers and men landed. Captain Blackstone, late of the *Rainha*, was appointed to her, and a mixed crew of one hundred men got together. Captain Wilkinson took command of the *Rainha*, with the rank of commodore ; Captain Charles Napier was appointed principal adjutant, and Mr. Pearn master of the fleet, both with the rank of commander ; Lieutenant Peak was

appointed to command the Donna Maria. Captain Goble remained in command of the Don Pedro, and Captain Ruxton in the Villa Flor. Captain Mac Donough took charge of the steamboats, and Captain Pryce of the naval transport, with directions to complete her with water and provisions, and be ready to move where required.

Those changes very much tended to re-establish discipline, which from want of pay, food, clothing, and other causes, was much relaxed; indeed the crews had been in open mutiny; many of the officers had been intriguing against the admiral; an attempt had been made to arrest that admiral on board his own ship, by a weak and foolish government; some of the officers had been dismissed, and others had gone home.

The ships were badly furnished in every species of stores, had hardly a boat that could swim, and could not average two anchors and cables for each ship. The men were almost naked, and there was no means of clothing them. In short, it was impossible to see a more inefficient squadron, and how Admiral Sartorius got through the winter and kept them together, is difficult to understand.

The Don Pedro mounted fifty short eighteen-pounders and thirty-two carronades; the Rainha forty-six eighteen-pounders, long and short; the Donna Maria forty-two eighteen-pounders and thirty-two-pound carronades; the Villa Flor eighteen eighteen-pounders; Portuense twenty thirty-two-pound carronades. The crews consisted of about one thousand men and officers.

With this force, and in this state, we had to conduct an expedition to rescue Portugal from the tyranny of Don Miguel, and place Donna Maria on the throne, against one hundred thousand men in arms, and against the will of the nation, as had been repeatedly asserted and believed by the Tory party in this country; and this was to be done in face of a squadron of two line-of-battle ships, one fifty-gunned ship, a fifty-gunned frigate, three corvettes, and four or five brigs, ready for sea in the Tagus; and the troops to go on this expedition were to be embarked at night, and pass over a dangerous bar, within pistol-shot of the enemy's batteries, who had full warning of our intention, and had made every preparation to destroy them.

On hoisting my flag I issued the following order:—

“ On taking command of the squadron of Her Most Faithful Majesty, I feel proud in associating myself with so many gallant officers and men, who have already so nobly distinguished themselves in the cause of freedom and the Queen.

“ The squadron must have seen that a large force of steam-boats are now here to co-operate with them. Should the enemy put to sea, you will know what to do with them; should they remain in port, attacks will be made on various parts of the coast, and a general rising of the people against usurpation and tyranny is anticipated. My lads! we have battles to fight, and great exertions to make—preserve discipline and look up to your officers, and we shall succeed. The eyes of all Europe are on you—your countrymen, aye, and countrywomen also, are longing to welcome you to England; and when the battle is won, and you return to your native homes, you will be hailed as men who rescued suffering Portugal from tyranny and oppression.”

• The steam-boats were ordered in shore to receive

the troops, and boats sent to assist in towing them off; we received, however, only one cask of water and five soldiers. Next morning I telegraphed—“ That was not the manner to gain the cause of the Queen;” and suspecting that there were dissensions between the government and the marshal, I again telegraphed—“ Are soldiers coming off or not? I shall act accordingly”—and I wrote to say that if troops were not immediately embarked, I should haul down my flag, and return to England forthwith. I had been most explicit with the minister, and I knew, from the vacillation and intrigues that were going on, that nothing but taking a high tone would put an end to them.

In the evening I received an intimation by telegraph to send boats on shore for troops, and a dispatch by the guard-boat, informing me that another council had been held, in which it was decided that five thousand men could not be spared, and that two thousand five hundred were to be embarked under the Duke of Terceira, and Palmella was to accompany the expedition as civil governor of the provinces who declared for the Queen; that Marshal Solignac, who disap-

proved of this entirely, had resigned ; that the Emperor had taken command of the army, and appointed General Saldanha chief of his staff.

It is due to the marshal to observe, that though he disapproved entirely of sending so small a force to the south, he offered either to accompany an expedition of five thousand men to Lisbon, or, if the Emperor went, to remain and defend Oporto. This measure, however, did not square with the timidity of the Emperor's advisers. They neither cared to go with the Emperor on so bold an enterprise, nor liked to remain with the marshal with so small a force, and, consequently, they succeeded in persuading His Majesty to choose the smaller enterprise.

The appointment of the officers seemed to be very satisfactory, and all began to look forward to a happy change of circumstances. I also received the following letter from the Emperor.

“ Oporto, June 11, 1835. ”

“ MY DEAR ADMIRAL,

“ I hasten to communicate to you that a decision was yesterday taken to send

an expedition of two thousand six hundred and seventy-two men to the south, of which four hundred and ninety are already on board, one thousand four hundred and seventeen will embark to-night, and to-morrow the rest, by which means the expedition will be ready, I think, to sail in the course of the following day. You may be assured that I will contribute all my energies that there shall be no delay.

“ I should have wished to have written this with my own hand, but too much business hinders me. Go away then, my dear admiral. I follow you with my vows, and I hope to see you return to me covered with glory and the blessings of a grateful nation, to whom you came in the generous intentions of performing brilliant services. Receive, my dear admiral, the assurance of the consideration with which I am,”

“ Your affectionate,

“ D. PEDRO.”

“ I send you the detail of the troops embarked.”

Appendix.
No. XV.

On the night of the 15th the Dukes of Terceira and Palmella came on board with a numerous and brilliant staff, and brought me a copy of their instructions. They were received on board the Rainha, the upper cabin being occupied by the two dukes and myself, and the fore-cabin provided with a sail for the staff. This was rough accommodation for counts and marquisses, but the best we had; and I never saw in any service a finer set of young men, or officers more ready to put up with every inconvenience. I must not omit to mention that a company of students, serving as volunteers, had no other accommodation than a sail under the half deck, and ship's provisions, and yet I never heard a grumble from them; they were all devoted to the cause they served, and were ready to put up with any hardships to advance it. Together with the duke came a division of troops, and by the 18th all were on board.

CHAPTER XI.

AT the time the troops began to embark, we had only ten days' water in the squadron; the steamers less, and they had not completed at Vigo, though left there for the express purpose. They had also neglected to take in fuel, all of which was to be done at Oporto in an open road with a constant swell. The difficulty of getting off water was great and expensive, and when you add to that difficulty the want of arrangement, it is astonishing we ever got any from Oporto at all. The water ought to have been sent before the troops; but after the latter came on board, it seemed to those intrusted with the embarkation, that all was right; and as for water, I suppose they thought there was a good supply alongside.

Day after day and hour after hour telegraphs were made for water, and on the 15th—"tell Emperor if water is not sent off expedition will fail." This was communicated to him, and it appears that a great exertion was made; for on the 19th we received a sufficient supply to enable us to proceed.

Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the fishermen and watermen of the Douro: night after night were those men employed under a heavy fire in bringing off troops and water, and disembarking provisions and stores; and too much blame cannot be given to those employed at the Foz to superintend it; there was neither energy, zeal, ability, nor arrangement, and the only exception I can make is in favour of Lieutenant Salter, who was indefatigable: he crossed the bar every night, and was at last wounded. Strange to say, in the whole of this embarkation there were not more than half a dozen killed and wounded, and amongst the latter was Marshal Solignac, who was obliged to return to Oporto, having received a severe contusion in endeavouring to pass the bar.

On the 20th I wrote to the minister and took Appendix,
No. XVI. leave by telegraph, having failed in weighing and lost an anchor the day before, as did the Don Pedro and Portuense in consequence of the heavy swell, and the want of proper messengers, nippers, &c. The steamers got away the day before, joined in the morning, and with a fine breeze we stood to the southward, our hearts leaping with joy at the brilliant prospect before us.

At noon we reconnoitred Figueras, and for the first time in my life I felt what it was to be in an undisciplined ship. The people were at dinner as we closed the land. The breeze was fresh, and as it would be necessary to reef top-sails when we hauled off, the hands were turned up for that purpose and to trim sails; but such was the want of zeal and exertion on the part of the ship's company, that there was no getting them on deck under half-an-hour; and had we been in a difficulty, we must have either lost our spars, or ran ashore before we could get the men to their stations. This state of things could not last, and the commodore who had a good deal of firmness and

tact, made a severe example the first good opportunity, which soon convinced them of the necessity of turning over a new leaf.

I had intended to have anchored the expedition in Cascaes bay, and to have been guided by the information we might receive ; but the want of discipline of the squadron, and the little zeal and energy displayed by the people, or I may say the perfect indifference with which they did their duty, obliged me to rélinquish that intention as fraught with danger in the event of the enemy putting to sea. The ships were also much crowded with troops, which was a great obstacle to exercise and improvement of discipline.

After showing ourselves off Peniché, we shaped our course a few leagues outside of the rock of Lisbon, abreast of which we lay to till sunset, with the view of distracting as much as possible the attention of Don Miguel's ministers, who had no idea where the blow was to be struck : indeed, at this time we did not know ourselves, which after all was the best way of keeping the expedition secret.

The government at Lisbon, seeing us on the coast, were by no means at their ease. Great exertions were made to get the squadron ready, and they were anchored in a line reaching down to Belem for the defence of the town. On the 12th of June orders were given that no vessel of any description was to be permitted to enter the Tagus at night, and on the 23d the merchant-vessels were ordered to move up the river to be out of the line of fire, and the British squadron were held in readiness to slip their cables.

Previously to my arrival at Oporto, Don Miguel's cause began to be considerably mixed up with that of Don Carlos, who was residing at Cintra. General Cordova, the Spanish minister at Miguel's court, was instructed to demand a categorical answer from Carlos, whether it was his intention to proceed to Madrid and be present at the meeting of the Cortes to take the oath to the young Queen. This he declined to answer, but promised to write to his brother.

Shortly after this the king of Spain gave him a peremptory order to quit Portugal and proceed to Italy; and on the 26th of May a Spanish frigate

arrived at Lisbon to convey him there. On this he suddenly quitted Cintra, and proceeded to Coimbra, where he was received by Miguel, who evidently came to meet him. On the day Cordova arrived at Coimbra, Miguel, wishing to avoid him, suddenly quitted it on horseback, leaving his suite and baggage to follow.

Cordova had been refused admission to Carlos's presence, but was quite ignorant of his intention to leave Cintra. The Portuguese ministers also declared their ignorance of his project to depart, and expressed their disapprobation of his conduct. When Cordova returned to Lisbon, he ascertained that both the Viscount Santarem and the Duke of Cadaval had had interviews with Carlos at Cintra, which they concealed from him. The Spanish minister, enraged at this treachery, and annoyed at being duped by Carlos, expressed his indignation in strong terms, accused the ministry of giving offence to the king of Spain and of ingratitude to him, who was and always had been a great friend to Don Miguel.

Zea Bermudez disapproved of Carlos's proceedings, but pretended to believe that he only meant

to pay a compliment to Miguel, and continued to protect him notwithstanding the insults to the Spanish minister.

The king of Spain was now in rather an unpleasant situation. Should Miguel succeed, he had every thing to fear from the Carlists; should the Queen's cause triumph, he was in danger from the Constitutionalists. Spanish troops were consequently ordered on the frontier to be ready to check either party.

Miguel, on the other hand, was afraid of offending Ferdinand, lest he should become liberal in opposition to Carlos and to favour his daughter, and equally afraid of offending Carlos, lest Ferdinand, who was in bad health, should die, and his party should be strong enough to place him on the throne.

At this time there were many Spanish refugees in Portugal, who were well received, and even employed in Don Miguel's army. A communication was in consequence made to Cordova, that if that practice was continued, the English government would no longer prevent Don Pedro employing the Spanish constitutionalists, and that

Mina and many others were both ready and willing to join his cause.

While those intrigues were going on in Lisbon, the expedition was sailing quietly to the southward, and preparing to cut the Gordian knot. Many speculations were afloat in the squadron about the issue of the enterprize: on board the flag-ship the opinion of a successful result was predominant. Our party was large, and I may say the flower of Portugal were embarked. In addition to the Dukes of Palmella and Terceira, the Marquis Fronteira, Count Ficalho, and Don Thomas Mascarenhas accompanied the expedition. Colonel Loureiro was quarter-master, and Colonel Méndez adjutant-general: both were old Peninsular officers, and well versed in their art. M. Mozinho, the chief engineer, was also a man of talent, and the first poet in Portugal. In addition to those were four or five aide-de-camps; and last not least our impatient and restless friend Mendizabal. Our party consisted of about twenty, and a happier one I never saw collected together: we were well supplied with every thing except water, and the days passed merrily away.

• On the night of the 23d we rounded Cape St. Vincent, which was well lighted by the friars in the convent, who have on certain nights a brilliant fire on the promontory. On the 24th we passed Lagos, Faro, and Tavira, and at five o'clock in the afternoon anchored in the bay of Cacellas, two leagues to the westward of the Guadiana, having decided on the previous day to make our descent there, push the steam-boats up the river, and make a rapid march on Beja. A battery of one gun, which was soon silenced, was the only defence, and notwithstanding the caution of the captains of the steam-boats, who were very unwilling to approach the land, the troops were all on shore together with their stores and ammunition before midnight. The enemy had collected a force in front of Tavira, on which point the Duke marched at day-light, having relinquished the line of the Guadiana. After a slight skirmish, he drove the enemy across a small river, and entered the town at noon, the squadron anchoring at the same time. Our reception was none of the best; in fact the inhabitants being given to understand we were robbers and murderers, had aban-

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doned the town to a man. The Duke of Terceira issued a proclamation, and in the evening the inhabitants began to return to their homes. A deputation was also received from Villa Real, who declared for the Queen, and a small detachment under Colonel Breyner was sent there, with arms to organize a force. The following morning the duke marched on Olhao, where he was received with great enthusiasm by the inhabitants, and on the morning of the 27th entered Faro, the capital of the Algarves, the squadron moving there at the same time.

At Faro we were tolerably received, but confidence was by no means restored. Our force was small, and the inhabitants were under apprehension of again falling under the government of Don Miguel, and were most cautious in taking a decided part. The Duke of Palmella landed, established a provisional government, and the principal inhabitants signed their adhesion to the Queen. Abundance of ammunition and stores were found in the arsenal; the engineer marked out redoubts for the defence of the town; and after halting two days to refresh and organize the division, the

Duke of Terceira marched on Loulé, leaving the French regiment, who were composed of raw and undisciplined men, in garrison, to secure the town and neighbourhood from any guerilla parties that might be formed. About two hundred of this regiment, composed of the worst of characters, were sent back to Oporto: I fear that the conduct of the remainder in the sequel was far from good. The duke had as yet formed no plan of operations, which could only be fixed after feeling his way, and ascertaining the force and position of the troops under the Viscount Mollelos, governor of the kingdom.

The squadron was well supplied with fresh provisions and water, which was most acceptable to the crews: they had long been without refreshments, and the inhabitants, finding every thing paid for, felt no disinclination to supply them. In Faro the squadron was augmented by a schooner of war, and one or two armed vessels were sent up the Guadiana to open a communication with Mertola, which had declared for the Queen.

On the 30th I anchored in Lagos Bay, the enemy having abandoned that city the day before.

Here we were better received than either at Faro or Tavira, and perhaps the fact of the squadron being composed of English officers and men brought back former recollections to the inhabitants, who had been accustomed in days gone by to see British men-of-war constantly in their port, and had no doubt profited by their sojourn. The authorities and principal inhabitants were assembled to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen, and this they willingly did, but showed very little disposition to form themselves into corps either for their own protection or for the advancement of her cause. With considerable difficulty I got together a party of about twenty, who marched a few leagues to re-capture the military chest, which had been removed; and I believe a small sum was secured. The enemy had now retired from the whole line of coast; a few deserters came in, but principally men belonging to the different towns we occupied; and I doubt much whether the division of the Duke of Terceira was augmented by five hundred men. Officers wearing uniforms and swords were in abundance, but they were chiefly old worn-out men, and showed no disposition to make themselves

useful. No horses were to be found, and the detachment of lancers was kept in garrison at Faro.

From Lagos the City of Waterford steamer was despatched to Oporto and thence to England with the news of our first success ; and after organizing the government and completing our supplies, on the evening of the 2d of July we sailed from Lagos, leaving the steamers to take in fuel and follow us along-shore to Lisbôn. At this time we knew nothing certain of the movements of Don Miguel's squadron. A vessel from thé Tagus had brought intelligence of their having dropped down to Cascaes, and returned the following day ; but this must have either been fabricated by the master, or she had been sent to throw us off our guard.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 3d of July, the officers of the watch reported two sail, then three, then four, and so on till they counted nine. I was surprised, and, as Sir Richard Strachan said, delighted ; but the delight was accompanied with a disagreeable sort of feeling,

just resembling the sensation of your heart coming up into your mouth, and requiring a tolerable gulp to keep it down. We were standing on the starboard tack under courses and top-gallant-sails; the enemy were on the larboard, broad on the lee-bow under their top-sails: one alone, which we took for the fifty-gun ship, had her courses and top-gallant-sails set, and sailed bad. The *Villa Flor* was immediately despatched to Lagos for the steamers, and after nearing the enemy to three or four miles, we tacked. They were formed in two lines, having the *Don John*, bearing a commodore's pendant, to windward, supported by the *Rainha* of the line, the *Martin Freitas*, and *Princess Real*. The three corvettes and two brigs formed the lee division opposite the open spaces,—all well painted, sails well set, and lines compact. It was a majestic sight, and I turned the hands up to shew the crews how well they looked, and to exhort them to pay attention to the management of their guns as the surest means of success. I had never been in a general action, and although delighted at the prospect before me, I

could not but feel appalled at their great superiority, and the magnitude of the enterprize I was about to undertake.

Both squadrons stood in for the land, and I was apprehensive they meant to prevent the junction of the steamers, who were in Lagos Bay, and considerably to leeward. At two I tacked and stood towards the enemy. This manœuvre had the desired effect; they tacked also, and left the bay open. At five the Villa Flor and steamers joined, and we took our station about a mile and a half on their weather-beam. The breeze was strong, and the sea too rough to attempt to board with success,—the plan of attack I had decided upon.

Here the enemy committed a great error: they ought to have stood boldly on, and either forced me into Lagos Bay to protect the town and steamers, and risk an action at anchor, or oblige me to fight under the disadvantages of wind and weather, one of which I must have done, or abandoned the town and steam-boats, which was impossible.

During the night the hostile squadrons kept within musket-shot,—the Miguelite fleet in a com-

pact line, my squadron in two, ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that should offer of bringing on a general action or cutting off any of their ships who might drop astern during the night. At day-light one of the corvettes was about three miles in the rear of the body of the fleet: we bore up in two divisions. She was under her topsails, but whether from indolence, or trusting to her superiority of sailing, she did not increase sail till we were within musket-shot. The Don John then tacked, and there being no possibility of cutting her off without risking a general action, we hauled off, neither ship firing. This brought us considerably to leeward. By noon we regained our station on their weather-beam: neither party showed any disposition to engage.

There was a good deal of impatience manifested by the crews to come to blows, and they expressed their concern that this might be delayed some time longer, or entirely given up. I instructed the different captains to assure them, that the moment a favourable opportunity offered, they should have their fighting propensities indulged to the fullest

extent, and recommended them to profit by the delay in improving the men in the gun-exercise, particularly fighting both sides, and working the alternate guns. Both squadrons wanted practice, and although we necessarily improved, it was natural to expect the enemy would improve also. They shewed no disposition to bring us to action: we dared risk nothing till the weather became sufficiently fine to make one desperate effort to save Portugal or lose the cause. There was no medium: all must be gained, or all lost. A partial action could only prolong for a few weeks the fate of Oporto and the division in the Algarves. A victory might save both; a defeat would end the civil war at once. I was very anxious to draw the enemy under the land, but this they avoided; and I became apprehensive that a convoy might have sailed from Lisbon with troops to take the Duke of Terceira in the rear; at the same time the enemy wished to draw me to sea and thus leave the coast open. This is what*ought to have been done, and for that very reason it was not; and more experience shewed me, that the war ministers of both parties were only gifted with the talent of

acting wrong, and in this the Miguelites had the advantage.

We kept our station close to the enemy during the afternoon and the following night, and towards morning there was every appearance of a calm, which eventually took place about nine o'clock. The steamers were now ordered to close, and to our astonishment and disappointment, the captains, engineers, and crews to a man, refused to take us in tow, with the exception of Captain Wilson of the *William the Fourth*, who with great difficulty persuaded his men to act. The *Pembroke* had parted the night before under pretence of her engines being out of order.

Officers and seamen came forward with all the money they possessed to bribe the cowards to act, which they refused to do unless two thousand pounds were laid down on the capstan-head for each engineer. This being impossible, they were dismissed the ship with the hearty curses of officers and men.

It had now been calm two hours: had the steam-boats taken the frigates in tow, we should have chosen our position, and in all probability have gained a bloodless victory; or had the ships

been fitted with paddles similar to those in the *Galatea*, the effect would have been the same. Never did I before see an occasion where they could have been so triumphantly employed.

Towards noon cats'-paws here and there indicated an approaching breeze, and the swell had completely subsided; the men went to dinner, and the captains came on board to receive their final instructions. I had at first intended to have laid the *Don John* on board with the flag-ship, leaving the other line-of-battle ships to the *Don Pedro*, and the *Princess Real* frigate to the *Donna Maria*; but the uncertainty of getting alongside of her without being disabled in passing the sternmost ships, and the possibility of a repulse, induced me to relinquish that intention, and content myself with throwing the flag-ship and *Don Pedro* on board the *Rainha* of the line, which I calculated on carrying ere the *Don John* could come to her assistance. This effected, if not too much disabled, we should be ready to attack the commodore, whom it was important to secure. At all events we were pretty certain of holding our prize, and I felt quite satisfied that Captain Peak

in the *Donna Maria* would carry the *Princess Real*, while the *Portuense*, *Villa Flor*, and *Faro* schooner, should make the most they could of the *Martin Freitas*, leaving the three corvettes and two brigs in the hands of *Providence*, who was sure to be on the side of the good cause. At the same time the steamers took their station to windward, ready for a bolt should the day be lost.

About one the breeze became steady ; the people were at quarters, determined to fight to the last, and I sat down to a hasty dinner with Commodore Wilkinson, Captains Goble, Blackstone, Pearn, Charles Napier, Ruxton, and Macdonough, who had quitted the steamers in disgust. We talked over the approaching battle with great confidence, little thinking that in half an hour three of the party would cease to live or be mortally wounded, and two more dangerously. At two the captains returned to their ships ; the signal was made for battle and close order ; the boats were lowered down ; and the squadron, led by the *Rainha*, displaying the constitutional flag at each mast-head, gradually edged away under their courses and top-gallant sails. The

enemy (with the exception of the *Martin Freitas*, who had her courses and top-gallant sails set) were under their top-sails, and as we approached, the lee line closed up in the intermediate spaces, but a little to leeward, thus forming a sort of double column of two line-of-battle ships, a fifty-gun ship, a fifty-gun frigate, three heavy corvettes, two brigs, and a xibeque. Previous to this, the frigate being to leeward tacked, and had all the appearance of coming over; but after fetching in the wake of the fifty-gun ship, she again tacked and took her station. The breeze was good, the water smooth, not a cloud in the heavens; the enemy looked well and firm, and they were plainly seen training their guns as we approached. It was a trying and awful sight, and accompanied with a considerable degree of dread, (at least I can answer for myself.) Officers and men were calm and determined, though aware of the danger of the enterprise, the success of which mainly depended on the state we should be in after the first broadside.

The enemy kept their line close, and reserved their fire till well within musket-shot; the frigate

then threw out a signal, which we concluded was for permission to fire : the moment was critical, and we all felt it.

The commodore's answer was hardly at the mast-head ere the frigate opened her broadside, which was instantaneously followed by the whole squadron, with the exception of the Don John, whose stern and quarter guns could only bear. Poor Rainha ! I looked up, and expected to see every mast tottering ; but the cherub was sitting aloft, and notwithstanding the most tremendous fire I ever witnessed, which made the sea bubble like a boiling cauldron round her, the smoke, clearing away, discovered to the astonished Miguelites the Rainha proudly floating on the waters of Nelson and St. Vincent, with her masts erect, her rigging and sails only shewing the fiery ordeal she had gone through.


The men were lying down at their quarters, few were struck down on the main deck, but the three foremost guns on the quarter-deck were nearly cleared, and Lieutenant Nivett, of the marines, received a mortal wound. At this time we had not fired a shot, and I ordered a few

BATTLE OFF CAPE S^o VINCENT between THE PORTUGUESE SQUADRONS

October 20th 1805

commenced at 4 P.M. and ended at 6 P.M.

Plan of Attack



Donna Maria's Squadron

Ship	Tonnage	Crew	Commander
A Razenbrade Portugal	46	10	Donna Maria
B Fregate V Ad's Flag	46	16	Donna Maria
C Don Pedro formerly Wellington India	48	6	Donna Maria
Grand Total		32	

Don Miguel's Squadron

Ship	Tonnage	Crew	Commander
1 Don Miguel	40	16	Don Miguel
2 Razenbrade	48	16	Don Miguel
3 Marquis Fructus	56	16	Don Miguel
4 Princeps Royal	56	16	Don Miguel
5 Zoroastre	56	16	Don Miguel
Grand Total		112	

to be thrown on board, to check as much as possible their taking a deliberate aim. Our example was followed by the Don Pedro, and we soon passed the frigate and Martin Freitas, the latter losing her fore top-mast. At this time the sternmost line-of-battle ship luffed to ; our helm was put up to avoid her broadside, and the Don John bore up across her bows, intending to place us between the two line-of-battle ships. This was just what I desired, and when she had passed too far to leeward to recover a weather position, our helm was put suddenly down. The frigate flew to, grazing the Rainha's stern with the flying jibboom ; the foremost guns were poured into her, crammed to the muzzle with round and grape ; the helm was then shifted, and we ran alongside under a very heavy fire, which struck down my secretary, master, and many men. The ships were lashed with the main-sheet, and Commodore Wilkinson and Captain Charles Napier, heading the boarders, passed from the bower anchor to her bulwark, driving the men across the forecastle along the larboard gangway.

I had not intended to board, having enough to do to look after the squadron ; but the excitement was too great, and I found myself, without hardly knowing it, on the enemy's fore-castle, supported by one or two officers. There I paused, till several men jumping on board, we rushed aft with a loud cheer, and either passed through or drove a party drawn up on the break of the quarter-deck. At this moment I received a severe blow from a crow-bar, the owner of which did not escape unscathed, and poor Macdonough fell at my side by a musket-ball ; Barradas, the captain of the ship, came across me wounded in the face, and fighting like a tiger. He was a brave man : I saved his life. The second captain came next, and made so good-natured a cut at me that I had not heart to hurt him : he also was spared. Barradas took up arms again, and was finally killed in the cabin.

The commodore and Captain Charles Napier, after driving a whole host before them, fell severely wounded on the larboard side of the quarter-deck ; the former with difficulty regained his ship ; the

Position when boarding



Don't die

A Prince's Regal

Tag

A Prince's Regal

D Fortitude

latter, being stunned, lay some time, till the noise of friends coming to his assistance, roused him from his stupor.

The quarter-deck was now gained, but the slaughter still continued notwithstanding the endeavours of the officers to stay it. The main and lower deck were yet unsubdued; and as the *Don Pedro* ranged up on the opposite side to board, both ships fired. I hailed Captain Goble to desist, as we had carried the upper deck, and desired him to follow the *Don John*, who had made off: at the same moment a ball from the lower deck struck him, and in a few minutes he was no more.


Lieutenant Edmunds and Wooldridge jumped down with a party on the main-deck, which they carried, but both fell under mortal wounds. In a few minutes all was quiet; the lower deck gave in, and many of the Portuguese seamen rushed on the quarter-deck for safety, with white canvas on their left arms, having discovered that was the badge worn by our men in boarding. Others got on board my ship, amongst whom several little boys found their way into the gun-room, and employed themselves wiping glasses.

The men were now ordered back to the Rainha, with the exception of those appointed to remain, and in the hurry the ships separated, leaving me in the prize. I, however, soon got back to the flag-ship. The fore-top-sail, which was cut to rags, was shifted;* all sail was set, and we were fast approaching the Don John, the Don Pedro being still nearer, when, seeing no chance of avoiding an action, she luffed-to and hauled her colours down.

The Don Pedro was directed to secure her, and I followed the Martin Freitas, who had been too strong for the Portuense, (whose captain, Blackstone, was mortally wounded,) and Villa Flor, and though much disabled, was making off: by ten she was in my possession. The Princess Royal corvette, coming across a steamer, surrendered also. A little after I got alongside the Rainha. Captain-Peak, in the Donna Maria, passed under the fifty-gun frigate's stern, raked her, luffed-to, and after firing a few broadsides, ran his bowsprit into her mizen rigging, and carried her in gallant style.

* The main-sail was also useless, and we were in the act of shifting it.

Position after the Action



1. Don John trying to cut. running.
2. Martin captured.
3. Martin trying to escape.
4. Martin trying to escape.
5. Martin trying to escape.
6. Martin trying to escape.
7. Martin trying to escape.
8. Martin trying to escape.
9. Martin trying to escape.
10. Martin trying to escape.

6. Load Maria escaped.
7. 15,000 escaped.
8. Francisco and Cortes came over.
9. 10,000 joined in Laguna Bay.
10. 10,000 joined in Laguna Bay.

- A. Pancha at the Martin, Pancha after the Don John, struck.
- B. Don Pedro going to take possession of the Don John.
- C. Don Pedro going to take possession of the Don John.
- D. Don Pedro going to take possession of the Don John.

Thus finished the action of the 5th of July, leaving in our possession two ships of the line, mounting eighty-six guns each, including four forty-eight pounders for throwing shells; one frigate of fifty-two guns, a fifty-gun ship, and a corvette of eighteen guns. Two corvettes and two brigs escaped; the two former arrived safe in Lisbon; one brig joined the following day, and the other got to Madeira. The enemy were amply found in every species of warlike stores, and mounted stern-guns, in addition to the full complement on their broadsides.

The loss of the squadron was about ninety killed Appendix,
No. XVIII and wounded. The enemy lost between two and three hundred.

It is not for me to comment on this action; I shall leave that to the world; simply observing, that at no time was a naval action fought with such a disparity of force, and in no naval action was there ever so severe a loss in so short a time.

It has been said by our detractors that the fleet was "bought"; I answer that they were, but with the same coin that Earl St. Vincent bought the Spanish fleet, viz. British powder, British shot,

and British steel, wielded by the hands of British officers and seamen, with the disadvantages of a long peace, an ill-found and ill-disciplined squadron, and many of the officers totally unacquainted with naval habits and discipline. I must also do justice to the Portuguese officers and men who were in the fleet, all of whom behaved most courageously.*

* It is a singular coincidence that a strong reconnoissance was made on Oporto on the day of the action, and the news of it arrived on the day twelve-month Don Pedro landed at Oporto.

CHAPTER XII.

By midnight the prizes were manned, their crews were secured, and after a hard day's work, both of body and mind, we were in full sail for Lagos Bay, where we arrived in triumph next morning, and were received with the greatest joy by the inhabitants, who vied with each other in showering down blessings on the people they were pleased to call their deliverers from the most unheard-of tyranny that ever oppressed a nation.

Next morning detachments were landed to pay the last tributes to the officers and men who had fallen. Poor Goble, Blackstone, and George were buried in the same grave, and they were followed to the tomb by all the principal inhabitants, who vied with each other in providing comforts and accommodation for the wounded officers and men.

The Donegal, Castor, and Leveret, who had been sent to demand an apology from Don Miguel's commodore for having fired at the latter, appeared in the offing, and Captain Fanshaw sent his commander to ascertain who were the victors.

The Duke of Palmella and M. Mendizabal arrived in the afternoon from Faro, half mad with joy at this unexpected event, and assisted me in the arrangements that were necessary to be made with the ships and crews. To hold them as prisoners would have been both impolitic and impossible; the Queen's service was offered and accepted by a few of the officers, who were known to be constitutionalists; the commodore and rest, who declined, were sent prisoners to Faro. The crews to a man declared for the Queen.

On examination it was found necessary to leave the flag-ship and the Martin Freitas to refit, and I shifted my flag into the Don John, and manned her from my late ship and the Don Pedro. The captain of the Princess Real corvette was appointed to the Don Pedro and manned from the Don John; the captain of the Martin Freitas, Marcel Pedro, who defended his ship well, was

appointed to the Rainha, and as many of her crew had deserted at Lagos, she was completed from the Don John and Martin Freitas, and the rest were sent to my old ship. Captain Ruxton, of the Villa Flor, was appointed to the frigate; Lieutenant Leot, my first lieutenant, to the Villa Flor, and Captain Napier to the Portuense. These arrangements having been made, every exertion was used to refit the squadron, and Pedroites and Miguelites vied with each other in repairing damages, and getting their respective ships ready for service.

The Duke of Terceira had marched from Faro on the 28th of June; he united his divisions between Loulé and Silves; he there learnt that the garrisons of Albufeira, Lagos, Sagres, and other small towns, having united at Silves, with several pieces of artillery, were rapidly marching on St. Bartholomew de Messines, to join the Viscount Mollelos, who had already abandoned that post, and was retiring on Santa Clara by St. Marcos de Serra. On the 30th he arrived at St. Bartholomew, and found that the enemy had already passed that town, having abandoned three pieces of

artillery, which were destroyed, and a considerable quantity of ammunition.

Thus in six days from the time the division disembarked, the whole province was cleared, and a considerable number of officers and soldiers, principally artillery, had joined the Queen's standard. All the coast artillery and the material of the province had also fallen into our possession, and the whole of the enemy's force on this side of the Serras de Monchique and Caldeirao were disorganized. The rapidity of his movements had rendered it impossible to bring up his artillery and ammunition, and he was consequently obliged to halt at St. Bartholomew till its arrival. During this halt two officers with an escort were sent to reconnoitre St. Marcos de Serra, and were surprised by the Viscount Mollelos' *ordinanzas*, who afterwards retired before a company of *caçadores*, taking with them the whole of the inhabitants of the village.

On the 3d the duke learnt that Mollelos had retired on St. Martinho das Amoreiras, where the roads meet that lead from the Algarves to Almodovar and Ourique, by Santa Clara,

having devastated the whole country in his line of march. He also received information that Colonel Breyner, with his volunteers and fifty of the Queen's tirailleurs that the Duke of Palmella sent from Faro, had advanced to Mertola, and joined a guerilla party from Serpa and the neighbourhood, and were moving on Beja. This determined him to return to Loulé on the 4th, as the best point of departure to cross the Serras, and being nearer Faro he might more easily unite the artillery, ammunition, and provisions necessary to pass the mountains : that done, he had the choice of three movements, which must be decided by the operations of the enemy ; the first was to penetrate into the Alentejo by Almodevar, the second by the road of St. Marco, the third, to gain the banks of the Guadiana, and advance by Mertola on Beja ; but this required a retrograde march on Tavira, being the only practicable road between Loulé and Mertola. This last movement, I am of opinion, would have been fatal to the cause of the Queen ; it would have had the appearance of a retreat, and encouraged the enemy to return into the Algarves.

The line of the Guadiana, which was the original plan, was in my opinion the best and safest, because the steam-boats could have pushed up the river ; and in the event of a reverse, the division was safe, and the squadron could have probably secured Faro and Tavira, but certainly Lagos, without any assistance from the army. Mollelos never could have united his troops in sufficient force to have arrived at Beja before the duke, and in all probability the presence of the squadron on the coast would have kept him in the Algarves. The retrograde movement to Loulé, together with the long halt there, certainly had a bad effect, which, however, was dissipated by the victory of the 5th of July.

The news of the action brought the duke to Lagos on the 8th, and I need hardly say he was delighted at the great success we had met with. All dangers and difficulties now disappeared. I spared him a couple of hundred of the Portuguese marines, who volunteered to join his division, and he at once decided on entering the Alentejo by the road of St. Marcos and Santa Clara ; and having united his forces and provisions at St. Bartholomew on the 12th of July, he

marched on the 13th on St. Marcos, where I shall leave him and return to the squadron.

Captain Peak, being ready, sailed on the 9th with the Princess Real corvette and Villa Flor to establish the blockade of Lisbon. The corvette, having parted the following night from the Donna Maria, returned to Lagos, her captain not having sense to proceed ; and the Villa Flor came in on the following day with the loss of her bowsprit. On the evening of the 13th, I sailed for Lisbon, with the Don John bearing my flag, and the Portuense manned with English ;—the Rainha, Don Pedro, and Princess Real frigate, manned by the same officers and men we had fought and conquered the week before, all sailing better than the flag-ship. That there was great risk in this is beyond a doubt ; they might have again tried the fate of war, or walked off to Lisbon, but there was no alternative. To leave them behind was impossible ; it was necessary to make an imposing appearance before Lisbon ; I therefore decided on taking them with me and forcing the bar with the very ships who had sailed a fortnight before to bring my squadron to the Tagus. This war

was unlike any other I had been engaged in. I took up a desperate cause, and it was necessary to fight a desperate game to the last ; and fortune never left my side, except in the melancholy instance I shall shortly relate.

The day after leaving Lagos, we fell in with the Marquis of St. Iria, who was appointed governor of the Algarves ; he brought letters from the minister, informing me that the Emperor had promoted me to the rank of admiral, and ennobled me by the title of Viscount Capo St. Vicenti ; all this was very gratifying, but I should have preferred the latter part to have been left alone. During the time the squadron lay in Lagos Bay, the men had worked hard, and had fallen into the irregularities very common in harbour, and more particularly after an action. Symptoms of cholera made their appearance before we sailed, and the late master of the Don Pedro had died of the disease. On the 14th off Cape St. Vincent, it broke out with the greatest violence ; men were seen walking about apparently in perfect health, and in a moment they were struck down, and before sunset nearly a hundred were in the

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hands of the medical officers; they were lying about all parts of the ship in the agony of collapse. Their messmates employed friction and every means they could think of to alleviate their sufferings, but in vain: seven died the first night.

The attention of Dr. Fraser and the medical department was beyond all praise; but the disease marched with such rapid strides, that their exertions were quite inadequate to keep pace with it: it frequently happened that while they were administering to some patients, others were taken below and fell into a state of collapse before any assistance could be rendered.

A gloom came over the crew: they became stupified with fear, not knowing at what moment they might be attacked. The same men, who a fortnight before had fought and conquered the Miguelite fleet, were now unmanned and unfit for any exertion. After the action they had shifted a topsail from the store-room in less than half-an-hour, and were ready to fight a second ship of the line: they were now upwards of twelve hours shifting the Don John's main-top-

sail. This state of things lasted for a week, when no less than two hundred passed through the surgeons' hands, and about fifty into the next world. As we stood to the westward, it gradually disappeared.

On the 19th I received a communication from the Duke of Terceira, to the effect that Viscount Mollelos had on the 15th made a flank movement on Beja, which town had declared for the Queen, thus leaving the road to Lisbon open ; and that, having gained two marches on him, he had decided on marching on the capital at all risks, and would arrive at Alcacer de Sal on the 22d, and St. Ubes the 23d. The bad sailing of the squadron and the northerly winds delayed us so long that we did not make Cape Espichel till that day, when we were joined by a steamer, with

Appendix,
No. XX. letters from the Emperor begging us to show ourselves off Oporto, to convince Don Miguel's army that his fleet was captured, the ministry very foolishly supposing that our appearance there would induce the army to declare for the Queen : and indeed they had actually sent a letter to the enemy's camp acquainting them with

the circumstance, and calling upon them to submit.

On the morning of the 24th, I despatched a corvette and steamer to Setubal, who brought me the intelligence that the duke had passed through that day and marched on Almada. The wind was still light and to the northward; and our anxiety for the safety of the duke was great. We knew he was followed by four thousand men; Almada was strong; and there was every reason to expect that a large force would be sent there from Lisbon. The usual sea-breeze had not blown for three days, and to attempt to force the bar without a strong wind was impossible. I looked upon the duke as lost, and without having the power of saving him. Every exertion was made to get to Cascaes, which I intended to have attacked in order to make a diversion in his favour; when abreast of the entrance of the Tagus, a British brig of war brought us the welcome intelligence that Lisbon had been abandoned by the Miguelites the night before, and was now occupied by the duke's troops. Thus by the cowardice and imbecility of Don

Miguel's ministers was Lisbon lost to Miguel and the Duke of Terceira saved.

The wind was still light ; we made little progress with the squadron, and were obliged to anchor at the mouth of the river. As yet it was not known whether St. Julian's and the Bougie had been abandoned, and it was difficult to believe it possible that such an unpardonable folly could be committed ; but nevertheless it was so. That night those forts, together with the whole of the defences of the Tagus, were deserted and the river left open to the squadron. We weighed at day-light, and were obliged to anchor at noon abreast of St. Julian's, which we occupied, lest the enemy should recover from their panic and return.

Several hundred persons, who had been confined in subterraneous cells for five or six years, were restored to their families, and many of them came on board the squadron to thank us for their deliverance. The Duke of Palmella and myself left the ships at the entrance of the river, and rowed up the Tagus. Our first visit was on board the Asia, where we were received in the warmest

and handsomest manner ; Admiral Parker saluted, and cheered us on taking leave. This was followed by the rest of the squadron as we passed ; nothing could be more gratifying to my feelings than receiving such honours from the officers of a profession to which I had so long belonged, and was a convincing proof that though removed from the naval list* by the infuriated howlings of an enraged and disappointed party, who by such a step might glut their revenge, but could not save Don Miguel, I was not removed from the good opinion of naval officers, who on this occasion did not allow their political feelings to depreciate the service I had performed.

From the Asia we proceeded to the arsenal, where the concourse of people was immense. Nothing could exceed the reception we met with ; the whole population were drunk with joy ; they had been for five years kept in the most abject state of slavery ; all friendship and sociability was at an end ; one family was afraid to trust another ; the streets were patrolled night and day by horse and

* It is singular that I received an order to appear at the Admiralty the day the action was fought.

foot; thousands of people were in prison for supposed political offences; and more than half of Lisbon was under the surveillance of the police; and yet Englishmen were to be found who regretted that such a horrible system was on the eve of being destroyed, and maintained in their places in Parliament that Don Miguel was the choice of the people.

At the arsenal we found the splendid equipage of the Baron Quintella waiting for us. Himself, the Duke of Terceira, and the authorities had gone down to the bar. We were conducted through the principal streets, where the greatest enthusiasm prevailed, and were finally put down at the Baron's house in the square of the same name, which now became the centre of attraction. All Lisbon seemed crammed into this place, and the vivas for the Queen, Don Pedro, Palmella, and myself were loud and continued beyond description.

In the afternoon, the breeze favouring the approach of the squadron to the city, the river was covered with boats containing the beauty and fashion of the capital. The ships were so crowded, that it was with difficulty they could be managed.

Many came to welcome their friends and relations back under a new flag, and many returned in affliction for the loss in battle of fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons.

The two line-of-battle ships were anchored abreast of the arsenal, and the Don Pedro was pushed up as far as Aldea Gallego to prevent the crossing over of Mollelos's troops, who had arrived there in a state of disorganization. Three brigs, who had gone up the Tagus, came down and joined the squadron, and were stationed in various parts of the river. The Donna Maria, Princess Royal frigate, (now the Duchess of Braganza,) and Princess Real corvette, (changed to the Cacella,) were sent to Oporto, together with several small craft, to be at the Emperor's disposal, and blockade the various ports on the coast. The Spanish frigate, which had been waiting for Don Carlos, left Lisbon the day we entered.

I had, under date of the 9th of July, at Lagos, four days after the action, declared all the ports of Portugal, which had not proclaimed the Queen, in a state of blockade ; and on that day Captain Peak sailed from Lagos with the Donna Maria and Cacella

to enforce it, the rest of the squadron sailing on the 13th. Yet Lord Londonderry, who I do not apprehend knew much about sea blockades, in his speech on the 31st of July, declared that it was quite impossible to blockade fourteen ports and a line of coast of four or five hundred miles from Cape St. Vincent to Viana. If his lordship had consulted a chart, he would have found an extent of coast of only three hundred and twenty miles, which, with all due deference to his lordship's judgment, could be well blockaded with two sail of the line, three frigates, two corvettes, two brigs, and two schooners, which was the force of the squadron when the blockade was declared. The Duke of Wellington was also of opinion that after an action we could not be in a state to blockade the whole coast of Portugal; but had his Grace reflected that the action was fought by boarding, he would have known that the ships must have suffered little in their masts or rigging. In short, the whole was a party question, and although supported by a majority in the House of Lords, the Commons took a more correct view of the subject, and supported ministers by a large majority.

In the evening I met at dinner the duke and his gallant staff, and he gave me the following account of his unprecedented march. When the squadron left Lagos, the duke was at Gravao, where the news of the revolt of Beja was confirmed; and he learnt at the same time that Mollelos had marched upon and occupied that city, his troops committing the greatest horrors, Colonel Breyner's detachment being obliged to retire on their approach, and leave the city to their vengeance.

On the 17th he arrived at Messejana, and there he called a council of war, and communicated to the members that Mollelos, having committed the great error of leaving the road to Lisbon open by his occupation of Beja, thereby giving his division two days march a-head of him, he had determined on gaining the banks of the Tagus, and putting every thing to the hazard of a die. He did not conceal the difficulties and dangers of such an enterprize, and that it must either terminate in immortal glory or a halter. Fortunately he was addressing as gallant a band as ever drew a sword, and his determination was received by acclamation. Their enthusiasm

extended to the troops, who, forgetting the fatigues they had undergone, and setting at nought the dangers and privations they must incur in such a march, rent the air with cries of 'to Alameda and Lisbon!' On the 19th they arrived at Bairos, and on the 20th the head-quarters were at Val de Ferreira. On the 21st, after dispersing a few royalist volunteers, they entered Alcacer do Sal, where they were received with the greatest enthusiasm. After halting a few hours, they took up a position near the Quinta de Palma. On the 22d they encountered the enemy in position in front of Setubal, who shewed every disposition to give battle. The column advanced in double quick time, their flanks being covered by a few sharp-shooters; the enemy immediately fled and were pursued through the town, leaving a considerable number of prisoners behind, as well as many deserters, who came over. The column halted at the Quinta of Esteval; and the castle of St. Philip and the town of Oritao opened their gates, and displayed the Queen's colours.

Here prudence would have dictated a halt till the position of the squadron could be ascertained;

but the duke, having thrown away the scabbard, pushed on to Azeitao, detaching a company of infantry by the road of Palmella, with orders to join him at the former place. By this time the news of his arrival at Alcacer, and of the rout of the force of Brigadier Freitas in front of Setubal, was brought to Lisbon by the fugitives. Then, and not till then, did the Duke of Cadaval open his eyes.

A strong detachment of infantry, with three squadrons of cavalry, were crossed over to Almada under the command of Telles Jordao, a staunch Miguelite and a great barbarian; and there he was destined to receive just punishment for all the cruelties he had committed when governor of St. Julian's. A plain of three leagues, which separated Azeitao from Lugar d'Amora, and where the enemy ought to have been posted, was passed on the 23d. Their advanced posts were then discovered, but they retired on the duke's approach; and the peasants brought information that the enemy were in position on two hills which commanded the road leading to Almada. Here they had established a line of tirailleurs. The

duke threw out his caçadores on each flank of his column, and continued his march, the enemy's tirailleurs retiring from height to height, to the entrance of the defile, which, by the barrier of Alfeite, opens into the Valle da Piedad. This valley, extending to the borders of the Tagus behind Cacilhas, is bounded on the south by the heights of Almada, and opens into a small space, which is entered on one side by the road the duke advanced, and on the other by the roads of Pragal on the left, Almada on the centre, and Cacilhas by Murtella on the right.

Here the enemy, knowing his superiority in cavalry, endeavoured to draw the column, in order that he might profit by that arm. The duke, being acquainted with the ground, foresaw and was prepared for this manœuvre, which was confirmed by the little resistance as yet opposed to his march. He persevered, however, and scarcely had his flankers, which were extended in the valley, dislodged those of the enemy, and the head of the column entered by the road of Alfeite, when the distant noise of cavalry was heard, and shortly after two squadrons, by the

road of Cacilhas, charged him with an impetuosity that ought to have insured them victory.

The Portuguese infantry have a horror of cavalry, and began to waver; but the duke and his staff being at the head of the column, by their noble example and exhortation to be steady, restored confidence; and as they approached the column, a volley brought down the leading men and horses, and the survivors fled in great confusion.

The duke followed up his success with vigour, and leaving the sixth infantry to cover the roads of Pragal and Almada, advanced with the rest of his troops direct on Cacilhas to cut off their retreat, having occupied the avenues leading to Almada with several companies of the third infantry. At the entrance of the square of Murtella the enemy had two field-pieces; but the second and third caçadores, despising their fire, charged bayonets and captured the artillery, and pushing on the head of the column, penetrated after dark to the Caes de Cacilhas. It is quite impossible to describe the disorder that now took place. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, and baggage,—generals,

officers, and soldiers, precipitated themselves into boats. The darkness of the night increased the confusion ; the conquerors and the conquered became mixed ; and much to the honour of the former they spared the enemy no longer resisting ; and in half an hour after both parties were friends.

As the fortress of Almada had not yet surrendered, the duke countermarched his troops, leaving a guard on the Caes de Cacilhas, and marched to the entrance of that town ; and wishing to spare his troops and the conquered enemy as much as possible, and to avoid the disorder inseparable from a forced entry into a town in a dark night, he there halted, and General Schwalbach, who commanded the head of the column, sent his aide-de-camp, Alfius Jorge, with a flag of truce to summon the fortress. He unfortunately fell in with some of the Miguelite cavalry, and by them was mortally wounded. The duke remained in his position, and at day-light in the morning Almada surrendered, and the garrison laid down their arms on the esplanade.

The loss of the enemy in this action could not have been less than a thousand in killed, wounded,

and drowned; amongst the former was Telles Jordao, who commanded; he well deserved his fate. The Spanish ambassador Cordova was taken prisoner: he had frequently been over to Almada giving advice to the Miguelite commander; and, instead of being dismissed, he ought to have been sent to the castle, which would have been the shortest manner of obliging Spain to withdraw her minister from the court of Miguel.

The news of this victory had such an effect on the nerves of the Duke of Cadaval and Don Miguel's other ministers, that at midnight the troops and police, consisting of upwards of six thousand men, assembled, and the capital was abandoned without a struggle, which no one who read Cadaval's fiery proclamation could have ex-
pected.

Appendix,
XXI.

CHAPTER XIII.

IT is incomprehensible that with all the devotion Don Miguel's ministers had for his cause, in which they were so deeply implicated, and though danger was staring them in the face, of which they were warned by Marshal Bourmont, who gave them excellent instructions for the defence of the Tagus, and to guard against the advance of Villa Flor; and although they had seen an insurrection take place at Punhete, which marched into Thomar, carried off the public money and a considerable quantity of cattle, and crossed into the Alentejo, still nothing could rouse them from their lethargy. On the 9th of July a few troops had been passed over to Aldea Gallego to reinforce Mollelos; but not till the Duke of Terceira was close upon them, was any energy displayed.

During the night all was quiet in Lisbon: indeed it was not generally known that the ministers and troops had evacuated the capital. They managed, however, to press carriages of every description, and carry off their baggage and families.

The Queen's colours flying on Almada was a signal for rejoicing. The whole population now poured into the street, and declared for the Queen; ^{Appendix, XXII.} salutes were fired in all directions; and the blue and white flag was displayed in every quarter of the town. Boats, crowded with the inhabitants, pushed across to Cacilhas, received the troops with open arms, and conducted the duke and his gallant band across the river in triumph to the capital.

It may easily be supposed how great was the excitement in a city which had for five years groaned under the most abject slavery. Imprisonments and executions had been innumerable, and even the very night before the evacuation two unfortunate wretches were executed in the public square. Nevertheless few excesses were committed; the most obnoxious of the Miguelites, particularly the judges, took shelter in the houses of foreigners, and in few instances were their habita-

tions plundered. Only one or two lives were lost.

When the size of Lisbon is considered, and the facilities that the various streets afford for every species of disorder and murder, with no police to keep order, the greatest credit is due to the inhabitants for their forbearance. After a cruel usurpation of five years, it may easily be conceived how many injuries were to be revenged on spies and informers, and even on the families of the police and other public functionaries who had been left behind; but the minds of the people were more occupied in rejoicing at their deliverance than in revenging the injuries they had received.

The march of Napoleon from Frejus to Paris has been thought the boldest and finest enterprize recorded in history; but when we consider that Napoleon was the idol of the French army, I may say, personally known to almost every officer and soldier in it;—a general who had fought and conquered in a hundred battles, and who had planted his eagles in almost every capital of Europe;—an emperor who came to rescue France from the imbecile government of the Bourbons, and who came

to meet his comrades in arms and reward them for their fidelity;—I say his enterprize sinks into insignificance in comparison with that of the Duke of Terceira. He had been shut up in Oporto for nearly a twelvemonth, surrounded by a large army, many of whom knew him, and had served with him; yet there was no reason to suppose they would join his colours: indeed, on the contrary, there was every reason to believe that they would not desert the standard of Don Miguel. Yet the duke, with a division of less than fifteen hundred men, threw himself into the heart of Portugal, and though followed within two days' march by a division of four thousand, with a garrison in Lisbon of eight thousand more, pushed boldly on, fought and defeated double his number, and placed the Queen's colours opposite to Lisbon; and he accomplished all this without knowing that a squadron was at hand to support him, for he had received no communication from me, nor was it in my power to send him any till he had left Setubal.

The ministers of Don Miguel of course knew by telegraph that I was at hand, and they also knew that almost always a strong breeze

blows into the Tagus during the day; and I dare say they had a shrewd suspicion that I would force the river, which no doubt operated on their fears; but this takes away none of the duke's laurels. Had the governor of Almada stuck to his post, and the ministers to theirs, and acted with vigor, it is more than probable the duke would have been lost. Mollelos was at hand; he might have been reinforced from Lisbon. St. Julian's, the Bougie, and the numerous batteries on the Tagus were in excellent order and well manned; the duke would have been hemmed in, and owing to the light winds I could not have got into the Tagus before the 27th. Had he maintained himself, and I had succeeded in approaching the town, which would have been attended with great loss, I could then have passed him across to Lisbon, and probably pounded them out; but had I failed, there was no retreat, and I should have been obliged to burn the fleet, join the duke with the sailors and marines, and then God only knows how the war would have ended. However, it was much better as it was, and in the sequel I shall show that Don Pedro's ministers were as capable

of taking a nap as Don Miguel's ; and that, had it depended upon them, Lisbon would have been lost as easily as it was gained.

The Duke of Cadaval was still in the neighbourhood, and I was under considerable apprehension that after ascertaining the smallness of our force, he would have returned and turned our joy into grief and mourning. In point of fact, had he shewn the least degree of enterprise, he would have called over Mollelos's division, and either driven us out of Lisbon, or blockaded us in the Castle St. George, in less than forty-eight hours ; for though there was great enthusiasm amongst the people, they had not the most distant idea of being attacked ; and instead of the authorities immediately barricading the streets and cutting traverses in every direction, nothing was thought of but eating, drinking, and rejoicing.

The arsenals in the first instance had been broken open by the populace, who provided themselves with arms ; and it was with great difficulty that they could be collected together to arm the corps the duke was assembling. I found it quite impossible to convince my friends of any danger ; in fact,

they knew their opponents better than I did, and they happened to be right. I, however, did all I could to render things secure. The *George IV.* steamer, who was seized in the Tagus, was sent up the river on the side* of the Alemtejo towards Salvaterra, where Mollelos's head-quarters were established; and my officers had actually been in his quarters passing themselves off as British, and counselling him to come over to the Queen. There was great confusion in his army; they had neither outposts nor piquets; and a regiment of caçadores might have captured or destroyed them in their beds; but the duke had few troops, and those few were fatigued, and Mollelos's division was allowed to cross the river at Vallada and form a junction with the garrison of Lisbon, who had retired on Leiria and Pombal.

Immediately after the occupation of the capital, noblemen, gentlemen, and people of all colours of politics waited on the Duke of Palmella, who held out to all parties conciliation, forgiveness, and oblivion of the past. The same line of conduct was followed by the Duke of Terceira and myself to military and naval men; and the Mi-

guelites began to think they were free from persecution and retaliation; and every thing was settling down to peace and quietness.

The occupation of Lisbon was followed by the evacuation of Cáscas and Peniché, the latter a strong fortress. A detachment of disorderly troops had been sent to the Burlings to get rid of them, and the commanding-officer, profiting by the panic, summoned the governor, who marched out, and it was quietly taken possession of. A detachment of marines was sent to reinforce the garrison, and they were followed by the Don Pedro, which placed it in security.

On the 27th, having formed my staff, I took possession of the office of major-general at the naval arsenal, which is the most complete and compact establishment I ever saw. It was built like most of the other splendid establishments by Pombal. The store-houses are large, well constructed, and well arranged, with splendid rigging-lofts, sail-lofts, and one of the finest mould-lofts in the world, in which the young gentlemen intended for the navy study. The ordnance and victualling departments are included in the building.

There were two slips ; one occupied by a corvette nearly finished, and the other by a ship of the line in considerable progress : the latter had been laid down upwards of ten years, and the first part begun bids fair to rot before the latter part is finished. There is also a splendid dock half full of mud ; and the gates, which had been lately made, were too feeble to resist the pressure of the water, and had been left in that state for several years. The store-houses had been cleared to fit out the fleet, and they, as well as the victualling stores, were empty. The Sibyl and Isabella Maria, the two corvettes who escaped, were dismantled. In addition to those were four store-ships, a prison-ship, sheer hulk, and several rotten craft, making a navy of about thirty sail.

Appendix,
XXIII.

The strength of the arsenal was upwards of two thousand, including the lame, the blind, and the lazy, who formed the principal part of the establishment. The principal officers have naval rank, and were seen attending their duties dressed in cocked hats, swords, and epaulettes. There were builders and builders' assistants in abundance ; some of the latter not bred to the busi-

ness: but in this arsenal ability was not considered a necessary qualification.

On taking my seat, I was waited upon by all the naval officers and others connected with the department. Amongst the former were captains, commodores, and lieutenants, several of whom had never been at sea. This was no unusual occurrence; and, indeed, Don John had in one instance transmogrified a bishop into a naval captain. Those ceremonies over, I inspected the different departments, all of which were good in theory, but nothing could be worse in practice. The navy of Portugal had long been neglected, and, except the late Marquis of Viana, no major-general ever had influence to make it better. The minister of marine and colonies is superior to the major-general, and as the least influential minister is generally in this department, it is always the last provided for; in addition to which there was no unity between the two offices. I vainly flattered myself I should be enabled to remedy those evils, but I was most egregiously mistaken.

The first thing necessary was to put the squadron

in order; the larger ships for the defence of Lisbon, and the small craft for blockade. The Portuense and Villa Flor required repair; the two corvettes replaced them. Captain Charles Napier and an English crew were placed in the Sibyl (now the Eliza); and the Isabel Maria was commanded and manned by Portuguese. The officers who joined the Queen's party at Oporto were, of course, employed in preference to any others.

Great objections were made to the late captain of the Martin Freitas, whom I had appointed, in the hour of need, to the Rainha; he had given offence to the Emperor, and I was obliged to replace him by Commadore Bernardine, and refit the ship for temporary service. The Don John, which I intended for the permanent flag-ship, was ordered to be arranged in the same manner as an English ship of the line, and got ready for permanent service; and the corvette on the stocks to be finished forthwith. This employed the whole of the arsenal establishment, who were certainly neither the best nor the most industrious artizans.

The former defect is accounted for by the system

of allowing an immense number of apprentices in the different trades, who are not obliged to find tools ; and after playing about, sleeping, and pilfering for a certain number of years, are admitted as workmen. The latter fault was owing to the irregularity of the payments. They had now been many months in arrear, and they proportioned their labour to their pay. I found it necessary to pass over for the present those arrears, and begin a fresh score from the date of the occupation of Lisbon. I promised them regular pay, and I exacted regular work or their dismissal from the arsenal. Under the old system they worked when they liked ; some came three, some four, some five days in the week : half-days were also admitted, which led to all sorts of abuse. Fellows would be found sleeping about in all directions, and if detected, it was probable they did not work that day, or, at all events, said so. The system of mustering led also to every species of irregularity : those present were checked, and the absentees left blank, so that the clerks could introduce their names at pleasure, and in all probability went shares with the ab-

sentees. I am much inclined to think this was the case from the great opposition I met with in changing it. A table, signed by the inspector, was presented to the major-general every morning, of the number of men at work and where employed ; but though this was the neatest thing possible (the Portuguese are famous for making out tables), it did not contain one word of truth ; and myself and all the department laboured for full three months before we could obtain a correct statement. I could not have believed it possible that such a strong fight on the part of the inferior clerks could have been made to preserve the old system ; and except my own officers, who I must do the justice of saying were indefatigable in their labours to assist me, I met with obstacles at every step I took, both from the superior and inferior departments.

Appendix,
XXIV.

Proclamations were now issued by the Dukes of Palmella and Terceira, and orders given by the latter to unite the old corps in their former quarters ; but nothing further was done for the defence of the city, and I looked forward with great anxiety for the arrival of the Emperor, whose activity in

constructing the lines of defence at Oporto led me to* hope he would be equally active in the capital. In the evening the news of the defeat of Bourmont before Oporto added greatly to our joy, as considerable apprehensions were entertained that he might succeed in penetrating the lines.

It appeared by the correspondence of Saraiva to* the Viscount Santarem, that great exertions had been making in London by the friends of Don Miguel to support his cause, and the very people who were crying out against interference were doing all in their power to assist him. Captain Elliot, of the Royal Navy, had been in Lisbon, and made arrangements with Don Miguel's ministers to assume the command of his fleet, and had actually embarked on board the United Kingdom, five hundred seamen and a host of officers, accompanied by bands of music, &c. to keep up their spirits on the passage; and promises had been made that the fleet should not sail till his arrival. The government, however, trusting in their strength, very naturally sent the squadron out, to prevent us, if possible, from carrying all before us in the Algarves; and the 5th of July saved him

and his officers the reproach of coming out to fight their own countrymen—and the disgrace of a defeat, which, in all probability, they would have met with, for it is not to be supposed that the junction of English officers and men with Portuguese, unacquainted with each other's language and customs, could have constituted a force sufficiently fit to take the sea in less than a month or six weeks, and the nature of the service they were on would not have allowed them as many hours. Be that as it may, the news arrived in London the day previous to that appointed for their sailing, and their cruise finished at Gravesend instead of in the Castle of St. George.

Marshal Bourmont and a numerous staff had sailed previous to this, and fell in with the *Britannia* off Viana, carrying the news of the defeat of the fleet. Nevertheless he pursued his course, landed at Villa de Conde on the 12th, and joined Don Miguel's army the 13th. He immediately endeavoured, and partially succeeded, in discontinuing the cruel system of firing into the town, which had long been found to be useless, as far as intimidation went; on the contrary, it had made the

inhabitants warriors, and determined them to defend it to the last extremity. Colonel Sorrel, the British consul, had before this represented to the Count St. Lorenzo the total inutility of firing into the town, and recommended a cessation of hostilities of that nature until the fate of the expedition was known. This, however, was not attended to : he also notified the probability that a larger naval force might be sent into the Douro, which was strongly objected to by the Miguelite general.

On the 15th the *Loidella* was reconnoitred, and considerable apprehensions were entertained for the safety of the town. The Miguelite force was now commanded by an able general, assisted by numerous French officers; and it was not probable that the same miserable system, which had so long marked the incapacity of the Miguelite general, would be persisted in.

Colonel Badcock and the British consul recommended the English church and its vicinity as a fit place of security for their countrymen, as it was not probable that much favour would be shewn to them in the confusion of an assault ; but there was little or no union amongst them, and

each family trusted to the protection of their own houses. On the 14th the Miguelites reconnoitred in various directions ; there was very little firing, but troops were seen passing over to the north. From that time to the 25th both parties were fully employed, Don Pedro in preparing for defence, and Don Miguel for attack. The disparity of force was so great, that, according to every rule of war, Oporto ought to have fallen ; but, according to every other rule, it was defended, and defended with success.

At daylight, on the morning of the 25th, the Miguelites attacked the Lordello and the Quinta of Vanzeller in great force. In the former place, they met Colonel Shaw's Scotch ; they had leapt a stone wall, and were pushing forward to gain the road in gallant style, when their commander, a French officer, was killed, and they were beaten. The infantry, after driving the Pedroites from a work, were also repulsed, and the work retaken. The attack at the Quinta Vanzeller was most vigorous, and though repulsed, they again and again renewed their attacks, and again were beaten back with great loss. Bom-

firm was attacked at nine by a strong column, who reached the entrance of the place; but Saldanha, putting himself at the head of his staff and a troop of lancers, vigorously attacked the column, and drove them back with great slaughter. The firing continued on both sides till two, when Bourmont gave it up as a bad job, and withdrew his troops.

In this attack Don Pedro lost between three and four hundred men, and many brave officers. amongst them were Alexander Almada, one of Saldanha's aid-de-camps, and Colonel Cotter, of the Irish, and his brother-in-law. The Miguelites lost between one thousand and fifteen hundred men.

The failure of this attack must be attributed to the great dislike the Miguelite troops had to attack intrenchments. The heads of the columns, instead of keeping firm and filling up the spaces, become vacant by the killed and wounded, and, marching boldly up, invariably broke into skirmishing parties, securing themselves as well as the nature of the ground would allow, thereby exposed to a desultory fire, probably from its

duration more destructive than the bolder and more decided attack of the bayonet would have entailed upon them. During this action there was no confusion in the town; every body capable of bearing arms was in the lines: even the women displayed "great firmness, and in many cases were seen carrying water and ammunition to the troops.

CHAPTER XIV.

ON the night of the 26th the news of the occupation of Lisbon arrived at Oporto; next day the Emperor reviewed his troops, and communicated his intention of proceeding to the capital. He was well received by the soldiers; indeed I should say his kindness and affability made him a great favourite with the army. After dark he embarked with his staff, minister, &c. and got safe on board the William IVth, leaving Saldanha to command the army at Oporto. Next day he arrived in Lisbon, where he was received with the greatest enthusiasm. The moment the salutes from St. Julian and the Bougie announced his approach, the news spread rapidly through the town; every vessel and boat was put in requisition; and before

the steamer with the royal standard had passed Belem, the now peaceful waters of the Tagus bore on their surface all the beauty and fashion of Lisbon, decked out in blue and white colours, hastening to meet and welcome the Emperor to the capital of his ancestors. It was indeed a brilliant sight, and what with rockets, fireworks, and salutes from the batteries and ships, there was more powder burnt than would have fought a general action.

I was the first on board, and was met on the gangway by the Emperor, who fairly pulled me out of the boat, and embraced me in the warmest Portuguese fashion. He repeatedly thanked me for the services I had performed, and very flatteringly gave me the credit of having placed the Queen on the throne.

This meeting was very different from the first I had with him. He was frank and kind, and I ever found him so to the day of his death. He begged me to speak always openly to him, and he would do the same by me, and I never had reason to think he deceived me. I was complimented afterwards by the ministers and his personal

staff in the most flattering manner; they all seemed rejoiced at having at last got out of Oporto, and no doubt were longing to find themselves comfortably fixed in their homes and offices, where they could actually play the game of minister, which they had been so long rehearsing at Oporto.

Shortly after I got on board, the Dukes of Palmella and Terceira arrived, and were also warmly received by the Emperor, who embraced them and thanked them for their eminent services. Sir William Parker and the captains of the British men-of-war came next, and were treated with great attention.

When the steamer got abreast of the arsenal, the Emperor and his principal officers accompanied me on board the Don John, and were received by the gallant crew with three hearty cheers. The commodore was still confined to the cabin by his wounds: to him and to all the officers and through me to the crews, he returned thanks for their brilliant conduct, and repeatedly acknowledged that the Queen owed her throne to the squadron.

. From the Don John he proceeded to the arsenal, which was crowded to excess; and no king or emperor ever met so warm a reception. It is in vain to talk of Lisbon having been attached to Don Miguel: the people's feelings had been stifled for some years, and they burst forth like a volcano. The Emperor in his joy drew, and, I believe, threw away his sword, thinking he should have no further occasion for it; nor in all probability would he had he been blessed with good advisers: but this we shall examine into in its proper place.

The crowd in the arsenal was so great that to move out was impossible, and the Emperor was glad to take refuge in one of the store-houses till horses could be procured to carry him through the town. This delay gave an opportunity of collecting a few cavalry and soldiers to keep the arsenal and the adjoining streets sufficiently clear to allow the cortege to proceed. As soon as horses could be procured, the Emperor, accompanied by the Duke of Terceira, myself, his aid-de-camp, and as many as could procure conveyances, proceeded through all the principal streets of Lisbon, amidst

the acclamations of a numerous and delighted population. The windows were adorned with flags and the most ornamental carpets and coverlids that the houses afforded ; and there was no want of white handkerchiefs in the hands of the fair sex to welcome his arrival. After visiting the Necessidades, he proceeded to the magnificent palace of the Ajuda, which was still unfinished, and unfinished it ought to remain as a memento of the folly of Don John commencing such a structure in the small kingdom of Portugal. Had the same money, in addition to what Mafra cost, been expended in making roads and improving the country, Portugal for its size would have been one of the richest nations in Europe.

In the square in front of the Ajuda, were drawn up the gallant troops who had marched from the Algarves and occupied Lisbon. The Emperor, on coming on the parade, clapped spurs to his horse and galloped towards them : they in their turn broke out of their ranks, and flocked round him, and he seemed to take great delight in the affectionate manner they met him. After talking to whoever came first, they fell into line, and he

passed them in review, repeatedly thanking them for their gallant conduct.

The Ajuda stands in a most commanding position above the Castle of Belem, and about three miles from Lisbon. The front with the great entrance looks to the city ; the north, south, and east fronts are nearly completed. The building is quadrangular, three stories high, having four projecting square towers somewhat higher than the centre building : the two eastern ones only are finished. In the centre is a splendid court, and the apartments are approached by a magnificent staircase. The rooms are large and well proportioned, but badly furnished ; they command beautiful views of the river, sea, and city. There are no good paintings in this palace : those in fresco on the walls are complete daubs, and Don John is represented in various places in all his native ugliness : the painter certainly cannot be accused of flattering him.

After slightly inspecting the palace, the Emperor proceeded to the chapel and heard high mass : it was performed by one of the inferior clergy ; the services of the Patriarch were declined in conse-

quence of his having preached against the rights of Donna Maria.

I had the honour of being placed in the Emperor's tribune, and on his right hand. The minister, generals, and the other officers, with the exception of two aid-de-camps behind his chair, were in the body of the church. This was a great compliment to me, but the same attention ought to have been shewn to the Dukes of Terceira and Palmella. During the service he made several remarks on the ceremonies, and asked whether I did not think a man might be a good Catholic and a good Christian without so much mummery. He was certainly a very religious man, but no bigot, as he has clearly proved by the reform he carried through in the church.

After the ceremony the Emperor returned to Lisbon, and took up his quarters at the Palace of the Bemposta. Next day he held a court, which was numerously attended. Few of the nobility appeared, as they had not as yet ascertained how they would be received. In the evening I dined with the Emperor and met the ministers, the Dukes of Palmella and Terceira, and the principal peo-

ple of his court. The following day the Duke of Palmella was relieved from his authority by a Carta Regia. I have already stated that the policy of Palmella was conciliation, and the Miguelite party had a considerable degree of confidence in his character, and none whatever in the Emperor's ministers. They considered the war at an end, and conciliation unnecessary. Many of the nobility who remained in Lisbon, were desirous of paying their respects to the Emperor, and Lord William Russell, who was most anxious for kind measures, enquired of the minister for foreign affairs how they were likely to be treated. He recommended them not to appear and many of those noblemen, naturally distrusting the government, left Lisbon and joined Don Miguel.

Now I am satisfied, had the Emperor given them a kind reception, taken them by the hand, excused their conduct on account of the difficulties of their situation, and the impossibility of abandoning their families and properties during the usurpation, it would have tended much to restore confidence; but the contrary line of con-

duct was followed. Decrees came out, depriving people of the places they had been appointed to during the usurpation, and replacing all those who had been superseded ; thus creating a general confusion in every department of the state because it extended to the lowest and most subordinate offices. That it was necessary to purge the offices of dangerous men, there cannot be a doubt ; but it ought to have been done with caution and judgment, and left to the officers at the head of each department, and not at one sweep send whole families into a state of starvation. Many had risen in their places by seniority without having any political bias ; and others were constitutionalists ; those who remained in their situations during the usurpation were not meddled with, although they were surely as criminal as those appointed by the usurping government. Had the ministers been endowed with the least common sense and prudence, they must have seen the impossibility of several thousands of clerks refusing posts during an usurpation of five years having probably no means of subsistence.

In addition to this, all naval and military offi-

cers promoted by Don Miguel were degraded, and in the most ungracious manner. This might be just; but when there was an army of thirty thousand men in the field, besides militia and royalist volunteers, opposed to Don Pedro, it was impolitic and unnecessary. Those arrangements ought to have been left till the end of the war, and every encouragement held out to men to abandon the standard of the usurper.

It is true, the Emperor had a difficult game to play, as his officers would not submit to serve under those of Don Miguel; but they might have been promoted without degrading the others, which would have satisfied both parties. But all this was unheeded by the Queen's ministers. Paper, pen, and ink were rife, and their inclinations were willing. Bouyed up with success, they thought the war at an end, and conciliation useless.

Palmella and myself had urged Admiral Parker to land the British marines for the protection of the town; the British merchants had also petitioned for protection under the plea that it had been abandoned by the Miguelite government carrying off the whole of the police, and in the

event of an attack their lives and properties would be endangered. We of course were all anxious to commit the English government, and the admiral was as anxious to avoid doing so, unless circumstances authorized it, which he was of opinion was not the present case. The Emperor and his ministers, however, fancied the victory their own, and were displeased at the very mention of foreign assistance.

In the marine department I did every thing in my power to soften the decree: it was inexecutable and dangerous, and the officers with few exceptions were reappointed in a few days. In one instance the minister succeeded in outwitting me by the most unjustifiable means ever adopted by any government. The director of the marine unaccountability had been in office many years. He was a respectable old man, and I had never heard of his entertaining any violent political feelings. His place was wanted, and as I had reinstated him in office, it was necessary to concoct a plan to get rid of him. This was easily managed. A barber was found to swear he was engaged in a plot against the life of the Emperor. On this

information two files of foreign soldiers were sent to the inspector's office without consulting me or the minister of marine (as he said), and he was conducted to prison, and his place filled up. I remonstrated with the minister of marine and justice on the cruelty and indecency of this proceeding, but the latter assured me that the proofs were so strong it was impossible to act otherwise: but that if his accuser did not make good his charges, he should be sent to Cape Verd. The old man remained in prison about three weeks, had a sort of trial, and was acquitted for want of proof; but nothing was done to his accuser. He lost his place, returned to the arsenal as a clerk, and shortly after died. I mention this as a fact that came under my own observation, and I have no doubt many similar cases occurred.

The Pope's Nuncio was recommended to quit the kingdom, and a ship of war was offered to convey him. The patriarch was ordered not to appear at the palace, and the Jesuits were sent out of Portugal. The English judge conservator was removed, but reinstated on a remonstrance from Mr. Hopner, and Madame Juramenha was

sent to a convent and shortly after released. Precipitation and want of thought was the order of the day as far as administration went : imbecility and procrastination were conspicuous in military preparations.

The occupation of the capital made no impression on the country. Santarem alone declared for the Queen, and the towns through which the Duke of Terceira had passed were again occupied by the Miguelites. Forty-two prisoners were murdered at Estremos ; and had the governor of Elvas not sent away the royalist volunteers, the prisoners there would have shared the same fate. All was quiet in Lisbon, but every thing without indicated a long and bloody civil war.

The cholera, which had been raging in Lisbon, Setubal, Coimbra, and Leiria, considerably subsided after the occupation by the Queen's troops, and shortly after entirely disappeared ; while, on the other hand, it broke out in the Algarves, and carried off many thousands : that unfortunate province was likewise overrun by guerillas, and little respect was paid to property or persons whatever were their political opinions.

* On the 7th of August Colonel Guyot, a French officer, arrived from France with orders to protest against Marshal Bourmont and the French officers being employed on Don Miguel's service, but no attention was paid to his remonstrance.

It will naturally be supposed that as the government were so active in creating internal enemies, they would have been equally active in making preparations* to resist external ones, who might be expected shortly at Lisbon. This, however, never entered their heads. The minister of finance was certainly most active in raising money, and did wonders; but the minister-at-war never contemplated the possibility of the Miguelites marching on the capital; and he contented himself with issuing out decrees for the formation of moveable and fixed battalions. All persons from the age of eighteen to fifty, with few exceptions, were obliged to join those battalions; the young unmarried men formed the moveable, and the married men the fixed. The government found arms and rations; they clothed themselves.

The artizans of the naval and military arsenals and public works were also formed into battalions;

and it is astonishing what progress they made in the drill, and with how much good-will they submitted to it. This was the extent of the exertions of the minister-at-war; no other proposition was made to meet the enemy. As for lines of defence, though a plan had been submitted to the government the very day they arrived, they were never thought of; and they seemed determined to lose Lisbon with the same facility we got it.

Officers were much wanted in the new regiments; many had arrived from Oporto, and others were appointed from amongst those who had been confined and persecuted by Don Miguel; but whether they had been worn out by confinement, or had never been good for any thing, in few instances could they be compared to those of the liberating army. Arms were wanted, as were clothing and horses; and much time was lost in sending for, and much time lost in procuring them. Orders were sent to England and Belgium to enlist men for the British and Belgian regiments, and, I fear not much to the credit of the agents employed, not the best description were picked up, and abundance of promises made which were never

*kept. Young gentlemen were fairly kidnapped with the offer of commissions by people who had no authority to give them; and on their arrival in Lisbon, instead of finding themselves officers, they had the choice of carrying a musket and a pack, or of returning to England, in many instances without having the means of doing so.

Had a bounty of four or five moidores been offered, I am of opinion that abundance of native troops would have been raised for the regiments of the line, much more efficient than the moveable and fixed battalions. That sum would also have brought many from the opposite party, who were both badly fed and badly paid, and who would have been superior to the description of men and boys brought from England, Ireland, Scotland, France, and Belgium, who were generally unruly, addicted to drinking, averse to discipline, and clamorous for pay, which was rarely forthcoming.

After the attack of the 25th on Oporto, and the news of the capture of Lisbon was known in the Miguelite army, it was supposed that many deserters would have come in, but in this we were mistaken. They showed no disposition, however,

to renew the attack, and contented themselves with occasionally firing into the town. Here the Miguelites committed a great error; they ought either to have marched to Lisbon immediately, where they would have found Mr. Freire asleep, or have concentrated the whole of their artillery before the Foz and Serra Convent, which they would have levelled to the ground, and ultimately taken Oporto. This would have required time, but its success was certain, and Don Pedro would have lost his army. Bourmont might then have marched on Lisbon with his whole force; the Emperor's resources would have failed; and he must have finally capitulated. A middle course was pursued after a considerable delay, and Don Miguel lost his crown.

On the 2d of August the guns began to disappear from the Miguelite batteries, and on the 6th their troops were seen to move off, which was confirmed by deserters who now came in in considerable numbers. On the 9th, cattle and provisions of all descriptions entered Oporto, the whole country between Matozinhos and Lordello being

free from the enemy. On the 12th General Saldanha occupied the Monte Castro, Ervilha, and Seralva batteries, and convinced himself of the immense strength of the Miguelite lines. In fact Oporto was hemmed in on all sides, and had the plan of attacking either from the north or south been adopted, instead of sending a force to the Algarves, the army of Don Pedro would have been defeated and Oporto taken.

Badcock's
Rough
Leaves.

On the 16th of August the Conde D'Almer, who had been left in command at Villa Nova, having failed in making arrangements with Saldanha relative to the wines, set fire to the stores, and destroyed about twenty thousand pipes of port wine. Captain Glascock landed with a party of seamen, and fortunately saved from destruction the British stores.

On the 18th General Saldanha moved out from Oporto, and drove the enemy from their positions on the north of the Douro, and made many prisoners. On the 19th vessels entered the river, and on the 20th the Miguelites retired from Villa Nova, leaving Oporto free

after a siege of eleven months, in which the Queen's party lost sixteen thousand souls, including seven thousand troops, — a siege that, with an enterprising enemy, ought not to have lasted eleven days.

So little apprehension was entertained by the Emperor or his ministers of the approach of the Miguelites, that Mendizabal had been sent home to bring out the Queen and Empress. Admiral Parker made an offer of a frigate for that purpose, which was declined, with many thanks by the Emperor for his attention: but a British steamship-of-war was requested might convoy the Queen, who was herself to embark in an English steam-boat fitted up for the purpose, and bearing the constitutional flag of Portugal.

On the 11th of August I received a communication from Lord William Russell, that Bourmont was in full march on Lisbon, having left from eight to ten thousand men to watch Oporto and cover Braga. The advanced corp consisted of five thousand men, composed of their best troops, in which were placed upwards of one hundred French officers.

They were followed by eight thousand more, commanded by Gaspar Texeira. This intelligence ought to have been known to the minister-at-war, who should also have been acquainted with the force of the Duke of Cadaval and Mollelos's troops; but still no order was given to fortify Lisbon.

On the 12th I rode round the ancient defences of the town, waited on the minister, and pointed out the absolute necessity of beginning the fortifications, and offered to superintend them myself. At the same time I wrote a strong letter to the Emperor, pointing out the situation he was in, and calling upon him to save Lisbon by the same activity he had displayed at Oporto. I had before applied to Admiral Parker to land the marines for the protection of the town, in which I was supported by Lord William before he was minister, but his task was difficult; he was tied down to strict neutrality; but such scenes had been acted in the defenceless towns in the Algarves by the Miguelite party, that he at last consented, for the protection of the English, to land at St. Julian's and

Fort St. George, after the enemy had passed Leiria, provided the ministers requested it ; and he could perceive they were exerting themselves for their own defence. This I communicated to the minister-at-war, and to my astonishment thanks were not even tendered for his assistance ; and the enemy had absolutely passed Coimbra before a spade had been put into the ground. Who was to blame for this apathy it is difficult to say ; but it is evident the minister-at-war ought to have known of the approach of Bourmont, and have given directions for the fortifications ; but I verily believe he knew as little of the movements of the marshal as the Duke of Cadaval had known of Terceira's.

Next morning the Emperor came to the arsenal. and assured me he had begun the works of defence, and that he would himself attend till they were completed ; and he kept his word. From daylight till dark he hardly ever quitted the workmen ; and I feel quite convinced, had he not been in Lisbon, his minister would not have awoke until Don Miguel had rapped at the gates

of the town, and the Queen's cause would have been lost, by the same indolence that Don Miguel's was, a fortnight before.

CHAPTER XV.

THE fortifications began at Alcantra, where a deep ravine separates Lisbon from Jonqueira. The ground here is strong, and easily fortified, as far as Lourical and St. Sebastian. It then becomes flat to the Pena de Franca; from thence to the Tagus it is again strong. Redoubts were thrown up on all the commanding heights, connected together with breast-works and ditches. The position was not extensive, and when finished and well defended, was not to be forced.

The frigate Rainha, of Portugal, flanked the right of the position; a brig was stationed higher up, and the Liberal at Villa Franca. The Don John was placed below the Necessidades to flank the ravine. The Miguelite Rainha (now Cabo St.

Vicenti) took her station above Belem ; and the Don Pedro, (which had returned from Peniché,) below, both ships flanking the approach to that castle, which was an important point, as it commanded the river, and it was necessary either to defend or destroy it. Old Torres, who had so well preserved the Serra at Oporto, was in command here. The Donna Maria was at Sines, and the Isabel Maria at Setuval ; the rest of the squadron along the coast, to prevent the introduction of stores and ammunition.

The spirit of insubordination still existed in the fleet. Between the Rainha and Don Pedro's ship's company, (who manned the Dohn John,) there was a great deal of bad blood and jealousy, which arose to such a height that it was impossible to carry on the duty. They were clamorous to be sent home, pretending that they had received promises to that effect. Their wishes were immediately complied with, under the understanding that all pay and prize-money was forfeited. About seventy of the most mutinous gave in their names ; the remainder cooled, had time for reflection, and went quietly below.

A transport was ready for the malcontents, and they were sent on board forthwith, many of them heartily repenting of their conduct ; but this was no time for trifling, and they had full warning that if they left the transport they should be imprisoned. Of this they were regardless, broke out into open mutiny, threatened to cut the captain's throat if he attempted to take them out of the Tagus, lowered down the boats, went on shore, and committed every excess ; were arrested agreeably to my promise, and sent to Fort St. George, where a regimen of bread and water brought them to their senses, and they were shortly shipped off for England.

From that moment every thing settled down quiet in the *Don John*. The commodore became sufficiently well to do his duty, and in a short time she was as well-disciplined as any ship in the British Navy. Seamen, like boys, when left to themselves, soon run wild, and are capable of going to any excess ; but, provided severity is tempered with justice, they are easily subdued, and become sensible of their folly, and soon discover that there is more happiness and comfort

in a well-disciplined ship than a privateer, and I had an opportunity of observing that a few severe examples are much better than the niggling punishments now in practice in the British service; and if our naval rulers would hold out more encouragement to the petty officers, by giving the first class double the seaman's pay, and the second class one-half more, they would soon find that such a system would tend more to abolish corporal punishment, and preserve discipline, than any means that have been as yet adopted.

On the 14th a steamer brought the welcome intelligence of the recognition of the Queen, at the same time accrediting Lord William Russell as minister; but this was done with so much caution, that it was only on condition that her affairs continued prosperous. The next day was appointed for his reception, it being the Queen's name day. Lord William was well received, and the Emperor expressed himself much satisfied with the early recognition of his daughter by his oldest ally.

The decree for the summoning the Cortes for the 1st of October also appeared on this day.

Nothing could shew the state of ignorance in which ministers were, with regard to the feelings of the country, than issuing this decree. Did they expect the war to finish before the 1st of October? Did they still believe that Bourmont was not marching on the capital? Or did they think Don Miguel was coming to lay down his arms? They must have believed either one or the other, or they never could have issued a decree which every one saw could not be put in force, and knew they would afterwards be obliged to rescind.

The appointment of Lord William as minister was much approved of; he had been some time in Lisbon watching the movements of the Spaniards, and was well known to be a friend to the cause of liberty. His name alone was a sufficient guarantee for his principles; Lady William was supposed to lean the other way, and for no better reason than because she afforded occasional protection to a Miguelite, who fancied himself in danger; but be it remembered, when Miguel's party ruled in Lisbon with an iron sceptre, and that red-hot, her house was always open for the protection of the unfortunate constitutionalists.

Admiral Parker was also looked upon with suspicious eyes, because, although decidedly in favour of the Queen, he was scrupulously neutral in his conduct; no man could have better maintained the dignity of a British admiral, or conducted himself with more propriety; and I am happy to be able to bear witness to this fact, and to state that during the whole time he commanded in Lisbon we were on the best of terms.

Lord William, being now in an official capacity, was entitled to give advice. Old Candido expected interference, and was prepared to resist. Advice he was willing to receive, but, I much fear, not to follow. Lord William was favourable to the Palmella party, and to conciliation, which was always promised, but never performed. The Emperor's ministers had committed so many errors in former times, that they inspired little confidence; they were not liked by the Queen's party, and hated, feared, and detested by the Miguelites. When shut up in Oporto, they had promised indemnity to the Queen's friends at the expense of their opponents,* and still they expected the country would be in their favour. They had

abolished the tithe (a great part of which went to the state) without substituting another tax, and otherwise alarmed the Church, which they had no power to reform, and still they expected the priests would become constitutional. They were detested by the Miguelite nobility, and took no pains to conciliate the few peers who had sacrificed all, and remained faithful to the Queen. They degraded the Miguelite officers, yet expected the army to declare in their favour. They issued a decree to confiscate the property of the Miguelites absent from Lisbon, and actually began selling their moveables, which nobody but Jews and brokers would buy. In fact one species of tyranny was substituted for another; there was a change of men, but none of measures; they were rulers of a party, not of a kingdom. One half of Portugal had been confiscated by Don Miguel's ministers, and the other half by Don Pedro's. They thought themselves masters of the kingdom, and took no pains to conciliate.

Those acts satisfied a few hot-headed men, who looked forward to enrich themselves by confisca-

tion; but the sensible men, and those who had lost most by the usurpation, saw the impossibility of pacifying the country by such a system.

Lord William pressed for an amnesty, which was promised on the arrival of the Queen: that of Palmella at Terceira had been already published with the same exceptions, but it had no effect.

As the enemy approached Lisbon the government became alarmed; and on the 19th the minister of foreign affairs officially asked for the armed interference of England, and yet a few weeks before they had taken no advantage of the admiral's offer, and had neglected for three weeks to commence the fortifications. The interference was refused, accompanied with a recommendation to exert themselves.

Don Carlos was still at Coimbra: he had been repeatedly ordered to quit Portugal by the king of Spain, who was in declining health, and now positively refused. The Princess de Beira, a clever woman, exercised much influence over both Carlos and Miguel. The Portuguese government were most anxious to get the whole of Carlos's family

out of the kingdom. An English frigate was in consequence offered to convey him to Italy, which he declined. Don Pedro was much dissatisfied with the Spanish ministry not withdrawing their minister from Miguel's court. He however refrained from remonstrating, in hopes England would insist on his being withdrawn.

A Spanish courier, with a passport from Cordova, on coming into Lisbon was detained and his despatches seized ; against this the Spanish consul remonstrated, and received for answer, that Spain had no right to keep a minister at the usurper's court, and that his passport would not be respected. At the request of Lord William Russell the despatches were given up, with an intimation that no more couriers would be permitted to enter Lisbon when in a state of siege.

The Spanish government was much offended at this, as well as the detention of another courier named Texugo ; he had been a notorious spy, and now passed for Sir John Campbell's secretary ; both were taken in the Queen, an English vessel who had broke the blockade at Figueiras, and were sent to the castle of St. George. Sir

John remonstrated against his seizure and claimed the protection of the English minister. It was quite notorious that he had been with the Miguelite army, and, although not employed, assisted them with his advice, and had now retired, disgusted at the little attention he received from Miguel.

Under those circumstances Lord William declined interfering, and on reference to the British government his conduct was approved of, and Sir John remained a prisoner.

The Spanish government complained to the English minister at Madrid of the seizure of their couriers, and threatened, if instant reparation was not made, to take the matter seriously up, expressing at the same time that they had no wish to quarrel with the Queen's government. The British minister at Madrid took a wrong view of the subject, and thought taking a spy out of an English vessel who had broke the blockade was an insult to England. This minister was not very favourable to the Queen's cause, and rather encouraged the Spanish ministry in making frivolous complaints of her government. This came with a peculiar bad grace from Spain, at the time she

had a minister at Miguel's court, and permitted the Madrid gazette to be filled with false accounts of what was passing in Lisbon.

Lord William had requested Mr. Addington to insist on the recal of Cordova, which he declined, not conceiving he had a right so to do, but promised his good offices, and Cordova was finally ordered to watch Carlos, and not accompany Miguel's court.

It is difficult to understand what was the policy of Zea Bermudez at this time. Though Carlos had constantly refused to quit Portugal, and Miguel had taken no steps to compel him, on the contrary had countenanced his remaining, probably foreseeing the death of Ferdinand, and afraid of a constitution in Spain, yet a Spanish minister had till now been kept at his court. Ferdinand, it is very evident, did not like the constitution in Portugal; but he liked the presence of Don Carlos less. Zea Bermudez, on the other hand, was no friend to the Portuguese constitution, which he feared might be imported into Spain on the death of Ferdinand, and probably encouraged Carlos to remain, preferring him and absolutism to a queen, a minor, and a constitution.

On the 10th of August the Miguelite army entered Coimbra and joined the troops who had retired from Lisbon, Bourmont and the French officers were indefatigable in reorganizing the army, which was ill-appointed, but nevertheless enthusiastic in Miguel's cause; and it was not before the 14th he could put his troops in motion.

* Count San Lorenzo had been dismissed from the office of minister-at-war, and Bourmont filled that office as well as commander-in-chief; but about this time San Lorenzo again received the portfolio.

The army was divided into three columns. The first, under De Larochejaquelin, was directed on Abrantes, there to pass the Tagus, and occupy Salvatierra; the second, under General Lemos, marched direct on Santarem. Don Miguel accompanied the marshal with the third column, who marched on Leiria. The three columns consisted of from fourteen to fifteen thousand men. The troops were ill off for shoes, and were obliged to halt two days at Leiria and three at Caldas.

On the 21st of August the Duke of Terceira marched with a division of from four to five thou-

sand men on Villa Franca, where the Liberal schooner was anchored. On the 25th General Saldanha arrived from Oporto. He had little confidence in the activity of the ministers, and thought it advisable to leave the command at Oporto in the hands of Sir Thomas Stubbs, to act upon the defensive, and proceed at once to Lisbon without waiting for leave; and fortunate it was he took such a decided step; for although the Emperor was extremely active, he required the head of his staff at his elbow, and I know he was delighted to see him, as were the generality of the people in Lisbon.

Saldanha, at one time, was no favourite with the Emperor, but he soon found out his merits, and I believe gave him all his confidence. He also liked the Duke of Terceira, but was jealous of the glory he had acquired by his rapid march, and rather appeared to keep him in the back-ground; at least I have every reason to believe so, for certainly, after the Emperor's arrival in Lisbon, the Duke had little power, and only the command of his own division.

Terceira was a good unobtrusive man; when sent on service, no one would perform it better, as he

often proved ; but he was not a person likely to push himself into notice ; and both he and the Duke of Palmella repeatedly told me, when I spoke to them on the subject of fortifying Lisbon, that they had no power since the arrival of the Emperor and his ministers. The position of Saldanha was different ; he was chief of the Emperor's staff, and could direct every thing in his name without exciting jealousy.

He took up his quarters in a large house above the Quinta of Lourecal, from whence he could view the whole position. The fortifications went on with great activity, as well as the organizing and disciplining the new levies, who were divided, as I have already stated, into moveable and fixed battalions. As the enemy approached Lisbon, considerable reinforcements arrived from Oporto ; amongst them were Bacon's lancers, two hundred and fifty strong, the fifth caçadores, and ninth and fifteenth of the line. Two additional squadrons of cavalry had been formed from deserters, and infantry soldiers who could ride ; but there was much difficulty in mounting them. Requisitions had been made in Lisbon for both horses and mules, but many were sheltered by the

English, who took them under their protection. Men escaped the levies by the same means.

The situation of the Queen's party at this time would have excused setting momentarily aside many of their privileges; but they had been so long accustomed to their abuse under all circumstances, that it would have been considered next to robbery; and as the generality were not particularly favourable to the Queen's cause, a great outcry would have been made.

I, however, strongly recommended the Emperor to prevent the abuse of privileges, and requested him to make me inspector of horses and mules for twenty-four hours, and order them all to be paraded in Black-horse Square without any distinction. I should then have requested the English to point out their own horses on their word of honour, and the rest should have been sent to the dépôt. This would have had the desired effect; for although the English from good-nature might have lent their names to protect the horse of a friend without reflecting on the consequences, they would never have publicly given protection to horses not *bonâ fide* their own property. The

Emperor, however, felt delicate^a about any interference; my advice was not followed, and we were in consequence badly off for cavalry.

During the time the enemy were marching on Lisbon, priests and friars were not idle in stirring the people up to arms: large Guerilla parties were forming in the Alemtejo and the Algarves under the command of a notorious brigand, Ramochin, who drove the small detachment of the Queen's troops out of Mertola, Villa Real, and Castel Marino; and finally obliged them to retreat to Faro. The Audáz brig and gun-boats also quitted the Guadiana: these disasters were followed by the abandonment of all our posts in the Algarves with the exception of Faro and Lagos.

I had collected together about five hundred English and Portuguese marines with the intention of seizing Figueiras, when despatches were received from the governor of the latter place, demanding immediate assistance. The steam was already up to proceed to Peniché: her destination was changed to the Algarves, and she arrived in time to save Lagos from capture. The guerillas were driven from before the town,^a and about

two hundred Portuguese marines were left in garrison.

On the 30th the Duke of Terceira retired from Villa Franca, the enemy having made their appearance in force. The Liberal schooner^{*} was withdrawn, and the troops occupied their different positions in the lines, bristled with upwards of one hundred pieces of artillery. Saldanha was on the left; the Duke of Terceira on the right; and the Emperor commanded the whole.

A few days before the enemy appeared, I ascertained that the greater part of the guns on the Tagus as far as Cascaes were still mounted. I had repeatedly urged the minister-at-war to have them removed, and it is probable he had given orders to that effect; but no one looked to their execution, and they remained in *statu quo*. It was now too late to remove the guns, but the boats of the squadron brought away the carriages, thus depriving the Miguelites of the means of besieging St. Julian's and Belem, and of strengthening the positions they would occupy in front of our lines.*

* When the Emperor landed in Portugal, Santa Martha left guns enough in Oporto to arm the lines.

On the 3d the enemy appeared before Lisbon, and occupied Campo Grande, Campo Pequeno, and the adjacent villages. The Miguelite flag was seen flying in all directions, and the water was cut off, which caused much inconvenience, although arrangements had been made to receive a supply from the south.

The force of the Queen's troops was about eight thousand, including five hundred cavalry, as many artillery, and about the same number of moveable and fixed battalions. The lines were not finished, and in many places much exposed. The three weeks of idleness was now felt.

There were upwards of one hundred pieces of cannon mounted. The force returned by the minister-at-war was twenty-nine thousand three hundred and seventy seven, and one hundred and eighty guns ; but that was on paper, and probably exaggerated to make the Cortes believe he had been most active in his exertions for the cause ; but Marshal Saldanha, I am certain, did not bring half that number equipped into the lines.

On the morning of the 5th General Bourmont, having made his dispositions, pushed forward his light troops from the Quinta Lourical close up to

the redoubt which commanded it, not far from the aqueduct ; taking advantage of a wall which ran from the Quinta to the angle of the redoubt, and by some unaccountable neglect had been left standing, together with many houses in the neighbourhood, probably from a desire to injure the proprietors as little as possible. From those houses, and wall, a very destructive fire was kept up for several hours on the redoubts, as far as St. Sebastian, where stands a house at an angle where two roads meet leading into Lisbon. From the Quinta of Lourical an avenue of trees led up to the redoubt before mentioned.

About seven o'clock a strong column, well covered by light troops, pushed up this avenue to the right of the redoubt with great courage, were met and overthrown by the fifth caçadores, who followed them down the hill to the very Quinta itself, inflicting on them a heavy loss. Don Thomas Mascarenhas was killed, the Duke of Terceira had a horse shot under him ; and the poor Marquis of St. Iria lost a son, being the second killed in this war. The Emperor had a narrow escape a little before the attack from a cannon-ball,

which killed a man close to him. The loss of the caçadores was not heavy in driving the enemy, but many were killed and wounded in the redoubts. I never saw a heavier fire than was kept up on St. Sebastian: the house was completely covered with round, grape, and musketry: and the approach through the court-gate to the garden where the battery stood, was just as hot as any amateur could wish it. Here I think General Bourmont should have made a simultaneous attack. Two roads led from the enemy's lines on each side of St. Sebastian's, meeting in a broad street. On each of those roads should have been placed a strong column between stone walls. Another column should have advanced in the open space in front: they would have probably broken into skirmishing parties, as the Miguelite troops generally did; but the other two being confined, must have either pushed on or remained to be shot in mass, which, if well led, would not have been the case, and, in all probability, they would have entered the town.

It may be presumptuous in my giving an opinion on military matters, but I should always prefer

leading soldiers boldly up to an attack, than through a cover; for they in general dislike as much leaving it to come under a shower of musketry, as people in civil life do to leave a portico and get into a shower of rain.

About two the enemy made dispositions for a second attack, and collected a strong column in a field to the left of Lourical. In the redoubt in which I was, we had neither powder nor shot, and the guns were very imperfectly manned; and had they pushed boldly up and kept steady in column, it is more than probable they would have forced that part of the line; but this the Miguelite troops never did; they invariably, when under a sharp fire, broke their ranks and spread out as caçadores.

After remaining a short time in column they were withdrawn, and in half an hour a squadron of cavalry, led by Louis Rochejaquelin, made a desperate attempt to gallop into the redoubt under cover of the wall I have already mentioned. Their gallant leader, who deserved a better fate, was killed close to the ditch, where many men and

horses fell, and the rest retreated in confusion. A party of fifteen or sixteen came by mistake on the wrong side of the wall close up to the redoubt; and though a heavy fire was opened on them, they only left two men and horses behind.

It is difficult to conceive the object of this daring enterprize. They were not supported by infantry; and had they succeeded in entering the battery, they must have been driven back or destroyed before any assistance could have been given them. It is possible that this gallant youth, impatient at the inactivity of the general commanding the column, had rushed up either to ascertain the nature of the defence, or, if he succeeded in entering, to strike a panic into our troops, and preserve it till he received succour. Such things have succeeded before; and in armies there are always aspiring spirits who will risk every thing to obtain renown; and in most instances their valour is crowned with success. Here the brave youth perished in a foreign land, and lies in a common grave with others, without even a monument to record his gallant bearing.

The firing from behind the wall and the redoubts lasted till dark ; but no further attack was made by the enemy. In the night they were driven from behind the covering, which was razed with the ground. Our loss in this affair was from three to four hundred men ; that of the enemy could not have been less than a thousand.

Next morning the ground occupied by the Miguelites previous to the attack, was taken possession of by the Queen's troops, and the adjacent houses, which had much annoyed the lines the day before, were destroyed. For several days after, there was occasional skirmishing and moving about troops ; but no further attack took place, unless the reconnaissance of the 14th could be called one. Indeed, from this time General Bourmont appears to have given up all idea of taking the town by assault, and probably hoped to do it by blockade. To accomplish this required a greater force than he had at his disposal, as supplies could be thrown in both from the south and by sea. Had he got possession of the numerous heavy guns which had been removed

from the batteries on the Tagus, he might have possibly possessed himself of St. Julian's and Belem; this would have rendered our situation less pleasant, but could not have prevented supplies being thrown in. In the mean time the new levies were getting into a better state of discipline, and were rapidly increasing; and an expedition of three or four hundred men, under Captain Ruxton and Colonel Raboca, were sent to Samora to bring over a quantity of forage and grain in store there and at Benevento. A strong detachment of militia was surprised and driven from thence, a good many killed and wounded, eleven or twelve prisoners taken; and several boats brought away with grain. The enemy in their turn surprised our detachment two days after, captured our boats, and drove the troops to Baroca d'Alva; at least they marched there as fast as they could, but without waiting to ascertain the force of their opponents.

At this time several communications went on between Admiral Parker and General Bourmont relative to the protection of British property, and

I took advantage of this circumstance to endeavour to bring about an accommodation with the Miguelite general, but without success. This was ^{Appendix.} No. XXV. winked at by the Emperor, but not authorized, and indeed, as the *sine-qua-non* was the retirement of Don Miguel from Portugal, it was at once refused.

CHAPTER XVI.

ON the 21st of September, Marshal Bourmont resigned the command of the army. It is supposed he wished Don Miguel to withdraw the army from before the lines, assemble the Cortes, and change the ministers, to which he would not consent. Desertion also became considerable at this time from the Miguelites, but more went home than came over to the Queen.

Marshal Bourmont was succeeded by a General Macdonell, who had formerly served in Spain. He had arrived a few days before at St. Martinho, in the Lord of the Isles steamer, afterwards captured by a gun-boat fitted out by the governor of Peniche. He was accompanied by several French officers; and Captain Elliott, Don Miguel's admiral, or rather naval adviser. He was still sigh-

ing for an opportunity of serving his worthy master's cause. One of his officers, Mr. Luckraft, a master in the navy, had been sent to Castle St. George for holding communication with the Miguelites at Belem. Information had been received of the proceedings of this gentleman, but the proof was not sufficiently strong to arrest him. I therefore determined to have it out of his own mouth, and he was requested to attend at the arsenal; as he had been captured in the Lord of the Isles steamer a few days before, he made no objections to this. I represented to him the danger he had incurred in going to Belem, and observed that, had the Miguelites known it, he would certainly have been hanged as a spy. He fell into the snare and acknowledged he had been frequently there. He was in consequence arrested by the orders of the minister of marine. At this Lord William Russel took fire, and made a strong representation to the Portuguese minister of foreign affairs, observing that such a proceeding struck at the very root of the English privileges. Now I apprehend Lord William was wrong, for it never could have been contemplated by the

Methuen treaty, that in the event of Lisbon being besieged, it should be necessary to consult the judge conservator before a man who had confessed himself to have been in the enemy's camp could be arrested. Be this as it may, he was released a few days after, and sent out of the country, not a little satisfied at his escape. He was under the name of Williamson, and it was not till after his departure that his real name was ascertained, and that he was a master in the navy. Had that circumstance been known, he certainly would have stood a very fair chance of exaltation.

The change of generals made no change in military operations. The Emperor continued to fortify his lines and discipline his troops; the opposite party remained in front of Lisbon without undertaking any enterprise on either bank of the Tagus.

On the 22d, the Queen and Empress arrived in the Tagus in the Soho steamer, bearing the Portuguese colours and standard, escorted by an English steam ship of war. Their Majesties had been residing in Paris, watching the progress of

events. When the troops in Oporto were reduced to the last extremity, the Emperor had written to the Empress that nothing but a miracle could save them. After the capture of the squadron, he again wrote—"the miracle has been worked, the fleet is taken, and we are safe."

On receiving the Emperor's invitation to come to Lisbon, they proceeded to Havre, where they embarked in a steamer and landed at Portsmouth. Their Majesties were remarkably well received in England, and invited to pass some days at Windsor. Don Pedro was much pleased at the attention of the King of England to his wife and daughter, and highly indignant at the King of France for having ordered the Duke of Leuchtenberg, the Empress's brother, out of the kingdom; he considered it a personal insult to himself, and could not allude to the subject without expressing his indignation.

The moment the signal was made from St. Julian's, Lisbon got into motion; blue and white flags were flying in all directions, and blue and white dresses were generally displayed by the

ladies. Boats were put in requisition, and long before the steamer passed Belem, the river was covered.

The Emperor had prepared a magnificent boat of twenty-four oars and forty-eight men painted blue and white, the men dressed in the same manner, in which he embarked at the arsenal with a couple of aid-de-camps and myself to receive the Empress and Queen; and so impatient was he to meet them that he pushed off without either court or ministers. I never saw him so gay or pleased; he got on board a little above Belem, was received at the gangway by the Empress, who embraced and kissed him with great affection. The Queen was much affected, and could not restrain her tears. The little Princess Amelia, his youngest child, occupied much of his attention: she was rather alarmed at the appearance of his beard, and was not very grateful for his caresses. After the first salutation, the Emperor presented me to the Queen and Empress, from both of whom I received much attention and sincere thanks. She expressed her regret that there had not been sufficient accommodation for my

family, but they might be expected every day in a steamer who was shortly to follow.

After the steamer anchored, Admiral Parker with his captains and Lord William Russell came on board, and shortly after all the ministers and principal people of Lisbon. The marshal and officers of the army were prevented from coming off, lest the enemy should seize that opportunity of attacking the lines. It was arranged that the landing was to take place next day at twelve.

The Empress is above the middle stature, handsome, and extremely pleasant and agreeable; by no means proud, though perfectly acquainted with her station; in fact she is an accomplished lady. The Queen is fair, has a plump and handsome face, about the middle size, and a great deal of *embonpoint*. She was about fifteen, very shy and retired, and said little. Both spoke English: the Empress discoursed with great affability, and seemed highly delighted. About five o'clock, the visitors having retired, dinner was announced. The Emperor handed down "Viva Queen, and at his desire I had the Empress!"

handing the Empress and was invited to dinner ; and I do not think I ever saw a more happy party. There was no form or stiffness whatever. The company was small, consisting of the Emperor, Empress, Queen, two ladies of honour, and two or three gentlemen and aid-de-camps. Several toasts were drunk after dinner, and about eight o'clock the party went on deck, took coffee, listened to a very good band, and enjoyed the beautiful evening in that delightful climate.

At ten the Emperor went on shore, and guard-boats were placed round the steamer to prevent any surprise in the night.

Next morning at half-past eleven I went on board the *Soho* in the Queen's barge : the Emperor, the principal officers of the court, and the minister, were already there. The royal barges, about a dozen in number, were appropriated to carry different persons of the suite, and attend the disembarkation, forming themselves in a line on the starboard quarter of the Queen's barge. Admiral Parker and those captains of the English squadron were on the quarter, and the boats from the

Portuguese squadron took their stations outside of each line. At noon the Queen, accompanied by the Emperor and Empress, the ministers, officers of the court, and myself, shoved off in the state barge. This was the signal for manning yards and for a royal salute from the ships and forts. Innumerable boats, under sail and rowing, floated on the river. The windows of the houses were crowded to excess, as also the different quays, with well-dressed people wearing the Queen's colours. The streets from Black-Horse-square to the cathedral were lined with the fixed battalions, and the army on the lines kept under arms to prevent surprise; the officers were strictly forbid to quit their posts.

At half past twelve the Queen landed in the square, which was announced by another royal salute. There General Saldanha was presented, and on this occasion was made a marshal. She took the Emperor's right arm, the Empress the left, and prompted by the Emperor she called out "Viva la Carta Constitucional!" This was re-echoed by the public, together with cries of "Viva Donna Maria!" The Emperor and the

A state carriage was in waiting, which conveyed the royal personages to the cathedral, where *Te Deum* was sung. This finished, they proceeded to the palace of the *Necessidades*, followed by an immense concourse of people. No court was held this day, though many kissed the Queen's and Empress's hands. After remaining a few minutes in the palace, the Emperor bowed to the company, who took the hint and retired, leaving the royal party to their own domestic circle.

On the 24th there was a grand review in the lines. The Queen, accompanied by the Emperor and Empress in a carriage and four, passed before the troops, the bands of the different regiments playing the constitutional hymn. The troops looked well, and the sight was altogether imposing. The generals and principal officers were presented on passing. On the 25th a court was held at the *Bemposta*. The Queen sat on the throne for the first time, the Empress on her left; the Emperor stood below. The company was numerous, and sufficiently brilliant; the show of nobility small; independent of those attached to the court in some way or

other, there was only the Count Farobo, myself, and a youngster (whose name I forget). In Portugal the nobility, whether holding official situations or not, have the entrée to the throne-room before the levée begins, and occupy the right of the throne. The rest of the company remain in the other rooms, which are sufficiently large for their accommodation; and there is no necessity to squeeze them in between rails, as is done at St. James's.

At half-past two the door of the throne-room was thrown open, and the diplomatic corps introduced. They were followed by the foreign officers, who paid their respects to the Queen and to their Imperial Majesties. A deputation from Oporto came next; then the municipal body of Lisbon; a deputation from the Wine Company at Oporto, and several other public bodies: after them, officers of both professions, priests and civilians, who have the right of appearing at court.

In the evening I had the honour of dining at the Necessidades with the royal family, where I

met the ministers and principal people of the palace. The dinner was plain, and by no means on an expensive scale. The Emperor was a great economist, and looked himself into all the expenses. There was no state at this dinner; indeed it looked much more like a family party than a royal one. The Emperor drank water only, and the wine was far from being good. This was the first and last dinner the Emperor gave after the arrival of the Empress and Queen; indeed he appears to have kept the latter much too back, considering the important post she was destined to fill.

The City of Waterford steamer, with the rest of the Queen's suite, had not made her appearance, and some apprehension was entertained for her safety; and a few days after the Queen's arrival, Saldanha came to my office much agitated, having learnt that she was wrecked on the coast; and his wife and family, with many of the Queen's and Empress's suite, were at St. Martinho, under the protection of a detachment sent from Peniché by the Baron de Sa. The guerillas had paid them

a visit, but they were not aware who was in their hands, and Mr. Bell, acting with great presence of mind, convinced them she was an English steam-boat with passengers on board, and by those means they were saved from plunder, and probably from worse treatment. On receiving this intelligence from Saldanha, I took two companions of caçadores on board the Soho, and started in company with an English steamer of war, which Admiral Parker was kind enough to send with me, called at Penichô, took on board the Baron de Sa, and then proceeded to St. Martinho, where we found the Countess Saldanha and family, Madame Mascarenhas, and several of the Queen's and Empress's suite in safety. The greater part of the passengers saved their effects, but all the Emperor's, Empress's, and Queen's carriages and baggage were destroyed. I also lost the effects of my family, and only saved a horse with great difficulty. Two servants, who had charge of my things, amusing themselves gathering grapes, were made prisoners by the guerillas, and conducted to the enemy's quarters, but were immediately released.

After embarking the passengers and baggage, the caçadores were landed and marched to Peniché, and we returned to Lisbon. Poor Madame Mascarenhas had little idea that her husband was no more. Her brother accompanied me in the steamer, and we managed to keep her in ignorance till she got to Lisbon, to her mother, the Marchioness of Ficalho.

On the 2d of October the Superb steamer arrived, with the Marquis of Loulé and her royal highness the Marchioness, the Duchess of Terceira, my family, and the Swedish minister and family. I was in great hopes the Marquis would have resumed the portfolio of minister of marine; but he was so disgusted with the line of conduct of his former colleagues, that he declined having any thing to do with the administration of affairs, and took his station as one of the Emperor's aide-de-camps. The Marquis was an upright, honourable man, and an enemy to persecution; and the Marchioness a most amiable princess, the youngest sister of Don Pedro, very handsome and agreeable, and in private society she threw off the princess entirely and enjoyed herself; but no

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person knew better than she did how to assume it when necessary, or when she thought she was not treated with the respect due to her rank, and this not unfrequently happened at the Necessidades. •

A P P E N D I X.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

(TRANSLATED COPY.)

RENOWNED INHABITANTS OF THE AZORES !

I HAVE passed more than three months among you, and throughout that time I have been filled with admiration at, and gratitude for, the services you have made, and for the adherence you have shown in behalf of the sacred cause of my August Daughter. I must now leave you : I go, at the head of my brave companions, to put down the usurper, to restore the throne to the Queen Donna Maria the Second, to assert the empire of the law, by establishing the government of the Charter, under the protection of which the Portuguese shall enjoy anew the blessings of union, tranquillity, and justice, of which, by the hands of barbarity and despotism, they have been too long bereft.

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I leave you, then, faithful Azorians ; but I carry with me a lively remembrance of your loyalty and patriotism. I likewise bear with me the important knowledge of the capabilities of your soil, and the industrious character and enterprising spirit of its inhabitants ; and, if whilst here, amidst the difficulties with which the Government of Her Most Faithful Majesty has had yet to contend, I have provided, as far as circumstances allowed, for your necessities, you may rest assured, that hereafter, when the development of the projected institutions shall have taken place, the same Government will reckon it as one of its most sacred duties to extend, in a special manner, the protection and benefits of those institutions to this fertile country, and its useful and diligent inhabitants.

Farewell, then, brave Azorians ! If a glorious undertaking obliges me to bid you adieu, I carry along with me the certainty that your love of justice, for which you have been ready to sacrifice yourselves, and your adherence to the new institutions, of which you begin already to experience the benefits, will preserve in security and in the full merits of all its acquired renown, this noble archipelago, the classic land of Portuguese loyalty, the illustrious cradle of the regeneration of the mother country.

(Signed) DOM PEDRO, DUKE OF BRAGANZA.
25th June, 1832.

No. II.

SOLDIERS !

Your afflicted native country calls upon you, and offers to you, in return for your fatigues, your sufferings, and your loyalty, peace, gratitude, and reward.

Full of confidence in the visible protection of the Lord of Hosts, let us go, Soldiers, to finish the noble enterprise we have so gloriously undertaken. We are preceded by the renown of your incomparable courage and undaunted perseverance ; we are accompanied by the unshaken love wherewith we have devoted ourselves to the Queen Donna Maria II., and by our enthusiasm for the constitutional Charter. We are followed by the ardent wishes of the suffering Portuguese nation. Europe anxiously attends the decision of the struggle betwixt loyalty and perjury, justice and despotism, liberty and terror. Finally, Soldiers, glory calls upon us to preserve our honour.

Come, then, let us march to the sound of “ Long live the Queen, and the Charter, the palladium of Portuguese liberty !”

(Signed) **DOM PEDRO, DUKE OF BRAGANZA.**
25th June, 1832.

No. III.

Her Majesty's Ship Donna Maria,
16th September, 1832.

HONOURABLE SIR,

We, the undersigned petty officers, in the name of ourselves and the crew of Her Majesty's Ship, beg leave most respectfully to solicit your interference with the Commander-in-Chief, in respect of redress to a general grievance, which is apparent to every man in the ship, viz. that our force is by no means adequate to meet the enemy to any advantage; and running, as we are at present, from any means of assistance, without our knowing to what purpose, is a general cause of discontent. Further, we do sincerely and solemnly protest, that this ship is by no means seaworthy: and in the condition she is in at present, it is at the risk of ourselves to be at sea in her, particularly when it comes to blow but half a gale of wind. That we shall, to the utmost of our power, when called upon, act as Britons ought, against the common enemy; but in the present state of affairs, we most sincerely wish for an explanation as to the course to be pursued.

We remain, Honoured Sir, with respect,

Your obedient Servants,

William Davie, *Captain Forecastle.*

John Dawson, *B. Mate.*

John Ryan, *Ditto.*

James Marshal, *Quarter Master.*

William Davies, *Captain Main Top.*
 John Wood, *Quarter Master.*
 William Parker, *Captain Fore Top.*
 George Mollay, *B. Mate.*
 Adam Stow, *Quarter Master.*
 William Brown, *Gunner's Mate.*
 Hugh Hughes, *B. Mate.*
 Joseph Rumble, *Captain Fore Top.*
 John Williamson, *B. Mate.*
 Alexander Surrey, *Captain Afterguard.*
 Thomas Wipshot, *Captain Main Top.*
 James Palmer, *B. Mate.*
 Stephen Merryman, *Gunner's Mate.*
 William Webb, *Sergeant Marines.*
 Patrick Hogan, *Sergeant Marines.*
To Peter Mins, Captain.

Captain Mins, having received a letter from the seamen, stating that the ship was not sea-worthy, and the men dissatisfied, made the following remarks :—

“ Whatever may be the opinion of the ship's company with regard to the Admiral's conduct, I will never, while I remain here as captain of this ship, allow any man on earth to question the Admiral's conduct in my presence. If his conduct is blameable, there are officers sufficient to judge whether he does his duty or not, and it is not by men, from whom the Admiral's motives must be necessarily concealed, that his conduct is to be estimated. With regard to the inefficiency of the

ship in point of sea-worthiness, I am the responsible person, and on me (if any) the blame must fall. As to our ability for attacking the enemy, I will tell you, so far, that we have such and such ships (naming the number and force) expected by to-morrow night—a force sufficient to crush the enemy at once, which is an object of as much importance to the success of our cause, as the failure or the defeat of our fleet would tend to its complete ruin. The only part of your letter which I can at all approve, is the close, in which you say that whatever may happen, you will still behave with the spirit of Britons; and that I shall not be disappointed in this respect, I am (from your previous conduct) perfectly confident.” To the remark in the letter, “That our force is by no means adequate to the enemy;” the Captain answered, “It is not the Admiral’s intention to attack the enemy, until our other ships come down from Oporto; and as the steamers and schooners have been despatched for them, we may expect them here, if you keep a good look-out at the mast head, by to-morrow night. As for this ship, I can place so much confidence in her and my men, that by placing her against such a parcel of orange-fed rascals as the *Don John’s* crew, I am certain we could knock her to pieces in a very short time.”

Remarks made by Davie and Ryan:—“We will go into action with you, Captain Mins, with the greatest coolness; but the Admiral may do as he did last time, take us into action, haul his wind, and leave us to fight it out ourselves.”

Another remark made by Surrey :—“ I am sorry to say, Captain Mins, that the common seamen of the *Rainha* (flag-ship) knows more about what we are going to do than the captain of this ship.”

No. IV.

PROCLAMATION OF GASPAR TEXEIRA.

Soldiers !—The rebels, dreading your valour and your discipline, have hidden themselves behind walls, not daring to shew themselves in the open field. Routed at Ponte Ferreira, obliged to fly precipitately at Souto Redondo, and driven from Villa Nova, they tremble at our arms.

Soldiers ! It is from Oporto, their last and vain refuge, that we must dislodge them ; and it is on their own ground, in which they endeavour to hide their crimes, that it behoves us to chastise them.

Soldiers ! Let the day of attack be that of our victory ; *but, mark, that victory will not be complete so long as a single revolutionist remains in existence.* Swear, then, that you will not lay down your arms, and that you will never take repose, *until you shall have exterminated the rebels.*

The king and the nation expect this *great deed from you* ; their hopes will not be disappointed.

Soldiers! In the day of your greatest glory, one which you so anxiously and laudably expect, unite to your great courage and unshaken fidelity the most exact obedience to the orders of your superiors; because one negligence, one extravagance, even one incautious excess of valour, may be injurious to the brave themselves. The God of armies protects a cause so just; it is that of Portuguese lovers of their legitimate king and of their country.

Soldiers! Let us to battle; let us put an end to revolutions; and in the midst of our transports let our cry ever be, Live the Holy Religion of Jesus Christ! Live our King Dom Miguel the First! Victory and happiness to the Portuguese!

THE VISCONDE DE PEZO DE REGOA,
*Commandant of the Corps of the Army
of Operations.*

*Head Quarters at Agoas Sanctas,
27th September, 1832.*

No. V.

Agreeable to the orders of His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Commander-in-chief of the Liberating Army, the Marshal Major-General yesterday made a reconnoissance on our left to ascertain the force and positions of the enemy on that side.

By extraordinary circumstances, none of which de-

pended on him, he was obliged to remain in position with the small force he had on the heights of Pasteleiro for a longer time than he intended, or was convenient, which allowed the enemy to unite so superior a force, that, notwithstanding the devoted bravery and firmness of the army he had the honour of commanding, he found himself under the necessity of either abandoning the position and retiring, or suffering a great reverse.

In view of which the marshal thinks it is his rigorous duty to render to the officers and soldiers their well merited eulogies and praises, it not being possible to direct them in particular to any individual, in as much as all distinguished themselves with that intrepidity and bravery which characterises this devoted army, and which experience has just proved that it can be imitated, but never exceeded.

Qualities such as these guarantee to the marshal the complete and immediate triumph of the sacred cause in which he and the said army are engaged.

B. SOLIGNAC.

25th January, 1833.

No. VI.

Portuguese Legation,
36, Baker-street, 1st Feb. 1833.

SIR,

IN consequence of orders just received from my Government, I have the honour to propose to you the

command of the squadron of Her M. F. M. Donna Maria II., on the same terms and conditions, and with the same rank as were granted to Admiral Sartorius, provided that you present yourself at Oporto on or before the 20th February instant.

Requesting the favour of your early reply to be communicated to my Government,

I have the honour to be, sir,

Your very obedient servant,

CHEV. D'ABREU E LIMA.

To Captain Napier, R.N.

Oporto, le 31 Janvier, 1833.

MON CHER CAPITAINE NAPIER,

Je vous ai déjà écrit en reponse à la lettre adressée par vous au Marquis de Palmella en lui proposant une expedition sur Lisbonne. Le projet d'entrer dans le Tage me paraît impraticable, parceque si nos bateaux à vapeur échappaient aux nombreuses batteries de terre, il serait presque impossible qu'ils pussent échapper aux canons de plus d'une douzaine de batiments de guerre mouillés dans le fleuve. Je pense que la partie de la côte où il nous serait le plus utile de débarquer s'étend depuis Peniche jusqu'à Cascaes, qu'après vient la côte entre le Tage et le Sado : après cela nous avons Sines, la côte de l'Alentejo, peut-être la plus facile pour effectuer un débarquement, vu qu'il y a peu de ports et qu'on ne la garde point. Nous avons encore les belles plages de l'Algarve. Vous savez comme nous avons grimpé

sur les rochers de St. George et de St. Michel. Et il vaut mieux avoir encore à grimper que d'être exposé pendant le débarquement à des batteries.

Il faut que chaque bateau à vapeur porte des canots pour le débarquement, ainsi que quelques échelles, qui pourront peut-être nous servir comme cela nous est arrivé à l'île de St. George.

Quant à votre engagement pour le service de la Reine et votre venue ici il faut garder le secret autant qu'on le pourra.

M. Magalhaes, porteur de cette lettre, est chargé par le gouvernement de s'entendre avec M. de Lima et Mendizabal sur cette affaire, et particulièrement avec vous.

Je vous dirai un mot de notre escadre. Nous avons en mer trois frégates et le brick Villa Flor, tripulés par des Anglais, ce sont des bons batiments, et deux corvettes, tripulées par des Portugais, de celles-ci la Portuense de vingt ou vingt-quatre canons est très bonne, la Constitution est mauvaise.

L'esprit des équipages Anglaises a été à la revolte, ou en partie du à cause d'arrérages de solde, partie du à des intrigues entre quelques officiers et Sartorius ; j'ai toujours soutenu celui-ci, pour soutenir la discipline, et je soutiendrai toujours celle-ci pendant que je serais chargé du département de la marine.

La frégate Rainha est commandée par le Capitaine Blackeston, il a commandé longtemps des navires marchands. On le dit bon marin. La Don Pedro est commandée par le Capitaine Goble, il a été le second de

Sartorius dans la frégate *Pyramus*, on le dit bon officier. La *Donna Maria* est commandée par le Capitaine *Massey*, alias *Evans*, de la marine Anglaise. Cette frégate était auparavant commandée par le Capitaine *Mins*, alias *Bingham*, et la *Rainha* par le Capitaine *Sackville Crosby*, qui a été le second de Lord *Cochrane*.

Prenez vos informations, et voyez s'il vous convient de garder ceux-ci ou d'avoir d'autres meilleurs, choisissez donc.

Adieu, mon cher ami, croyez à l'estime avec laquelle je suis

Votre dévoué

BERNARDO DE SA NOGUEIRA.

No. VII.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 1st instant offering me the command of the squadron of Her Faithful Majesty, I have the honour of informing you that I shall not hesitate on taking the command on the inclosed terms.

1. Admiral Sartorius must be acquainted by the government of their intention to supersede him, if it has not been already done, or if he has not himself given it up, which I presume he has not done.

2. My passage, and that of the officers I may take with me, must be paid to Oporto.

3. Six months' pay must be paid in advance to myself and officers.

4. My life must be insured for a year for £10,000, which can be done at four or five per cent.

5. I am to have the same rank and advantages as Admiral Sartorius, and the officers I bring out are also placed on the same footing.

6. I am to have full power to appoint, promote, and discharge officers, without having recourse to courts-martial in the one case, or reference to the government in the other.

7. I am to have access to the Emperor when the service requires it.

8. The officers and ships' company must be paid up to the time I take the command.

I consider them indispensably necessary for my own security and the proper maintenance of discipline. I must also observe that my taking the command will be of little use to the cause, unless active operations are immediately commenced by the squadron. English seamen, when idle, are always discontented, and they become more so in a foreign service.—As I presume the force now assembled in Oporto is insufficient to make a forward movement without a rising of the people, steps should be immediately taken to force them to weaken their force before Oporto. Several plans present themselves to me; the first and grandest would be to hire ten steamboats, embark the whole army and carry them direct up the Tagus and land them in Lisbon. This would require funds; the second is, running the squadron into Lisbon

with two thousand men on board; this could only be attempted if it was ascertained that the inhabitants were favourable to the cause. If successful, so much the better; if not, there is anchorage in Lisbon out of shot on all sides, and an enemy's squadron there would oblige them to raise the blockade of Oporto.

Should either of these plans be deemed inadvisable, from a thousand to fifteen hundred men should be embarked in the squadron, and descents should be made on different parts of the coast. Peniché, for instance, I have no doubt might be seized; this would draw men from Oporto. Attacks might be made in Lagos Bay in the Algarves, in fact the whole coast should be kept in hot water; the command of the sea is an enormous advantage, and it ought to be used, and should the people be favourable, men might be raised in the Algarves and armed, which would be attended with the most advantageous results to the cause. The fifteen hundred men might be the nucleus of an army that might march through the Alentejo, and create a powerful diversion.

No. VIII.

My letter missing, but merely to communicate to Sartorius that they had offered me the command, and my reply.

MY DEAR NAPIER,

Your conduct has been such as I expected from your strict and honourable character.

The ——— have behaved in the most infamous manner to me ; they commenced by intriguing with my officers ——— even at the islands giving each to understand that they should have the command. ——— went so far as to tell his officers that he was to hoist his flag before he left the Azores ; his conduct ever since has been most atrocious. Although warned against him even then by many (particularly ———) I could not give credit to the existence of such gratuitous unmerited atrocity.

I have experienced a degree of wretchedness and misery I can hardly describe during the time I have been in this service, without pay, without clothing, without provisions for the last four months except what hazard presented, expecting every moment the ships to be taken from me, betrayed by ———, unsupported in action. I have notwithstanding kept Oporto free, have licked my opponents, and blockaded Lisbon, and if my advice had not been invariably neglected from the commencement, we should now have had Madeira, and a revolution in the south of Portugal.

I have advanced the little ready money I had to pay my men to quiet them, about £420 ; my bill for this has been dishonoured, and I am nearly five months in arrear, and many of my people nine months.

I gave up the money from the first they awarded to me for the risk of my commission, and have had no guarantee or reward of any kind, and yet see what is the conduct of these ———.

I shall however be very happy to give up the command

to you, if they fulfil their engagements to me, the officers, and people.

They were shaking hands with me and professing friendship during all the time this intrigue has been going on.

Yours, truly,

G. R. SARTORIUS.

Vigo, March 14th.

No. 1X.

CARTA REGIA.

Sir John Milley Doyle, Marechal de Campq of the Royal Army, belonging to my Etat Major Imperial.

FRIEND,

I, the Duke of Braganza, Regent, in the name of the Queen, send you much greeting. It is for the good of the service, that you go on board the squadron of the same August Senhora, now at anchor in Vigo Bay, to put in execution the orders you have received. I direct you to embark immediately, and to be particular to fulfil all the instructions you have received of the same date as these. I have to assure you that I confide to your intelligence, zeal, and activity, in putting into

effect the important mission with which you are charged.

D. PEDRO, Duke of Braganza.

(Signed) BERNARDO DE S^a NOGUEIRA.

Written in the Palace of Oporto,

13th of March, 1833.

To Sir John Milley Doyle.

(Translations.)

MARINE DEPARTMENT.

Instructions given to Sir John Milley Doyle, Marechal de Campo, A. D. C. to His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of Portugal.

I.—Sir John Milley Doyle will immediately embark on board the *London Merchant* (steamer), and proceed to Vigo, or wherever he is likely to meet with Her Most Faithful Majesty's squadron, for the purpose of presenting to Vice-Admiral Sartorius the Royal Decree (Carta Regia), superseding him from the command in chief of the said squadron. For this purpose, Sir John M. Doyle will present the Vice-Admiral the Royal authority he has received, from His Imperial Majesty, the Regent, the important commission, as will be seen by the Royal Decree, which was delivered to him of the same date.

II.—Sir John is likewise charged to invest the Captain de Mar e Guerra S. Crosbie, with the temporary command of the squadron, in virtue of the decree, which to that effect has been passed, bearing the same date, and which will be delivered to him by the said Sir John M. Doyle.

III.—Sir John M. Doyle is directed to declare, and assure Vice-Admiral Sartorius, that the Government of Her Most Faithful Majesty undertake to satisfy all legal claims which can be made by the said Vice-Admiral Sartorius, officers, and crews of the squadron; but that it will only satisfy such claims, on the conditions that the command, *de facto*, be transferred to Captain de Mar e Guerra S. Crosbie; Vice-Admiral Sartorius being directed to return to Oporto, for the settlement of his accounts.

IV.—If (contrary to the expectations of Her Most Faithful Majesty's Government) it so happens that Vice-Admiral Sartorius refuses to deliver up the command of the squadron, Sir John M. Doyle, after having exhausted all means of persuasion, is directed to place him in arrest, and conduct him to Oporto, in consequence of his disobedience of these orders.

In all other occurrences which may take place in the present affair, Sir John M. Doyle will act conjointly with the temporary Commander of the squadron, and Captain Bressane Lieto, that the important commission may be terminated with the greatest brevity, and in the most amicable manner, so as to enable the squadron

of Her Most Faithful Majesty to sail immediately for Oporto.

(Signed) BERNARDO DE SA NOGUEIRA.

Palace of Oporto,

13th of March, 1833.

No. X.

“ The late conduct of the ministers, at present, unfortunately, conducting the affairs of Her Most Faithful Majesty, having shown (in spite of all our sacrifices and sufferings) a constant neglect, and positive refusal, to comply with the just claims of the auxiliary forces, naval and military, engaged under compact made with Vice-Admiral Sartorius; and by such conduct, so dishonourable, disloyal, and insulting, as must prevent the Vice-Admiral and his companions having any further reliance on their word, good faith, or honour; in consequence, the principal officers of the squadron, acting in the name, and for the interest, of the rest of the squadron, have come to the following resolutions, viz.—That they are ready to enter upon active service, on the following conditions:—

“ *First*,—That £20,000 shall be immediately advanced, to pay the wages and claims of the squadron up to March 31st.

“ *Second*,—That the ships of war, by a public decree,

be made over to the officers, seamen, and marines, acting under the compact, as a guarantee for the future payment of growing wages and allowances, and to provide against any claims that may arise for unpaid bills, drawn for the public service.

“ *Third*,—That the payment of pensions for the wounded, and for the families of the killed, be put on a sure and satisfactory foundation.

“ *Fourth*,—That, if the Admiral shall quit the service of Her Most Faithful Majesty, all those officers who wish to do the same, may have full permission of the Government, acting in the name of the Queen, to do so.”

(Signed)

Captains GOBLET, BLACKISTON, AND GEORGE.
Commanders MASSEY AND WILSON,
Lieutenants LUDLOW, LIOT, ROBINSON, & FOX.
Surgeons BIRMINGHAM, FRASER, ACHESON,
GILL, BELL, and a Portuguese.
Commissaries BEAUMOND, ROBERTSON, FISHER,
AND BENSON;
and many others.

*Additional Resolution, proposed by Captain
MASSEY, and adopted.*

“ That the undersigned, in the name of the officers, marines, and crews, of the whole squadron, having entered into a determination, not to desert their Commander-in-Chief, after the just claims of the officers and men

are liquidated, require, that he shall be indemnified, in a pecuniary way, for the commission he so nobly risked for the cause of Portugal and the legitimate Queen Donna Maria, and which he has since been deprived of by his own Government."

No. XI.

Ruinha de Portugal,
Oporto, April 24th, 1836.

MY DEAR NAPIER,

After the sparring I have had with this government, it is out of the question my remaining any longer than to give up the squadron to you. I have intimated this to them after they had reinstated me de facto and granted all my demands.

They are as follows,—the men to be paid up to the last farthing, officers also. The ships to be made over by a legal document (as a security for growing pay and pension) to the officers and crews, and those who wish to leave to have permission. Many talk of leaving, but I am sure of retaining sufficient with some Portuguese to make the squadron equally effective and more tractable than with all English, indeed it was my intention to have halved the crews, but all officers English. They are capital sailors, and mixed with our men they have shewn quite as much pluck.

I informed the government that had they honestly told me of their proceeding to replace me, and that they wished to have had you, that heart and soul I should have approved and concurred with them, both in having a most fit and competent officer, and for having done me a personal favour in giving me such an opportunity to retire.

When you come out, you had better bring with you some two or three hundred men, as several might wish to leave with me. The ships are in want of nothing of consequence; the masts, although badly strung, have been so well fished and so well tried that you have nothing to fear, the summer having set in.

Bring out a good captain and some good sailor men, as lieutenants are much wanted.

Very truly yours,

G. R. SARTORIUS.

No XII.

Captain Wilkinson's letter, giving an account of the mutiny, is unfortunately lost.

No. XIII.

Londres, ce 18 Mai, 1833.

MONSIEUR LE CAPITAINE,

Il me semble inutile de vous rappeler ici tout ce qui s'est passé entre nous relativement aux ordres que j'ai reçûs de Sa Majesté Impériale Monseigneur le Duc de Bragança, d'abord en date du 19 Janvier dernier, pour vous offrir le commandement de l'escadre de Sa Majesté Très Fidèle, ce que j'ai fait par la lettre que j'eus l'honneur de vous adresser le 1er Fevrier suivant, et ensuite en date du 27 du dit mois pour vous consulter sur l'exécution qu'on voulait donner au projet que vous aviez adressé à Monsieur le Marquis de Palmella en date du 8 du même mois, ce que je vous ai communiqué verbalement moi-même à Londres dans les premiers jours de Fevrier. Le 1er Avril je vous ai prié de venir encore ici, et le 3 nous eumes une conférence chez Mendizabal, à laquelle assista le Colonel Evans, et alors vous avez accepté avec un noble désintéressement, le commandement de l'expédition que l'on projetait de faire sur l'Algarve, en mettant la seule condition que Monsieur le Marquis de Palmella irait avec vous : mais non seulement vous vous êtes prêté de bon cœur à diriger la partie maritime de l'expédition, mais vous avez proposé d'aller à Vigo arranger l'affaire de l'escadre, et s'il le fallait vous placer sous le commandement de Sartorius, comme son second, si pour cela on vous fournissait un bateau à vapeur et £12,000 pour le payment des équipages.

Je n'oublierai jamais cette noble et généreuse proposition, qui seule doit inspirer pour vous les sentimens de la reconnaissance de tous les loyaux Portugais ; vous méritez tous les égards de Sa Majesté Impériale Monseigneur le Duc Régent, et l'estime de toutes les ames élevées. Vous savez comment et pourquoi l'expédition a changé de force et de projet ; maintenant elle se rapproche plus du plan que vous aviez suggéré, et que Sa Majesté Impériale avait approuvé.

Vous allez donc, Monsieur le Capitaine, commander la partie maritime de cette expédition, et vous voulez bien vous prêter à prendre aussi éventuellement le commandement de l'escadre. Il est cependant entendu que vous mettez à cet acte de dévouement à la cause de la Reine, la condition que vous serez chargé de quelque entreprise particulière contre l'ennemi, et que vous ne presumez pas prendre le commandement de l'escadre, pour effectuer une simple croisière, ou un simple blocus. Il est toutefois entendu que vos plans et les opérations de l'expédition seront discutés et combinés à Oporto, sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale, et soumis à sa haute approbation.

Je vous ai fait voir les lettres de Sartorius, et vous avez pu vous convaincre par vos yeux de la résolution où il est de quitter le commandement de l'escadre. Il m'a engagé fortement de solliciter votre prompt départ pour aller le remplacer, et c'est aussi sur cela que se fondent en grande partie les démarches pressantes que j'ai faites auprès de vous pour vous porter à prendre le commandement maritime de l'expédition prête à sortir.

Quant au poste dont vous serez investi dans la marine de Sa Majesté Très Fidèle, il est évident qu'il ne peut être moindre que celui qu'on a conféré au Capitaine Sartorius, votre *junior* officier dans le marine Britannique, et les conditions devront être celles qui se trouvent dans le contrat fait avec le dit Capitaine. En outre il n'est que juste que vous receviez six mois d'avance de la solde, qui vous reviendrait comme Vice-Amiral, pour subvenir à vos frais, et aux besoins de votre famille pendant votre absence. Votre vie sera aussi assurée pour la valeur de £10,000, afin de parer aux chances des dangers que vous allez courir dans le service de la Reine. Les deux conditions principales que vous aviez mises à votre engagement éventuel, et à votre départ pour Oporto se trouvent donc remplies, et je ne doute nullement que les autres ne le soient également. Cependant tout ceci n'implique pas l'idée d'aucun engagement fixe et préalable, et il est entendu que vous aliez à Oporto offrir vos services à l'Auguste Régent, et recevoir de Sa Majesté Impériale lui-même votre brevet et votre commission.

Agréez mes vœux sincères pour l'heureuse réussite de votre noble devouement à notre cause, et croyez moi avec les sentimens les plus distingués,

Monsieur le Capitaine,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE CHEVALIER D'ABREU E LIMA.

Monsieur le Capitaine Napier,

De la Marine Royale Britannique,

&c. &c. &c.

No. XIV.

Carlos de Ponza* (Napier), Vice-Admiral of the Navy of H. M. F. Majesty. I, Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen, wishing you health. Taking into consideration your capacity, zeal, and intelligence, many proofs of which you gave in the service of His Britannic Majesty, and confiding in your love for liberty, that you will employ all your energies to terminate with glory the struggle in which I am engaged to restore the throne to the same August Lady, and the Constitutional Charter to the Portuguese nation,—I do, in the name of the Queen, charge you with the chief command of the squadron destined to assist in this noble enterprise, authorising you, on this occasion, to name and appoint the captains and officers to the ships of which the squadron is composed, in the certainty that the appointments you make will be legally confirmed. I communicate this to you for your intelligence and execution.

Given at the palace of Oporto, the 8th of June,
one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five.

D. PEDRO, Duque de Braganca.

MARQUIS DE LOULE.

Para Carlos de Ponza.

* The name I assumed.

Carlos de Ponza, Vice-Admiral of the Navy of H. M. F. Majesty. I, the Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen, wishing you health. Taking into consideration the zeal and intelligence you dedicate to the service of my August Daughter, and to the Portuguese nation, and wishing to give you a proof of the approbation you deserve, I, in the name of the Queen, name you Major-General of the Navy, whose duties you will at all times exercise when your service as the commander-in-chief of the squadron shall permit your residence near the government. I communicate this to you for your intelligence.

Given at the palace of Oporto, 8th of June, 1833.

D. PEDRO, Duque de Braganca.

MARQUIS DE LOULE.

No. XV.

His Excellency the DUKE OF TERCEIRA, Peer of the Kingdom, Lieutenant-General of the Royal Army,

Having taken the resolution of detaching from the army under my immediate command a divisionary expedition to aid the people in a free manifestation of their loyalty in favour of the cause of H. M. F. Majesty Donna Maria Secunda and of the Constitutional Charter of the Monarchy, and having unlimited confidence in

your loyalty, honour, and patriotism : I have therefore thought proper to nominate you, in the name of the Queen, commander-in-chief of the above expedition, and to confide to you unlimited power for the execution of all military measures you may think necessary and useful for the accomplishment of the important commission with which you are charged, being regulated by the instructions sent you by the minister of war. Part of the civil duties will be discharged by the Duke of Palmella, according to letters patent and the instructions, of which a copy is enclosed ; and I expect that with the Duke and with the Vice-Admiral Carlos de Ponza (Napier) you will maintain that good intelligence which is always conducive to the public welfare.

(Signed) DOM PEDRO,
Duke of Braganza.

(Countersigned) AUGUSTINHO JOSE FREIRE,
Palace of Oporto, Minister of War.
15th June, 1833.

Instructions for the Duke of Terceira, &c.

ARTICLE 1.

The divisionary expedition which is entrusted to the command of the Duke of Terceira is comprised of a light brigade formed by the second and third caçadores, and a brigade of the line, composed of the third and sixth light infantry and the first battalion of the first Queen's regiment, a detachment of lancers on foot, and another of artillery.

ARTICLE 2.

This division will be directed on a point which will afford the greatest probability of an easy landing, and the least opposition from the enemy, and the best reception from the inhabitants. Should there be found more than one place similar to the one before described, it will be preferable to land where from the operation may result a more prompt and decisive effect upon Lisbon or Oporto, or on both, taking particular care, should the enemy be able to detach a formidable force, not to enter into a disadvantageous conflict, or abandon the country.

ARTICLE 3.

There will be found along the coast many places which embrace all the conditions of the preceding article, but it is impossible to prescribe any thing with precision on this subject. A military council composed of the Dukes of Palmella and Terceira and the Vice-Admiral Carlos de Ponza will be assembled on board for the purpose of determining on what point the landing is to be effected, and in what manner the communication between the land and sea forces is to be maintained.

ARTICLE 4.

The troops when on shore are to be entirely and exclusively under the command of the Duke of Terceira; he may if he think proper secure some position for the purpose of establishing a depot or hospital, and at the same time maintain a communication with the sea, to protect a re-embarkation, if necessary.

The nature of the enemy we have to deal with makes us believe that any small fort, convent, or edifice well situated will answer the purpose, and along the coast many such are to be found.

ARTICLE 5.

The Duke, commander-in-chief, will receive with kindness all persons who may present themselves, without distinction of condition or class, or whatever may have been their past opinions or errors.

To the military men their rank must be allowed, even in case of their having acquired it during the usurpation; but no one is to be employed in an effective service without a certainty of his loyalty to the national cause, or without the guarantee of service lately rendered.

With respect to civilians that the Duke may want to employ in the absence of the civil government, he will always prefer such persons who by their virtues and qualities may have an influence over the people, and do credit to the situation entrusted to them and to the noble cause they serve.

ARTICLE 6.

The Duke of Terceira will use every effort to preserve the strictest discipline amongst the troops, especially foreigners, and to punish with rigour any breach thereof, and he is also authorized to confirm and put in execution all sentences of courts-martial.

ARTICLE 7.

The duke is also authorized to punish with severity all peasants and ecclesiastics who may be found in arms against the national cause, with such penalties as the law allows.

ARTICLE 8.

With regard to prisoners of war all those who can be depended upon may be admitted into our ranks ; in any other case they are to be sent to Oporto or to any other place according to circumstances, being always treated with that kindness becoming a government of justice.

ARTICLE 9.

Particular care must be taken with regard to the employment of public money and the regularity of requisitions of every description, and finally, that all acts of authority should tend to shew in practice the difference between a legitimate government and one of usurpation and tyranny.

ARTICLE 10.

The commander-in-chief is authorized to promote to the rank of ensign those cadets and non-commissioned officers who shall distinguish themselves in action, and he may also propose to his Imperial Majesty those who shall deserve to be rewarded with the decoration of the Tower and Sword.

ARTICLE 11.

The duke commander-in-chief will take any other measures which may be suggested by his own observation,

making reports of his progress through the department of the minister-at-war.

To his Excellency the Duke of Palmella.

Conceiving it for the interest of the cause of H. M. F. Majesty Donna Maria Segunda, my August Daughter, Queen of Portugal, and to the interest of the Portuguese nation, that a divisionary expedition should be detached to those parts of the kingdom which may be thought most appropriate, for the purpose of affording the people that aid that they so much desire to enable them to display that loyalty which force and the fear of a despotic power now stifle in their bosoms; I have nominated for the command of this expedition the Duke of Terceira, and have taken the resolution to choose a person, who by his loyalty and deep knowledge of the management of affairs may deserve that I intrust him with my confidence, and a part of the authority which I am exercising in the name of the Queen, during the necessary period for regulating provisionary both civil and judicial affairs in those countries whose inhabitants may declare their feelings in favour of the Queen and Charter, and consequently have nominated you civil and provisionary Governor, because I trust that in such an important commission you will be enabled to conduct yourself with loyalty and intelligence, which has distinguished you in many other commissions of high trust which have been confided to you, being regulated by the instructions which will be delivered to you with this letter patent.

(Signed) DON PEDRO, Duke of Braganza.

Countersigned by all the Ministers of State.

Instructions to accompany the letters patent of the 13th June, 1833. Addressed to the Duke of Palmella, member of the state council, peer of the kingdom, and provisionary civil governor.

ARTICLE 1.

The Duke of Palmella, &c. &c. will embark with the expedition under the command of Vice-Admiral Carlos de Ponza, with the purpose of accompanying the Duke of Terceira with the commission with which he is charged.

ARTICLE 2.

In a military council composed of the Duke of Palmella, the Duke of Terceira, and Vice-Admiral Carlos de Ponza, will be decided, (having first the information and the enquiries that they will think proper,) the point on which the landing is to be effected with the greatest probability of a good result, having in view the requisite means contained in the instructions given to the Commander-in-Chief the Duke of Terceira.

ARTICLE 3.

The civil divisionary governor, the Duke of Palmella, will land with the divisionary expedition, and will immediately proclaim to the inhabitants and acquaint them with the nature of the commission, and make known to them that the aim of the expedition is not to wage war against the people, but to effect reconciliation and peace; their only object being to encourage the mani-

festation of the Portuguese loyalty towards their legitimate Queen and towards the constitutional charter of the monarchy, that being the firm and unshaken intention of his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen. What is expressed in the proclamation of the 2d January, 1832, has been always and ever will be executed with the greatest exactness, giving to the Portuguese nation and to the whole world an example of constancy and magnanimity.

ARTICLE 4.

He will make known to all classes of persons, as well by words as by actions, the immense difference existing between the legal government and that of usurpation and tyranny. He will cause to be published the laws about the extinction of the tithes, and will also publish all those laws (if he thinks it proper) with which the legal government of her Most Faithful Majesty the Queen has effectually benefited the people, making them free from all the tributes and vexations that have oppressed them.

ARTICLE 5.

He will take with him if possible a printer's press and the necessary persons to work it, in order that the convenient publication of the measures which have been taken and of the news should be made; periodical pamphlets should be issued with promptitude.

ARTICLE 6.

He will receive with kindness all persons who present

themselves, whatever may have been their past opinions or errors, but will not employ any person without conviction of his fidelity to the cause, or without a guarantee of his recent services.

The form of appointments shall be as follows :—

The Duke of Palmella, invested by his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen, with a part of the authority which he exercises in that character, provisionally appoints you for that place which he will hold as long as he will merit it by his zeal, or until it shall please H. M. F. Majesty to employ him in any other way.

ARTICLE 7.

He will punish with severity by courts-martial all peasants or priests taken in arms, as well as the seducer of the troops and all others who shall continue to shew themselves obstinate and incorrigible in the perpetration of capital crimes, having always regard to shew by practice that the legitimate government is as lenient and paternal to all those who repent, as they are energetic and inexorable to those who deviate from the public spirit and the natural fidelity of the Portuguese.

ARTICLE 8.

He will nominate personally proper persons to the municipal commissions, and to all other charges of justice and finance, and adopting the denominations of the ancient legislature, to which the country is accustomed, and employ only persons who by their virtues

and abilities are able to acquire public influence, and do credit to the noble and just cause which they serve. Immoral persons, without reputation or probity, are not to be employed in the public service, notwithstanding the sacrifices they may have made in the cause of the Queen. Such will be rewarded at a future time in another and proper manner.

ARTICLE 9.

He will collect with the necessary circumspection all the public revenues, ordering receipts to be passed, and taking care that the accounts be kept regularly ; and in like manner will take possession of the wealth of the rebels, for the support of the army and navy.

ARTICLE 10.

He will provide the divisionary expedition with rations, transports, and all other necessary articles according to the requisitions of the commander-in-chief, and to which he may apply the civil revenues ; taking particular care to do the least possible harm to the inhabitants, paying or giving bills at short date, to persons whose goods may be taken to furnish the army and navy.

ARTICLE 11.

He will take particular care to promote a friendly feeling with the inhabitants, not allowing the existence of any sentiments of private revenge, and will maintain firmly and with impartiality the force of the law, shewing that his Imperial Majesty's wish is to put an end to

party feeling, and re-establish with the legitimate government of the Queen and of the charter, the complete reconciliation of all the Portuguese family.

ARTICLE 12.

He will maintain with the Duke commander-in chief and the Vice-Admiral, all the necessary intelligence and understanding for the good of the service.

ARTICLE 13.

He is authorized to enter into treaty with any individual of the enemy's party, but those treaties ought not to compromise the principles of the constitutional charter or the laws and decrees of his Imperial Majesty ; being always aware that it is prohibited to enter into any treaty with the Infante Don Miguel, this being contrary to the glory of his Imperial Majesty and offensive to the honour of the subjects of H. M. F. Majesty Donna Maria Segunda.

ARTICLE 14.

He is authorized to promise and accord any rewards he may think proper, not including the persons named in the exceptions to the amnesty, published in the name of H. M. F. Majesty, and if any persons present themselves and will render service to the cause of the Queen, he can secure to them the pardon of H. I. Majesty in the name of the Queen.

ARTICLE 15.

The civil and provisional governor, the Duke of Palmella, is fully authorized to take any other measures of political administration, civil and economical, which he may think most advantageous for the prosperous termination of his mission, reporting all circumstances to the proper ministerial departments with whom he will maintain a frequent correspondence.

(Signed) CANDIDO JOZE XAVIER,
JOZE DE SILVAH CARVALHO.
AUGUSTINO JOZE FREIRE.

*Palace, Oporto,
13th June, 1833.*

No. XVI.

*Rainha de Portugal,
Oporto Roads, June 20th, 1833.*

MY LORD,

We have at last received a good supply of water, cocoa, sugar, tea, and glass, and are now off.

I shall send the Liberal back, and put her under Captain Bertram's orders, who I have sent on board the Edward. I have also put the gun-boats under his orders, and all yachts with directions to send them to Vigo for water, he will apply to you for officers to com-

mand them, and men to man them. I recommend Your Excellency to put provisions for the squadron on board the *Edward* also, so that she may be ready to move about in any direction I may want.

Should the enemy put to sea in my absence, I have ordered her to proceed to the Bayonne Islands, where I presume she will be in safety. I have also directed Captain Bertram to establish some signals with you that he may communicate any news I may send you.

The *Eugenie* and *Constitution* have orders to join me the moment they arrive, and I hope that will not be long as I expect seamen. The *Pedro* has parted her cable,—we are all infamously supplied. There are several men in prison who came out in the *Edward*, but never joined the squadron. I have no objection to their being sent on board, as they do not come under the head of mutineers. It will be necessary to send a large quantity of casks off to the *Edward* to fill the yachts with.

The news from Lisbon is favourable, several captains have resigned. An order of the day, dated at Coimbra, orders the troops in Lisbon in case of our approaching the coast to march there, and leave Lisbon in charge of the *Ordenanzas*—if we only could be sure of that, and a strong breeze, Black-Horse-square would be the place, but I fear our force is too weak for such an enterprise. It is, however, impossible to know what may happen when we are off Lisbon.

I beg you will assure the Emperor all that I can

do shall be done in his service for the cause of the Queen.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CARLOS DE PONZA.

*His Excellency the Marquis of Loulé,
Minister-of-marine.*

No. XVII.

On landing in the Algarves.

PORTUGUESE,

The necessity of delivering you from oppression, in order that you may shew your fidelity to your legitimate queen, determined His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of that august personage, to send an army amongst you, which I have the honour of commanding. Loyal Portuguese, come under my command to liberate Portugal; the arms we carry are formidable to your oppressors, unite yourselves to me and to my soldiers, and the legitimate queen shall be reinstated on the throne of her ancestors, treacherously usurped, and the constitutional charter and liberty restored to our country.

VILLA FLOR.

No. XVIII.

LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED.

RAINHA DE PORTUGAL.

Killed.

F. G. Macdenough, Capt.
 Frank Wooldridge, Lieut.
 and six Seamen.

Wounded.

James Wilkinson, Commo-
 dore, severely.
 Charles Napier, Chief of
 the Staff, severely.
 Lieut. Gidney, severely.
 — Knyvett, R.M. mor-
 tally.
 — Winter, Secretary,
 dangerously.
 Lieut. Edmunds, mortally,
 and seventeen Seamen.

DON PEDRO.

Thos. Goble, Capt. and six
 Seamen and Marines.

Charles Stanhope, Capt. of
 Marines, severely; since
 dead.
 John Powell, Mate, and
 twenty Seamen and Ma-
 rines.

DONNA MARIA.

John More, Sailing Lieut.
 and three men.

Sixteen Seamen and Ma-
 rines.

VILLA FLOR.

Five Seamen.

PORTUENSE.

Capt. Blackstone.

Lieut. Purver.
 And four or five killed and wounded.

RETURN MISSING.

No. XIX.

Palace at Oporto, 10th July, 1833.

ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,

His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen, sends your Excellency the inclosed copy signed by Antonio Pedro de Carvalho, director of this secretariat, the decree of the 9th of this month, by which the said August Lord has in consequence of your brilliant services named your Excellency Admiral of the Royal Navy.

God preserve your Excellency,

MARQUIS DE LOULE,

*To Carlos de Ponza, Minister of Marine.
Admiral and Major-General.*

Office of the Minister of Marine.

Oporto, July 10, 1833.

Seeing the renowned valour and great talent with which on the 5th of the present month, in the waters of Cape St. Vincent, the Vice-Admiral Major-General Carlos de Ponza, Commander-in-chief of the squadron of H. M. F. Majesty, gained with very inferior forces a complete victory over the rebel squadron, capturing by the most skilful manœuvres and intrepid boarding the greater and most important part of their ships, thus annihilating, with as much renown for himself as glory to the arms of loyal Portuguese, the whole maritime force

of the Usurper : I do in the name of the Queen appoint Vice-Admiral Carlos de Ponza Admiral of the Royal Navy. The minister, secretary of state for foreign affairs, provisionally charged with the marine department, will so understand and cause to be executed with the necessary despatch.

Palace of Oporto, July 9th, 1833.

DON PEDRO, DUQUE DE BRAGANZA.

MARQUIS DE LOULE.

Carlos de Ponza, Admiral and Major-General of her Most Faithful Majesty the Queen of Portugal, and Commander-in-chief of the squadron of the said August Lady in the waters of the Algarves : Friend, I, Duke of Braganza, Regent in the name of the Queen Donna Maria II., send you greeting. Taking into due consideration the glorious victory which, on the 5th of July, you gained over the rebels in the waters of Cape St. Vincent by resolutely attacking the enemy by boarding with three frigates, a corvette, a brig, and a small schooner, the enemy's forces, composed of two ships of the line, two frigates, three corvettes, two brigs, and a xebecque, which gave them a great superiority not only in the number and force of the ships, but in their weight of metal, directing that bold attack with a talent that belongs to yourself, running the ship of the line Rainha on board with your own flag-ship, whose crew, notwithstanding their efforts, could not resist your impetuosity and that of the brave men who followed your example, and not satisfied with that brilliant result, after having obliged

the enemy's admiral to haul down his flag, you gave chase to, and forced to surrender, the frigate *Martin de Freitas*, which fled before you and tried to save herself after the considerable damage she had suffered from the decisive attacks of the brig *Villa Flor* and the corvette *Portuense*, by which you not only acquired the glory of this brilliant enterprise and of so well executed a command, but in particular, that of the example you set in your own person of an activity and a valour which most especially distinguish you, the result of all which was the complete rout of the enemy, the capture of his ships of the line, and his frigates, scarcely allowing the smaller ships to escape, by running before the wind and thereby avoiding the certain fate that awaited them; and wishing to give you, in the name of the Queen and in my name, a further demonstration of gratitude for a deed so memorable in itself and of such vital importance in its results, I am pleased to name you Viscount of Cape St. Vincent, which I have thought proper to communicate to you for your information and satisfaction; and that you may immediately use the said title and enjoy in these kingdoms the honours and pre-eminence which thereby belong to you, I send you this. Given in the Palace of Oporto, &c.

D. PEDRO, Duque de Braganza.

CANDIDO JOSE XAVIER.

No. XX.

Porto, ce 24 Juillet, 1833.

MON CHER VICOMTE,

J'ai reçu votre obligeante lettre du 22 courant ; je suis bien fâché de la contrariété que vous avez éprouvée par le vent, ainsi que du danger que vous avez couru par la maladie : heureusement l'une et l'autre n'existent plus, et vous voilà rendu au point essentiel, et au moment précis d'entreprendre ce que vous jugerez convenable. J'approuve^{*} les raisons, qui vous empêchent de vous rendre dans ces parages ; des affaires encore plus importantes vous retiennent là où vous vous trouvez. Je suis sur, Mon cher Vicomte, que vous ne manquerez pas l'occasion, si elle se présente ; et je suis encore plus sur que vous retrouverez le Cap St. Vincent partout où il vous plaira de conduire vos braves à la victoire. Cijoint le plan lithographié de la bataille, dont le grand honneur vous appartient en entier : c'est le moindre hommage que l'on puisse rendre à votre vaillance. Agréez, Mon cher Vicomte, les assurances de l'estime avec laquelle je suis

Votre affectionné et admirateur

D. PEDRO.

*A l'Amiral Vicomte du Cap Saint Vincent.**Oporto, July 14th, 1833.*

Mr. Mendizabel landed here last night, and he gave me an idea of the state of the squadron and a general

account of the Algarves. I am sorry that your Excellency has not forwarded any official letters to me, to give the government an exact account of the state of the squadron, the losses we have sustained, and those of the enemy, by which we might inform his Imperial Majesty, who now expects with great anxiety, every detail of so glorious and so important an action.

It is impossible to detach any forces from hence at present, because the enemy has been encouraged by the arrival of General Bourmont, who, having taken command of their army, intends to make an attack shortly.

The appearance of any vessel off here would be of service, for the purpose of convincing the rebel army, who are deceived by their government, and who think that the squadron of the Queen was destroyed on the memorable 5th of July.

The Don John is the best known, but perhaps your Excellency does not approve of this plan, and every thing is always left to your opinion and determination.

I must not conceal that General Bourmont has landed at Villa de Conde or Vianna in the George the Fourth steamer, which has been bought by the government of the Usurper. It would be excellent if that steamer could be captured, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

MARQUIS OF LOULE.

*Viscount Cabo St. Vicenti,
Admiral of the Royal Navy.*

No. XXI.

Loyal Portuguese inhabitants of Lisbon ! Valorous soldiers, whom I have the honour to command !

Despair induced the rebels to land on the coast of Algarve, a party of adventurers, who, seeking in rapine the support which their country denies them, and avoiding the fifth division, directed their march to Setubal, relying on the asylum which their ships offer them.

General the Viscount de Mollellos with double their forces pursues their rear ; and dispositions have been made that they should meet with a valiant resistance in front. The towns, &c. which they cease to oppress with their detestable presence, again with the greatest enthusiasm proclaim the King my Lord. There is nothing to fear ; we have only to take measures against the evil-disposed, and against the persons abettors of the enemies of the altar and throne.

Honourable inhabitants of Lisbon ! run to arms in defence of the holy religion which we profess, and the legitimate King we have sworn to. Let cowards disappear and traitors fly, and let honourable men alone present themselves to render their services to the justest of causes.

Soldiers ! what have I to say to you ? To recommend valour ? You have valour superior to all the soldiers in the world. To recommend love and loyalty to the person of Don Miguel the First ! Who is there among you who is not ready to shed his blood for him ?

The most perfect discipline and subordination ; you well know how necessary it is ; with it, small forces overcome great armies ; without it, great armies are destroyed by few enemies.

Soldiers ! I am in your front, and I rely on the divine mercy that I shall not prove unworthy of the name I have inherited with my blood.

To obtain therefore the end which we all propose to ourselves and for the good of H. M. service, I determine the following.

1st. The city of Lisbon is henceforward to be considered in a state of siege by land and sea, and therefore the military authority superior to any other.

2nd. All those inhabitants of Lisbon who voluntarily wish to concur towards the defence and security of the capital, are to present themselves either at the quarters of the corps of royalist volunteers, or at those of the Urbans, in order there to be chosen for the service that may be most convenient according to circumstances.

3rd. Any person who by any act or seditious words promotes dismay or revolt, will be immediately seized, judged, and executed, if condemned to death, within twenty-two hours.

4th. Foreigners shall enjoy the protection of which the laws and treaties confer on them, and which shall be most scrupulously observed, provided that they interfere not with the political concerns of this nation, for in that case they shall be proceeded against according to the law of nations and to treaties, without scruple.

No. XXII.

On the 24th of July of the year of the birth of our Lord Jesus Christ one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, the people in a large body, free from all influence either external or internal, without compulsion, the city being forsaken by the troops, being assembled in the hall of the council of this very noble and ever loyal city of Lisbon, with a free and spontaneous will, and with an unanimity never before seen, ordained and declared the Senhora Donna Maria the Second, daughter of the immortal Pedro the Fourth, for whom the people are ready to spill the last drop of their blood as all loyal Portuguese are ever ready to do, for their lawful sovereign and their legitimate Queen, and in order that this should be made known the present act was drawn up, which was signed by all present.

Signatures follow.

 No. XXIII.

A LIST OF THE PORTUGUESE NAVY.

Don John.....	74	} the extra guns } were removed.
Cape St. Vincent....	74	
Duchess of Braganza	50	
Don Pedro	50	
Rainha	42	
Donna Maria	42	

Fifth of July	50	
Eliza	26	Corvette
Isabel Maria	24	Do.
Cacella	20	Do. Since sold.
Portuense	20	Do. Since lost.
Audaz	18	Brig.
Providenza	16	Do. Since sold.
Villa Flor	18	
Third of July	10	Brig. Since sold.
Liberal	8	Schooner.
Faro	5	Do.
Prince Don Pedro ..	20	Brought from Brest.
Schooner.....	10	Do.
St. John Magnanimo	30	East Indiaman.
	30	Do.
Eighth of July	24	Corvette.
	50	On the stocks.
4 store ships.		
1 Queen's yacht.		
1 do. building.		

At Brest, 1 good frigate, 1 corvette, and 3 bad frigates, all lying there rotting.

No. XXIV.

INHABITANTS OF LISBON !

A division of the liberating army intrusted to my command by H. I. M. the Duke of Braganza, to give you liberty, having passed through the provinces south

of the Tagus, came to the banks of the river, and displayed the standard of the Queen and liberty. But this standard, under which the loyal supporters of the throne and the charter have served in the midst of persecutions, of exile, and of battles, was never the symbol of war or vengeance, but the sign of peace and concord, concord and reconciliation to the whole Portuguese Family, and of clemency and pardon for the deluded and unfortunate.

Therefore, inhabitants of Lisbon, I expect and exact order and respect to the rights of all, tranquillity and safety to the capital. I have given and will continue to give attention to arm you regularly, and to re-establish the same corps who formerly sustained the Queen and Charter.

With them, and with those I am about to organise, you will have an opportunity of sharing the glory in the restoration of the Nation, the maintenance of order, and the tranquillity of your homes.

DUKE OF TERCEIRA.

*Head-Quarters, Lisbon,
July 24th, 1833.*

NO. XXV.

LETTER TO GEN. BOURMONT.

*Don John,
Lisbon, Sept. 18th, 1833.*

MARSHAL,

You are a foreigner and command D. Miguel's

army—I am a foreigner and command D. Maria's navy—You are, I believe, a decided royalist—I am a decided liberal—Is it impossible, Marshal, to put an end to this unfortunate war in an honourable manner? When I took command of the squadron, I told the Duke of Palmella, the Duke of Terceira, and Count Saldanha, if I found the people opposed to the Queen and the Charter, I would haul down my flag and return to England. We landed in the Algarves, were received with open arms, and the Duke of Terceira marched through the country with fifteen hundred men and appeared before Lisbon. The government abandoned the capital and its defences, and the inhabitants proclaimed the Queen with the greatest enthusiasm. I captured D. Miguel's squadron, and with his ships, officers, and crews, in conjunction with my frigates, appeared at the same time off the bar.

Your Excellency has been obliged to raise the siege of Oporto, you have been repulsed before Lisbon, and you know our lines cannot be forced,—your army is discontented, are deserting, and wish to give up the contest. They are held together by foreign officers alone. The ports are either in our possession or they are blockaded, your resources are cut off, and your troops without pay or clothing. Your Excellency will perhaps answer that the greater part of the nobility, the priests and the peasants support you. I grant it; more than that, every robber and malefactor in the country is on the side of Don Miguel, and they are practising the most unheard-of cruelties, murdering even

women and children. The nobles are fighting for their privileges, and the peasantry are excited by the priests. Are they, however, the intelligent people of Portugal? No!!! They are to be found in the large towns and in the middling classes, who are all for the Queen. Ought such a state of things to exist? I put it to your Excellency as an experienced soldier, as an honourable man, and above all, as a Frenchman, ought this unnatural war to be prolonged?

This letter is dictated by humanity alone.—Your Excellency knows we have nothing to fear. Should you even get possession of part of Lisbon, you would be driven out by the Castle and squadron.

France, England, and Sweden have already acknowledged the Queen—the other Powers will follow. Spain alone may hang back, but is she safe? Has she no fears for herself? Does she think a powerful squadron will be idle if she feeds the cause of Don Miguel and keeps an ambassador at his court?

I trust, Marshal, you will give this a patient consideration, and beg, Marshal, you will believe me to remain with the highest consideration your obedient servant,

CAPE ST. VINCENT.

Paço do Lumiar, 19 Septembre, 1833.

AMIRAL,

Assurément vous et moi sommes étrangers au Portugal; je suis certainement royaliste, et je vous crois très

liberal puisque vous me le donnez l'assurance ; ni vous ni moi n'avons excité cette guerre dont je déplore ainsi que vous les tristes effets ; nous sommes je crois d'accord sur ces points.

Mais nous ne le sommes point sur les vœux des Portugais ; je crois que l'immense majorité des habitans repousse les institutions novatrices que vous voulez introduire dans le royaume, et qu'en servant le roi Dom Miguel, non seulement je défends les anciennes loix du pays, mais j'agis conformément aux vœux de la majorité de la nation ; vous la seriez convaincu vous-même si vous considériez ce qui vient de se passer dans les Algarves, où le peuple seul, sans l'appui d'aucune troupe, a chassé les garnisons et les autorités civiles que vous y aviez établies.

Je ne fais point la distinction que vous voulez établir entre Portugais : je suis chrétien, et je considère tous les hommes comme des frères, je leur souhaite du bien à tous, et je ne pense pas qu'il soit juste de ne s'interresser qu'à ceux qui tiennent le premier ou le dernier rang social, ni à ceux qui tiennent le rang mitoyen ; tous ont des droits fondés sur les loix de leur pays, tous sont des hommes de même nature que vous et moi, et je ne mépriserai jamais les vœux ni les besoins d'aucune de ces classes : un paysan, un laboureur est souvent plus homme de bien, et la raison de cela plus estimable, qu'un autre homme fort instruit et fort riche ; j'en ai eu plus d'une preuve dans ma vie ; cependant, vous m'assurez avoir reconnu que le plus grand nombre des prêtres, des nobles, et des paysans sont du partie du Roi, et je

ne conçois pas bien l'application que vous voulez faire des principes libéraux, en opposition avec leur base établie dans les autres états de l'Europe, que *l'opinion de la majorité doit faire la loi*.

Mais je n'ai aucunement l'intention d'eclaircir ce point, qui ne regarde que vous-même.

Vous ajoutez, Amiral, que les voleurs et les malfaiteurs sont encore du parti de Dom Miguel ; j'aurais préféré ne point trouver d'expression semblable dans votre lettre, elle ne peut servir à rien, et elle est peu conforme aux usages de politesse établis entre gens estimables ; mais vous reprochez des cruautés inouïes aux partisans du Roi ; et cela me prouve que vous êtes bien malinformé des faits, car il me semble que s'il y en a eu malheureusement quelques unes de commises par le parti que je sers, celui que vous servez en a commis bien davantage, et qu'il la commet encore tous les jours à Lisbonne, où un système de confiscation et de vengeance est notoirement établi.

Les reproches, Amiral, sont au moins inutiles, et ne peuvent en aucun cas servir à diminuer les maux qu'entraîne une semblable guerre ; et comme la lettre que vous m'avez adressée se trouve sans conclusion, je ne veux, Amiral, que vous en accuser réception, et vous assurer que je suis avec une très haute considération

Votre très humble serviteur,

C^{TE}. DE BOURMONT.

A Son Excellence

Mons. l'Amiral Cape St. Vincent.

Lisbon, Sept. 20th, 1833.

MARSHAL,

I regret exceedingly that your Excellency should have taken offence at two expressions in my letter. They were intended to show the evils attending this unfortunate war, and not, I assure you, to give offence; but I frankly own on reading over my letter they ought not to have been used, and I sincerely beg your Excellency's pardon. I was also much irritated at the moment by intelligence of enormities committed at Alcacer do Sal, which will also plead my excuse.

If your Excellency disapproves of confiscations at Lisbon (cruelties there are none,) how much more must you disapprove of the executions, arrests, and confiscations that took place for five years before. Your Excellency cannot have forgot how your own countrymen were treated, and the chastisement that followed.

I wish your Excellency had seen Lisbon three months ago and could see it now; joy and happiness have taken the place of fear and trembling,—the high honour of a French general would induce him to immediately sheath his sword.

By putting an end to the war an immediate stop would be put to murder, rapine, imprisonment, and confiscation. So desirous is every man here to see it finished, from the Emperor to the common soldier, that I am certain if the “sine-quâ-non” of Don Miguel quitting Portugal was admitted, every difficulty would immediately disappear.

I beg, Marshal, you will believe me to remain with the highest consideration

Your obedient humble servant,

VISCOUNT CAPE ST. VINCENT,
Admiral and Major-General.

COPY.

Paço de Lumiar,
21 *Septembre*, 1833.

AMIRAL,

Je viens de recevoir la seconde lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire. Je vous remercie de l'explication que vous avez bien voulu me donner relativement à quelques expressions contenues dans la première. J'en suis pleinement satisfait.

Le *sine qua non* dont vous parlez ne me semble pas pouvoir être accepté par le Roi; et par conséquent ne peut servir à rien en ce moment.

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

Mons. l'Amiral,

Avec une haute considération,

Votre très humble et obéissant serviteur,

(Signé) CTE. DE BOURMONT.

A Son Excellence

L'Amiral Cape St. Vincent.

ERRATA.

- Page 9, line 22, *for* there will not be *read* there would not be.
- 12, — 2, *for* and in this capacity *read* and in that capacity.
 - 12, — 4, *for* had not shewn *read* did not shew.
 - 16, — 18, *for* reforming *read* reform.
 - 16, — 22, *for* proves *read* proved.
 - 59, — 5, *for* arms *read* army.
 - 111, — 8, *for* out off *read* cut off.
 - 140, — 6, *for* army *read* enemy.
 - 154, — 10, *for* Henry *read* George.
 - 162, — 20, *for* Oxenheim *read* Oxenstiern.
 - 164, — 13, *for* prepared *read* proposed.
 - 171, last line, *for* Lieutenant Peak *read* Captain Peak.
 - 173, last line, *for* intention, and had made every preparation to destroy them, *read* intentions, and had made every preparation to frustrate them.
 - 175, line 17, *for* informing *read* informed.
 - 178, — 5, *for* upper *read* after.
 - 180, lines 2 & 3, tell *the* *the* expedition.
 - 193, last line, *for* in a compact line *read* in compact lines.
 - 197, line 11, *for* line-of-battle ships *read* line-of-battle ship.
 - 200, — 3 from the bottom, *for* Lt. Nivett *read* Lt. Knyvett.
 - 203, — 11, *for* Lieutenant *read* Lieutenants.
 - 208, — 16, *for* the commodore and rest *read* the commodore and the rest.
 - 217, — 4, *for* who brought me *read* which brought me.
 - 221, — 10, *for* who had gone up *read* which had gone up.
 - 222, — 12, omit "*which was*" the &c.
 - 224, — 21, *for* town of Oritao *read* tower of Oritao.
 - 242, — 15, *for* my own officers *read* my own office.
 - 259, — 16, *for* unaccountability *read* accountability.
 - 260, last line, *for* Hopner *read* Hoppner.
 - 263, line 4, *for* proposition *read* preparation.
 - 267, — 22, *for* corp *read* corps.

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